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ABSTRACT 
Research on autism, which is defined as a life-long developmental disability affecting social 
interaction, has focussed predominantly on how autistic individuals perceive and interact with 
others with less emphasis on the perspectives of their interactional partners. Yet autistic 
viewpoints have highlighted how other people are part of a two-way breakdown in interaction 
originating from differences between people rather than the deficit of any one individual, a 
phenomenon known as the double empathy problem. A gap therefore exists in the literature in 
terms of understanding how autistic sociality (i.e. the range of social opportunities possible 
for a given individual on the spectrum) is shaped by different interactional partners.  
This thesis examines the double empathy problem in three interactional contexts. Study 1 
examines relationships between autistic people and their family members through focussing 
on perspective-taking, the ability to impute mental states to others. In light of prior research 
where autistic abilities have been assessed using abstract scenarios, Study 1 implements a 
two-way measure of perspective-taking which considers both sides of 22 real-life 
relationships (n=44) consisting of autistic adults and their family members, to understand 
how autistic people are seen by familiar others as well as vice versa. It uses a mixed-methods 
approach, where members of each dyad were individually asked about 12 topics, providing 
quantitative scores and qualitative explanation of their rating of Self, their rating of their 
partner, and their predicted rating by their partner. Comparison of perspectives provided a 
means for detecting misunderstandings and their underlying rationale. The contribution of 
Study 1 is that it shows perspective-taking is two-sided: family members can be biased in 
underestimating the perspective-taking of their autistic relatives, while autistic adults are 
aware of being negatively viewed despite disagreeing with such views.  
Study 2 examines interactions between autistic adults (n=30) partaking in a naturally 
occurring activity of video-gaming at a charity. It is a qualitative study using participant 
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observation, with each conversational turn systematically rated in terms of coherence, affect 
and symmetry to identify the key features of neurodivergent intersubjectivity, the process 
through which autistic people build shared understanding in their own non-normative ways. 
The contribution of Study 2 is to identify two forms of neurodivergent intersubjectivity which 
enable shared understanding to be achieved, but which have traditionally been viewed as 
undesirable from a normative social viewpoint: a generous assumption of common ground 
that, when understood, lead to rapid rapport, and, when not understood, resulted in potentially 
disruptive utterances; and a low demand for coordination that ameliorated many challenges 
associated with disruptive turns.  
Study 3 examines interactions involving lay people (n=256) who believe they are interacting 
with an autistic partner through an online collaborative game, when in fact they are playing 
with an intelligent virtual agent (IVA) who behaves the same way for all participants. Its 
contribution is methodological as it develops a new application for simulating interactions in 
experimental research called Dyad3D. Study 3 uses Dyad3D to explore how disclosure of an 
autism diagnosis by the IVA affects social perception and social behaviour in comparison to a 
disclosure of dyslexia and a condition where there is no diagnostic disclosure.  Combined 
with a post-game questionnaire, Study 3 triangulates self-reported (quantitative rating scales 
and qualitative explanation) and behavioural measures (quantitative scores of actions within 
the game) to understand the interplay of positive and negative discrimination elicited through 
using the label of autism. It highlights that diagnostic disclosure of autism leads to significant 
positive bias in social perception when compared to a disclosure of dyslexia or a no 
disclosure condition; yet participants are not as helpful towards the autistic IVA as they think 
they are, indicating a potential bias in helping behaviour.  
The thesis takes an abductive methodological approach which integrates with a wider call for 
a more participatory model of research in the study of autism. Abduction is a form of 
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reasoning which involves the iterative development of a hypothesis that holds the best 
explanatory scope for the underlying phenomena observed. It is inherently aligned with a 
participatory model of research because abduction involves the ongoing exploration of ideas 
that may originate from multiple sources (i.e. interactions with autistic people as well as 
research outputs). Taking a more holistic approach to the development of knowledge with 
autistic people which recognises the legitimacy of different claims to knowledge is important, 
because prior research in the field has often failed to critically reflect on researcher-
participant positionality and the principals underlying the development of research agenda. 
For this reason, the thesis details the participatory activities which surround and interconnect 
with the development of the three empirical studies. 
Overall the thesis contributes to understanding autistic sociality as a dynamic, interactionally 
shaped process. It reasons that autistic people have unrealised social potential, both in terms 
of imagining other perspectives (Study 1) and coordinating with others (Study 2). However, 
such social potential may not be easily recognised by other non-autistic people who may be 
biased in their assumptions about autism (Study 1 and Study 3). Consequently, the evidence 
presented in this thesis helps to explain some of the processes that underscore the double 
empathy problems reported in literature, including poor mental health (because autistic 
people are aware that they are misunderstood by others, see Study 1), employment prospects 
(because autistic social potential is under-recognised by others, see Study 1 and 3), and 
quality of life (because neurotypical standards of communication are not compatible with 
neurodivergent forms of intersubjectivity, see Study 2). The thesis therefore makes 
suggestions for how we design enabling environments which are sensitive to the dynamic 
factors that can enable autistic sociality to flourish.   
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1) INTRODUCTION 
Background and motivation 
In 2012 I started being a carer for Cambell, a young autistic man with severe learning 
difficulties. Our main activity was walking across town together from his home to his 
learning centre, a 3-mile round trip involving dual carriageways, road crossings, bus stops, 
parked cars, shops, leafy pavements, and pedestrians with animals.  
On some days my presence was surplus to requirements. Cambell knows the route to the 
learning centre and he can navigate there without so much as a second glance towards me 
(trailing behind since he walks so fast). However, on other days this same journey became 
impossible without my help. Bus stops (where Cambell has to wait for all passengers to 
board), drivers in parked cars (where Cambell has to wait for the driver to leave) and dogs 
(whose unpredictable bark may be painful to Cambell’s hypersensitive hearing) are all 
obstacles that can cause great anxiety and completely disrupt the task of arriving at the 
learning centre.   
Cambell’s autism was not the variable that explained these different outcomes. It was the 
environment and the behaviours of others which changed on a day-to-day basis. At one 
extreme, Cambell was unhindered in pursuing an everyday activity independently, yet at the 
other extreme, this same activity becomes impossible to independently complete.  
I therefore wanted to understand the interface between autism and society because I believe a 
huge margin exists for optimising environments and situations to enhance the experiences, 
independence and quality of life for people on the spectrum. I wanted to explore the potential 
that could be unearthed when making environments more enabling for autistic people.   
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This line of thinking was not particularly radical for 2012. The social model of disability had 
long since paved the way for shifting the focus from individuals to the social and physical 
context which disables people (Oliver, 2013), while more specifically to autism the 
neurodiversity movement has over the last twenty years made great inroads into breaking up 
the normative framing of social behaviour by medical discourses (Runswick-Cole, 2014).  
However, a number of challenges lay ahead. The first was how to fund such an ambition. An 
analysis of 106 funding awards made between 2007 and 2011 by Pellicano et al. (2014) 
showed that 56% of resources were allocated to projects in the areas of biology, brain and 
cognition, whereas only 1% was spent on societal issues (Pellicano, Dinsmore, & Charman, 
2014). I therefore had limited funding opportunities for conducting a PhD where I could be 
truly exploratory and interdisciplinary in my psychological investigation. Every funding 
opportunity available was already rooted in a research project that had a priori theoretical 
assumptions and methodological approaches. Thankfully, the LSE had a small number of 
funded studentships and my proposal for research was successful in 2014 and funded by the 
Economic and Social Research Council.  
A second challenge was how to find the right intellectual support. I really wanted to be truly 
interdisciplinary and connect psychological empiricism with sociological insight. I wanted 
my research to bridge these dialogues because it is the psychological discourse which holds 
all the power in terms of shaping definitions and clinical practice. To this end the Department 
of Psychological and Behavioural Science at the LSE, which grew from sociological roots, 
was a perfect intellectual environment to nourish my ideas. I also found the ideal supervisor 
in Dr Alex Gillespie, whose expertise in perspective-taking and broad intellectual interests 
provided outstanding guidance for me to harness my ideas.  
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A third challenge was access. Most studies of autism are based on very small samples 
potentially only covering 15-20% of autistic people (Boucher, 2008), partly because by 
nature accessing autistic people is not easy. To do so often requires large research teams, with 
significant funding, working with equally large charities or institutions. To this end I am 
extremely fortunate that my PhD aligned with the establishment of the Matthew’s Hub 
charity for supporting young adults on the spectrum, based in Hull, East Yorkshire. They 
provided outstanding access, not just in support of my research projects, but also in terms of 
simply allowing me to be part of their community, to sit in and listen to members on a day-to-
day basis, and to help out where possible in their operations. This experience has enriched me 
immeasurably and provided the much-needed practical understanding to compliment my 
intellectual endeavours.  
These challenges are mentioned here because they are all significant obstacles facing any 
early-career researcher undertaking interdisciplinary research on autism. Exploring the 
question of how environments are enabling for people on the spectrum is not without its own 
enabling conditions.   
Researcher’s identity  
Chapter 4 provides further detail about positionality in my discussion of methodology. It is 
however necessary from the outset of the thesis to clarify a number of points. I do not have a 
diagnosis of autism and I do not believe myself to be autistic. I consider myself to be 
independently functional (despite the views of my partner!). I do identify as neurodivergent 
on account of my hyper-sensory auditory profile (which has profoundly shaped my life), my 
IQ, and consistent feedback throughout my life about the idiosyncrasy of my interests and 
behaviour – all of which indicate I am divergent from the majority norm. The social 
difficulties I have experienced in life are largely attributable to anxiety and mental health 
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fluctuations and do not reflect a consistent disposition. It is likely that my neurodivergence 
may have contributed to my empathy-link towards autistic people, although empathy is 
something I have never been short of for any living person, creature or sentimental object.  
Overview and aims 
This thesis aims to understand the processes behind the double empathy problem (Milton, 
2012), the two-way breakdown in understanding between autistic and non-autistic people 
which inhibits autistic sociality.  It examines interactions between autistic people (who have a 
neurological configuration which results in social impairment) and Others (i.e. the 
interactional context which has the power to limit or extend social opportunities) to identify 
inhibiting and enabling psychological features. The thesis does not seek to build an enabling 
environment in itself, but aims to contribute to understanding how we can optimise the 
potential for social interaction, independence and quality of life for people on the spectrum. 
Each of the three studies presented in this thesis therefore explores a different context of 
social life, making empirical contributions to our understanding of autistic social ability and 
the perception and behaviour of Others towards autistic people.   
A sociological theory which has been used to describe the two-way interactional nature of 
autistic sociality has been termed the “double empathy problem” (Milton, 2012, p. 884). This 
problem relates to a two-way breakdown in interpersonal relations when interactants hold 
different norms and expectations of each other on account of their differing dispositional 
outlooks (Milton, Heasman, & Sheppard, 2018). However, although a well-attested 
phenomenon from the perspective of autistic people (Boucher, 2012), there remains a paucity 
of psychological research about the perspectives of non-autistic people (Jaswal & Akhtar, 
2018). Therefore, this thesis also makes a theoretical contribution by examining how the 
double empathy problem extends across psychological features that shape interaction. Study 
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1 examines perspective-taking in relationships, Study 2 examines neurodivergent 
intersubjectivity in naturally occurring activities between autistic actors, and Study 3 
examines the cultural effect of the label of autism on social perception.  
A third contribution of the thesis is methodological in terms of developing tools for 
investigating neurodiversity in action. By nature, autism involves diversity, both in terms of 
the breadth of sensory profiles, skills, and abilities of people on the spectrum and also depth 
in terms of the complexities of challenges faced in everyday life and the way in which such 
challenges play out in co-regulated interactions with others. However, most tools for 
understanding autism are derived from cognitive science, which focusses on the processes of 
individuals, divorced from their ecological context. Consequently, there is a mismatch 
between the existing tools and methods used in research on autism which seek to isolate 
individual stable properties, and the unpredictable phenomena of neurodiversity that is played 
out in everyday life. Each of the three empirical studies presented in this thesis therefore 
present a new tool for unpacking the nature of this complexity. Study 1 adapts an existing 
methodology called the Interpersonal Perception Methodology for use in detecting 
misunderstandings in autistic-family member relationships. Study 2 develops a rating 
framework for analysing neurodivergent intersubjectivity longitudinally. Study 3 develops a 
new computer programme for simulating interactions and analysing psychological attribution 
and its interpersonal effects.  
Ontological framework of the thesis 
In investigating the intersection between autism and society, this thesis posits our ability to be 
social requires an appreciation of human sociality that extends beyond one’s genetic or 
neurological configuration alone. To understand an impairment of one’s ability to be social 
requires an examination of the contexts in which we are social which have the power to limit 
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or extend our opportunities for independence and quality of life (Ochs & Solomon, 2010). 
This thesis acknowledges that autism involves varying degrees of challenges, and that these 
challenges can prevent some autistic people from being independent in any context. It also 
recognises the valuable insights and contributions from fields of study including research on 
genetic, neurological or cognitive capacities which have meant that autism has the status of a 
disability and has the associated political and social power to be institutionally recognised, 
funded and researched. In accordance with the perspectives of autistic voices, which to date 
have been largely excluded from the process of research, it does believe that there is an 
unexplored margin for optimising environments, including its socio-cultural dynamics, to 
enable autistic ways of interacting.  
A research framework which is suited to the project of exploring double empathy contexts for 
autistic people, and one which encapsulates the fundamental principles of the neurodiversity 
paradigm, is dialogism. Dialogism is a theoretical orientation which views the individual as 
interdependent with “others’ experiences, actions, thoughts and utterances” (Linell, 2009, p. 
11). Meaning is understood to be contextually determined, temporal (composed of preceding 
elements at a specific point in time), and having addressivity (always designed for someone: 
Linell, 2009). A dialogic view is therefore based on an interactional epistemology which sees 
the subject who knows, and the environment in which objects occur, as “irreducible 
ontological, i.e. existential, units” (Markova, 2016, p. 127). Dialogism therefore rejects the 
idea that Self-Other relations are the sum of their respective parts, and instead views such 
relations as an interdependent whole.  
There are many advantages to taking a dialogical approach to understanding social 
relationships involving autistic adults. For example, an interdependent view highlights the 
role of the Other in the construction of Self. For Mead (1934) other-orientations are the 
foundation upon which self-consciousness can emerge because it is through the imagined 
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perspective of others that individuals are able to see themselves as social objects (Mead, 
1934). Self-Other dynamics may be observed psychologically in different ways. At a 
cognitive developmental level social communication with parents enables children to use 
private speech to guide their own activity and achieve higher cognitive processes (Vygotsky, 
1986); at a linguistic level the deictic nature of words such as “you” and “me” depends on 
one’s position within the field of social action because they involve perspectival reference to 
make sense (Gillespie, 2009); at a discursive level the relationship between self-other-object 
within a symbolic field of culture plays an integral role in the constitution of identity (Psaltis 
& Zapiti, 2014). The dialogical paradigm views social cognition and behaviour as the product 
of social relations as opposed to individual minds and as such aligns with the call for a more 
social and contextual approach to studies of autism. It is within the superordinate framework 
of dialogism that social theories such as the double empathy problem can be easily 
understood and find natural conceptual extensions.   
For example, the dialogical paradigm highlights many social psychological dynamics which 
may have a significant impact on autistic sociality and have yet to be fully addressed 
empirically. Modern society, for instance, is characterised by pluralities of thought 
(Moscovici & Duveen, 2000) about the Self (Aveling & Gillespie, 2008), about possible 
selves (Markus & Nurius, 1986), about generalised others (Mead, 1934), and about abstract 
others (Bakhtin, 1981) which take place within a multi-layered historical, cultural and 
institutional context (Aveling, Gillespie, & Cornish, 2014). Such multiple interdependencies, 
or dialogues, represent multiple possibilities for construing reality. In this respect the existing 
literature on autism is narrow in its conception of social understanding because it assumes 
that perspective-taking is a cognitive activity, between consistent individuals, divorced from 
such pluralistic social milieu. Dialogism on the other hand emphasises that “the Self interacts 
with representations of institutions, interprets norms and rules, selects specific meanings and 
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attempts to change them” as opposed to operating directly with an objective reality (Markova, 
2016, p. 130). This perspective identifies new avenues of research for understanding autism. 
For example, are asymmetries of perspective in autistic relations the result of a failure to 
perspective-take, or are they the result of unrealistic expectations of self/other imported by 
non-autistic sociocultural norms? Moreover, are there adaptive strategies for managing 
representations of Self/Other which are specific to relationships autistic people share with 
others?  
Dialogism is not without its own limitations. It remains a loosely defined paradigm which 
originates from a number of different research traditions. There are consequently overlapping 
ideas about what axioms should govern dialogical investigation, and what foci are of interest, 
including literary (Bakhtin, 1981), moral/ethical (Buber, 1923/2013), pragmatic (Mead, 
1934), symbolic (Goffman, 1969), communicative (Habermas, 1984), activity-based (Linell, 
2009), and Hegelian (Marková, 1982) criteria. Rather than a weakness, I would argue the 
cross-disciplinary appeal of dialogism is a strength which reflects its central importance to 
human life, interaction and meaning. Dialogism aligns with the goal of this thesis which aims 
to understand the inhibiting and enabling features of autistic sociality, through highlighting 
the inter-dependent role non-autistic people play in shaping social possibilities. This 
ontological position therefore shapes the thesis in terms of looking beyond dispositional 
characteristics of the autistic individual alone, to consider in more detail the people and 
contexts in which autistic sociality is lived and achieved.  
Thesis format 
The thesis has been prepared according to the guidelines for a thesis-by-publication outlined 
by the London School of Economics Department of Psychological and Behavioural Science. 
Chapters 1 – 4 (introduction, context, literature review, methodology) and Chapter 8 
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(discussion) are solely authored by me. Three academic journal articles (Chapters 5, 6 and 7) 
examine the phenomena of the double empathy problem in three overlapping areas pertinent 
to social life: the relationships autistic people share with others, the activities that autistic 
people naturally engage in, and cultural influence of the label of autism on non-autistic social 
perception and behaviour. For each article I acted as the principle investigator, designing the 
study, recruiting participants, collecting data, analysing findings and writing up the report for 
publication as lead author. Dr Alex Gillespie provided intellectual guidance and was the 
secondary author for each paper.  
At the time of submitting the thesis, Study 1 (Chapter 5) has been published in print in the 
journal Autism (1st August 2018). Study 2 (Chapter 6) has been published online in the 
journal Autism (3rd August 2018). Study 3 (Chapter 7) has been submitted to the journal 
Frontiers (28th September 2018).  
Investigative structure 
To investigate double empathy contexts requires an interdisciplinary approach which will be 
discussed in Chapters 2, 3 and 4. Using theories and terminology from philosophical, 
sociological and psychological literature presents the challenge of maintaining clarity of 
argument. For the benefit of the reader I present a conceptual map of this thesis, to include 
the theories, contexts and methodologies used (Figure 1 below). Many items and 
relationships within this structure will become clear as the reader progresses through the 
thesis. Hopefully this conceptual map will serve as a useful aid for foregrounding and 
orientating to discussions presented.  
Important to note is that the conceptual map should not be confused with a structural map of 
the thesis. The conceptual map illustrates a top-down view of how different ideas in the thesis 
inherit from each other. Consequently, it begins with super-ordinate ontological theories of 
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dialogism and social constructionism before moving to the more specific context of autism. 
The structure of this thesis however, takes as its starting point the phenomena autism and the 
two-way misunderstandings that exist between autistic and non-autistic people, since this was 
the origin of the research questions explored.  
The points on the map may be explained thus: (1) presents dialogism and social 
constructionism (discussed in Chapter 3), the ontological antecedents from which the social 
model of disability inherits key concepts. Although both dialogism and social 
constructionism overlap conceptually in terms of explaining how mind comes to know 
reality, they are differentiated here because dialogism specifically views minds as 
interdependent (Linell, 2009). This is relevant to understanding neurologically divergent 
interactions which this thesis explores, whereas social constructionism has a broader focus, 
explaining how some constructions create ontological meaning (e.g. social reality), whereas 
other constructions shape epistemology surrounding meaning (e.g. the idea of quarks, not 
quarks themselves (Hacking, 1999)). Social constructionism is suited to understanding 
phenomena such as how representations of autism circulate in culture and come to shape 
autistic identity (Hacking, 2009); (2) presents the subject-specific conceptual framing of the 
thesis around disability, and more specifically neurodiversity, which draw upon ideas of 
social constructionism and dialogism; (3) depicts the double empathy problem, a specific 
theory about two-way misunderstandings that this thesis empirically explores and which has 
grown from the neurodiversity paradigm; (4) identifies the central research question, and the 
three core issues it raises, which lead to three areas of social life to be explored, depicted in 
(5); (6) breaks down the central research question into three sub-questions which form the 
basis of the three empirical studies in the thesis; (7) highlights the psychological phenomena 
each study examined; (8) details the methodologies created for the purpose of exploring the 
sub-questions (methodological contribution); (9) details the main findings from each of the 
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three studies (empirical contribution), and (10) contains the main implications for the thesis 
as a whole (theoretical contribution). 
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FIGURE 1: CONCEPTUAL MAP OF THESIS 
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2) AUTISM AND THE DOUBLE EMPATHY PROBLEM 
What is Autism? 
Defining autism is a challenge because its meaning is contested. Autism is a term that is 
presently used in medical discourses to describe a lifelong developmental disability that 
affects communication and social interaction with others, and also one’s sensory experience 
of the world around them (American Psychiatric Association, 2013; World Health 
Organization, 1992). Autism is conceptualised as a spectrum condition covering a vast range 
of abilities (i.e. includes IQs below 70 and above 130) and challenges (i.e. organising one’s 
daily life to misinterpreting implicit meaning). Behavioural features include difficulties in 
emotional reciprocity, non-verbal communication, restrictive/repetitive behaviours, fixated 
interests and hyper-reactivity to sensory stimuli (American Psychiatric Association, 2013). In 
particular, research has associated autistic behaviours with cognitive difficulties in 
perspective-taking (i.e. the ability to infer mental states in others), executive functioning (i.e. 
difficulties in planning, inhibition, and flexible thinking) and weak central coherence (i.e. 
detailed-focussed processing). Autism prevalence rates are considered to be over 1 in every 
100 people (Baird et al., 2006), with rates reported to be increasing over time (Matson & 
Kozlowski, 2011). Over 700,000 people are estimated to be autistic in the UK (National 
Autistic Society, 2018). Boys are more commonly diagnosed than girls at a ratio of around 
5:1 (Taylor, Jick, & Maclaughlin, 2013), which may reflect a potential diagnostic bias 
towards detecting autism in boys as well as the reported ability for girls to camouflage their 
social difficulties better than boys (Dean, Harwood, & Kasari, 2017; Rynkiewicz et al., 
2016). Comparatively little is known about autism in older populations compared with 
extensive research on children (Barnhill, 2007; Pellicano, Dinsmore, & Charman, 2014b), 
however mental health and economic outcomes are extremely poor with adults experiencing 
huge difficulty in finding employment and transitioning to independent life (Baldwin, 
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Costley, & Warren, 2014; Crane, Adams, Harper, Welch, & Pellicano, 2018; Howlin, Goode, 
Hutton, & Rutter, 2004; NAS, 2017; Ohl et al., 2017).   
Rather strangely for a social impairment, diagnostic criteria omits social context in 
determining individual behaviour, functionality, and establishing accepted norms (Kapp, 
Gillespie-Lynch, Sherman, & Hutman, 2013). Indeed, debates about diagnostic criteria, the 
politics of diagnosis (Liptak et al., 2008; Turowetz, 2015) and the political history associated 
with autism research (Czech, 2018; B. Evans, 2013) contribute to a complicated and sensitive 
socio-political terrain for both autistic people and researchers to navigate in terms of identity. 
There has been a proliferation of terminology used to describe autism, in particular the terms 
neurodiversity, neurodivergence and neurotypical. Nick Walker, an autistic author and 
teacher on the course Critical Perspectives on Autism and Neurodiversity at the California 
Institute of Integral Studies, has produced a useful and freely accessible glossary which 
examines and clarifies this terminology (Walker, 2014). Neurodiversity, according to Walker, 
describes the diversity of human brains and minds, but as such is a trait possessed by a group 
and cannot be possessed by any one individual. An individual whose brain functions in a way 
that diverges from the predominant socio-cultural norm should be more appropriately 
described as neurodivergent (Walker, 2014). Likewise the neurodiversity movement 
specifically relates to the politics of seeking rights, equality, respect, and 
inclusion for neurodivergent people, and is different from the neurodiversity paradigm, which 
relates to the principles of variation in mind being natural, ideas of normality being socially 
constructed, and neurodiversity, like other diversities, being a source of promise and creative 
potential (Walker, 2014).  
Autism is thus more than purely a neurological configuration, the term autism has far 
reaching implications for identity and political rights which are a constituent part of the lived 
reality, and the social barriers, that autistic people navigate. The language used to describe 
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autism remains a key debate. Kenny et al. (2016) investigated what terms should be used to 
describe autism, the majority preference, from autistic perspectives, was for the term autistic 
people rather than person-first language person with autism; however this view differed from 
those of professionals who preferred person-first language and the term on the autism 
spectrum (Kenny et al., 2016). This highlights ongoing discussions about whether autism is a 
constituent part of people’s identity (Brosnan & Mills, 2016), or whether it is separate. There 
are also concerns that existing definitions of autism ignore phenomenological accounts 
provided by autistic people themselves. For example, well documented cognitive differences 
in perspective-taking and executive function between autistic and neurotypical people may be 
explained as a difference in how attentional resources are used, with a distinction between 
monotropism, having few interests which are highly aroused, and polytropism, having many 
interests which are less aroused (Murray, Lesser, & Lawson, 2005). There is also a growing 
argument that neurotypical assumptions about what counts as reciprocal behaviour are 
embedded within the starting assumptions of scientists themselves (Jaswal & Akhtar, 2018). 
Certainly, the existing frameworks for both diagnosis and for researching autism must be 
critically evaluated, and are discussed in greater detail below.  
Autism might be described as heterogeneous, in terms of the diverse people it covers, their 
unique experiences of the world, and the complex challenges faced in everyday life. This 
raises questions about how to conceptualise, define and communicate knowledge about 
autism. Autism is often described as a spectrum. A spectrum view has utility in terms of 
illustrating diversity, but is also conceptually problematic given the multi-dimensional factors 
associated with autism which cannot be represented by a linear scale (Fletcher-Watson, 
2017). The idea that autism is one variable results in descriptions such as high and low 
functioning autism, which oversimplifies nuanced behaviour into dichotomous categories of 
functionality. This is problematic because functioning is the outcome of the fit between the 
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individual and the environment (Beardon, 2017), thus it underestimates the explanatory scope 
of social reality in which our social competence is formed and in which social barriers to 
interactions are encountered (McGeer, 2004). Likewise the view that somehow all people are 
on the spectrum is also unhelpful (Beardon, 2017) as it ameliorates the difficulties that 
autistic people experience and reduces the extent to which society takes seriously their needs.  
Heterogeneity presents a challenge for diagnostic frameworks which, by nature, aim to 
establish rules which are consistently applied across a given population (Woodbury-Smith & 
Volkmar, 2009). Hans Asperger acknowledged that despite traits of autism being distinct, the 
individuals he had studied possessed strikingly varied personalities and interests (Asperger, 
1991). This heterogeneity has remained a consistent challenge for the internal validity of 
diagnoses, for example, an impairment in communication could mean (a) an absence of any 
communication, (b) communicating only needs, to (c) repetitive questioning and lengthy 
monologues (Wing, 1991). In the absence of discovering any clear biomarker for autism 
(Happé, Ronald, & Plomin, 2006), clinicians rely on a combination of standardised tests, 
interviews with caregivers and observation for diagnosis (Turowetz, 2015). Examples of 
different assessments include the ADOS (Lord et al., 2000), ADI-R (Le Couteur, Lord, & 
Rutter, 2006), and AAA (Baron-Cohen, Wheelwright, Robinson, & Woodbury-Smith, 2005). 
However diagnostic frameworks have been criticised for focussing too much on the 
behavioural aspects and not the impairment which underlies such behaviours (Cashin & 
Barker, 2009), resulting in high diagnostic inconsistency between assessments which measure 
and interpret social impairments in different ways (Leekam, Libby, Wing, Gould, & Gillberg, 
2000). Moreover, autism has high psychiatric comorbidity with other mental health problems, 
such as depression (Lugnegård, Hallerbäck, & Gillberg, 2011), bipolar disorder (Munesue et 
al., 2008) and anxiety (White, Oswald, Ollendick, & Scahill, 2009). Thus, the diagnostic 
28 
 
process of autism continues to struggle with definitions which are broad enough to include 
heterogeneity, and definitions narrow enough to ensure clinical consistency.   
When attempting to describe autism it is also useful to state what it is not. Autism is often 
contrasted with the term neurotypical, however neurotypicality specifically refers to 
dominant social standards of normal and should not be used synonymously with non-autistic 
(Walker, 2014). Likewise, neurodivergent includes autistic people but equally could include 
anyone that diverges from societal norms, e.g. people with a diagnosis of schizophrenia. 
Autism is also not something which can be acquired, like a disease, however the cultural 
impact of the MMR controversy continues to shape societal perceptions of autism (Jones & 
Harwood, 2009; Provencher, 2007).  
To summarise, the question of how to define autism encounters many of the ontological and 
discursive tensions that exist between different stakeholders involved in understanding 
autism, which the following sections will explore in more detail. Yet there are areas of 
commonality across different approaches to autism, and not all debates are as intractable as 
they might initially appear.  
Approaches to understanding autism 
The study of autism transcends research disciplines from neuroscience to sociology. Such 
discipline boundaries are characterised by different ontological assumptions which result in 
significant tensions when discussing how to support people on the spectrum. One polarity 
may be termed the positivist paradigm, characterised by research fields such as biomedicine, 
neuroscience, cognition and behavioural science, which broadly assume that phenomena have 
stable and knowable underlying causes which may be universally applied (Brown, 2003). The 
other polarity may be termed the social constructionist paradigm, and includes research 
fields of sociology, human geography, and societal psychology, and more specifically the 
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neurodiversity paradigm and the neurodiversity movement. Social constructionist approaches 
understand human meaning and behaviour as contextualised to the resources and 
circumstances in which people find themselves, and in the case of the neurodiversity 
paradigm, views autism as a difference rather than a deficit from the behavioural norm.  
Different commentaries about approaches to autism have variously characterised polarities in 
different ways, e.g. as a tension between cognitive and phenomenological perspectives 
(McGeer, 2004); as a tension between biomedical science and identity politics (Ortega, 2009; 
Parsloe, 2015); as a tension between pathological and emancipatory research (Walker, 2016); 
as a tension between deficit-models and sociologically-situated models (Milton, 2014); and as 
a tension between behavioural deficit and cognitive processing style (Happe, 1999). For 
example, the biomedical paradigm views autism as having a neurological genesis as a 
disorder in normal brain functioning. Like other developmental disorders it is often described 
as a condition separate from one’s identity, thus individuals may have autism rather than be 
autistic, and likewise their condition is something to be treated and potentially even cured as 
one might treat or cure a disease. In contrast the neurodiversity paradigm, originating from 
the perspective of autistic people themselves (Singer, 1999), sees autism as part of natural 
human variation in neurology, and should not be pathologised as a disease but rather seen as 
a constituent part of one’s identity. The associated neurodiversity movement therefore places 
an emphasis on better cultural understanding and acceptance of autism (Kapp et al., 2013), 
because society is poorly placed to meet the needs of autistic people, and in many cases can 
actually exacerbate the challenges that autistic people face (Milton, 2012).  
In discussing approaches to autism, it can be easy to unintentionally reinforce existing 
discourse boundaries by viewing such dualisms as purely rooted in ideological terms. For 
example, as will be discussed below, the medical model has significant limitations in its 
approach to understanding the lived reality of autism. While addressing these limitations 
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requires a fundamental reorientation of ontological assumptions, it should not exclude the 
possibility that many people in the medical field are already sociologically minded, or that 
future changes to remove the unnecessary stigmatisation of autism are unachievable from a 
medical viewpoint. Indeed, if future debate is to move towards a more unifying discourse 
about autism then discussions need to find a way to work across boundaries, as well as 
critically reflecting on the boundaries themselves (Runswick-Cole, 2014). For this reason, I 
think it is important to critically examine the factors that enable such positions to become 
embedded within research disciplines, resulting in theoretical and methodological decisions 
which serve to reinforce ontological tensions.  
For example, a point of connect between positivist and social constructionist paradigms is the 
concept of neurodiversity. Both paradigms recognise that any population will be distributed 
over a range for a given property, such as one’s ability to be social. Where the paradigms 
differ is the question of how that neurodiversity should be understood, addressed, and 
communicated. Within the positivist paradigm, biomedically oriented disciplines understands 
diversity as resulting from an underlying mechanism (e.g. neurological configuration), and 
investigating it involves stripping away complexity (e.g. focusing on specific brain regions / 
specific cognitive domains) in order to isolate variables (e.g. Theory of Mind / mirror 
neurons). Such variables form the basis for interventions which seek to reduce and eliminate 
individual divergence (Kapp et al., 2013), both improving weaknesses (e.g. controlling 
problematic behaviour: Lang, Regester, Lauderdale, Ashbaugh, & Haring, 2010) and 
harnessing strengths (e.g. mapping and potentially transferring savant abilities: Remington, 
2017; Remington & Fairnie, 2017). In terms of communicating knowledge about diversity, 
the main audience for the positivist paradigms are often other researchers and clinical 
practitioners. Within the social-constructionist paradigm, the neurodiversity movement 
recognises diversity as something to be embraced (Runswick-Cole, 2014). It argues, from a 
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social model perspective on disability, that many of the impairments people with disabilities 
experience result from societal barriers rather than their individual difference (Oliver, 1983, 
2013), and thus such barriers should be removed through political activism. The audience for 
communicating the neurodiversity movement and research paradigm is potentially broad as it 
is communicated through a variety of media channels including blogs, as well as sociological 
academic journals.  
These different approaches to neurodiversity have resulted in representations of each other 
that prevent cross-discipline dialogue. The biomedical view broadly claims that the 
neurodiversity paradigm is anti-cure (Ortega, 2009; Runswick-Cole, 2014), and that the more 
complex needs of those on the spectrum, particularly those who lack the communication 
resources, are not being adequately represented in neurodiverse debates (Jaarsma & Welin, 
2012). On the other side of the debate, the neurodiversity paradigm claims that the 
biomedical view is unethical in its aims and values of labelling deficient bodies in need of 
cure (Smukler, 2005), and is disconnected from autistic interests (Pellicano et al., 2014b), 
largely excluding autistic voices from research (Bogdashina, 2005; Milton, 2014).  
Recent years have seen a strong push towards a participatory model of research in order to 
bridge these differences and to produce higher quality and more ecologically valid research 
(Jivraj, Sacrey, Newton, Nicholas, & Zwaigenbaum, 2014). A participatory model is one in 
which the voices of autistic people play a central role in influencing and co-creating the 
research process, from setting research agenda to conducting research, to dissemination and 
engagement of research findings. Research on the perspectives of autistic people, family 
members, practitioners and researchers has revealed differing views about the extent to which 
research is inclusive of the voices of different stakeholders (Pellicano, Dinsmore, & 
Charman, 2014a). Key themes uncovered from investigating non-researcher views relate to 
scepticism about the motivation for invitations to participate in research and frustration with a 
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failure of researchers to make their findings accessible and to transform their research into 
something of tangible benefit to stakeholders (Fletcher-Watson, Larsen, & Salomone, 2017; 
Pellicano et al., 2014a). Thus, initiatives such as the Participatory Autism Research 
Collective (PARC, 2018b) and #Aut2Engage (CRAE, 2018) aim to establish a cross-
discipline dialogue between autistic voices, with the important emphasis that agenda for 
research are autistic-led. Autistica, a UK based charity that funds research on autism, has also 
established a specific grant to support autistic researchers.  
The participatory model, and its role in overcoming many of the limitations of existing 
approaches to autism will be further discussed in Chapter 4 below. However, the contrasting 
views of different stakeholders highlighted above reflect an overarching concern with the 
existing positivist approach used to understand and create knowledge about autism, which is 
relevant to contextualising the double empathy problem. The following section therefore 
critically reflects on the existing limitations associated with the way knowledge about autism 
has been produced.  
Existing limitations associated with the way knowledge about autism is produced 
A central challenge of the existing positivist approach to autism is understanding difference 
from societal norms as a deficit in functioning. This is known as the deficit model and is the 
main discourse through which researchers, professionals and clinicians have understood 
autism-related conditions (Robertson, 2010). The deficit model portrays autism as an 
illness/disease which ostensibly requires fixing (Smukler, 2005), while similarly portraying 
non-autistic people as neurologically and psychologically ideal (Robertson, 2010). 
Methodologically this is grounded in comparative research designs matching autistic 
participants with non-autistic individuals via IQ scores, gender and age. However, 
comparative designs lead easily towards pathologisation because they are oriented to 
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measuring deficits (in the form of relative deviations from the norm) at a group level, and not 
identifying strengths in social ability at an individual level. Consequently the deficit model 
results in a very arbitrary view as to what constitutes functional human cognition (Fenton & 
Krahn, 2007), and has been critiqued in other contexts as resulting in institutionalised forms 
of normativity which dehumanise bodies from their identity (Foucault, 1976).  Cross-cultural 
psychology highlights how social interaction is normatively framed by cultural expectations 
which differ between cultures (Gillespie, Kadianaki, & O’Sullivan-Lago, 2012) and while 
many autistic people have extremely challenging behaviour, using a purely deficit lens risks 
overlooking the potential that many autistic people have for social interaction in light of their 
more obvious deficits (to the perspective of the neurotypical observer). To understand what 
makes environments enabling for autistic people one must take a broader approach to social 
interaction than that afforded by the deficit model.  
The biomedical approach to autism, which has traditionally used a deficit model approach, 
has been critiqued for lacking reflexivity concerning how knowledge produced about autism 
affects the social construction of autism, circulating in our culture and influencing the way 
autistic people see themselves (Bagatell, 2007; McGeer, 2009). Additionally, it also affects 
how others interact with people on the spectrum (Hacking, 1999, 2009) because autism has 
been subject to various misrepresentations (McGeer, 2009; Smukler, 2005) and controversies 
(Jones & Harwood, 2009). As Study 1 of this thesis will show (Chapter 5), representations of 
autism produced from science, such as an impoverished ability to mentalise other minds, can 
adversely affect the way in which non-autistic interlocutors interpret and support interactions 
with autistic partners. Moreover, stigmatisation of autism can obscure the moments of social 
potential autistic people may deploy, albeit infrequently. Thus, a deficit model is not only 
methodologically partial at best, it is also socially pathologising at worst.  
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There are also concerns regarding the power relations inherent to the biomedical approach to 
autism. As Foucault explored in The Birth of the Clinic, medical perspectives (particularly 
Western medical science) have historically been reified over alternative forms of knowledge, 
and have become institutionally ingrained across many facets of society, from clinical 
practice, education, policy, the media, and law. What Foucault’s work reveals is the political 
nature of who’s knowledge and which methods of knowledge production are prioritised in 
considering the medicalised body, which in turn leads to the (re)production of specific 
behavioural and physiological norms from which certain bodies can be categorised as being 
divergent (Foucault, 1976). Thus a power asymmetry exists between the medical experts who 
define knowledge about autism, and the voices of autistic people themselves who have great 
difficulty penetrating such discussions and are effectively excluded from the process of 
producing knowledge about autism (Milton, 2014).  
The biomedical aim of prevention and control of autism has little to offer the millions of 
autistic people existing (both diagnosed and undiagnosed) in older populations. Since the 
diagnostic category of autism has only been in clinical use since the late 70’s, many people of 
older generations have never received a diagnosis (James, Mukaetova-Ladinska, Reichelt, 
Briel, & Scully, 2006). Progress in policy and practice reflects progress in science (Verhoeff, 
2015), and research on older populations and societal issues accounts for only 1% of the 
funding landscape for research on autism leading to the feeling among autistic people that 
there exists a significant validity gap between science and the their everyday needs (Pellicano 
et al., 2014b). The current dearth of research on older populations contributes to poor public 
understanding of autism, and perhaps explains why autistic adults have poor employment 
prospects (Redman et al. 2009) and are more likely to be unemployed (without a job), 
underemployed (in a job which fails to utilise their skills), and misemployed (in a job which 
is wholly unsuitable to their strengths) than the overall population (Baldwin, Costley, & 
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Warren, 2014).  They are also highly likely to remain cohabiting with parents long into 
adulthood (Howlin et al., 2004). Thus the healthcare system and society in general are poorly 
placed to meet the psychological and social needs of autistic adults (Piven & Rabins, 2011). 
This thesis therefore addresses this validity gap by choosing to focus on understanding autism 
through examining autistic adolescents and adults.  
The difficulty in treating autism as a purely biological phenomenon and ignoring its presence 
as a social construction is further complicated by the ever-shifting political context in which 
knowledge on autism has been framed. Autism has undergone many transformations from its 
original conceptualisation by Eugen Bleuler (Bleuler, 1950/1911) of an individual that 
fantasises excessively to someone who does not have any fantasising ability at all (Evans, 
2013). The transformations in meaning in the UK were in large part brought about by the 
Mental Health Act 1959 which abolished the legal requirement for mentally “defective and 
insane” individuals to be institutionalised, leading to a need to distinguish the 
psychopathology of the new children being integrated into the majority population (Evans, 
2013). This led to a huge rise in epidemiological studies and the employment of educational 
psychologists, which shaped discussion of autism around issues of statistical deviance from 
the norm. Consequently, the way autism has been documented over time has been largely 
shaped by the policy and diagnostic instruments used to measure it, and the societal and 
political needs of the local councils that have to document their population for central 
government (Evans, 2013). This ever-changing landscape continues: recently in 2013, 
Asperger’s syndrome, autism, childhood disintegrative disorder and pervasive developmental 
disorder not otherwise specified (PDD-NOS), were subsumed into one category of autism in 
the DSM-V.  
Access to participants is also a challenge many researchers face. Given the nature of social 
impairment involved with autism, it can be hard to connect with potential participants and 
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build the necessary trust required to take part in research. Those that do participate in 
research therefore represent the proportion of autistic people that are accessible and willing to 
take part in research, which reflects a potential sampling bias. Arguably there are much larger 
sections of the autism population that remain unstudied because of their unwillingness to 
participate. Psychology already faces a replication crisis (Fanelli, 2009), however the 
sampling difficulties studies of autism specifically face, and the inherent heterogeneity of 
autism which by nature requires larger sample sizes, mean that the process of replication 
itself is almost impossible.   
Consequently there is a growing argument that more exploratory studies of autism are 
required which make use of naturalistic data in order to reconcile the tension which exists 
between biomedical and cultural perspectives on autism (Verhoeff, 2015). Contextual and 
naturalistic data can reveal more about how the enabling and disabling aspects that can result 
from situational factors, improving the efficacy of diagnostic assessments, while similarly 
including the voices of autistic people in constructing future understanding about their 
neurodivergence. It can also reveal more about the experiences of people interacting with 
autistic adults, who co-determine interactional outcomes.  Yet there remains a considerable 
methodological gap in terms of measuring diversity, and an empirical gap for understanding 
how diversity plays out in everyday contexts. This thesis seeks to address these gaps by 
developing new tools for measuring and understanding neurodiversity and the bi-directional 
nature of cross-neurological interactions. 
The double empathy problem 
The different approaches to autism, limitations with the existing research framework, and 
infrastructural issues associated with diagnosis and policy, result in a complicated socio-
political terrain for different stakeholders (e.g. autistic people, family members, practitioners, 
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and researchers) to manage. Building shared understanding requires experiential overlap 
(Chapter 5) which is a challenge when differences in perspective cut across intellectual, 
social and political contexts. A theory which helps to explain the gap in mutual understanding 
that can result in social impairment that autistic people experience is known as the double 
empathy problem, and although primarily used to depict interpersonal relations, it can also be 
used to describe structural gaps in understanding between institutions and people (e.g. 
psychological science and autistic people) (Milton et al., 2018).  
The double empathy problem is a term created by autistic scholar Milton which describes a 
“disjuncture in reciprocity between two differently disposed social actors” (Milton, 2012, p. 
884). This disjuncture is fundamentally two-way, because it originates from the dispositional 
difference between social actors (e.g. autistic and non-autistic), leading to different norms 
and expectations of each other that can make mutual understanding difficult (Heasman, 
2017a). Thus, the term “double” indicates that it is a problem distributed across social actors 
rather than attributable to any one individual. Yet despite this, in autistic-to-neurotypical 
interactions, “the disjuncture may be more severe for the non-autistic disposition as it is 
experienced as unusual, while for the ‘autistic person’ it is a common experience.” (Milton, 
2012, p. 885). 
The value of the double empathy perspective is that it avoids importing biases about social 
normativity into the interpretation of a lack in mutual understanding. The disjuncture is 
relational, resulting from a difference between actors, rather than originating from the deficit 
in social skill of any one individual. Moreover, the double empathy framework is a dynamic 
theory, because in principal the double empathy problem can have a “looping effect” 
(Hacking, 1996) whereby the misunderstanding which originated from a disjuncture in 
dispositions can feed back into the interpersonal dynamic and lead to further gaps in mutual 
understanding. Thus “as interactions unfold, an initial gap in mutual understanding due to a 
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dispositional difference can readily become a critical gap in mutual understanding which 
potentially terminates the interaction” (Milton et al., 2018, p. 1). In this respect the double 
empathy problem draws insight from a number of sociological and social psychological 
theories which understand the inter-dependency of human interaction including Mead (1934), 
Goffman (1958), Garfinkel (1964), Schegloff (1992) and Hacking (1999, 2009). 
Applications of the double empathy problem are numerous, helping to shape insights about 
mental health, employment, relationships, the justice system and research itself (Milton et al., 
2018). However, since it is a relatively new sociological theory there remains a paucity of 
empirical work on the double empathy problem. The main empirical and methodological 
contribution of this thesis is to explore different social contexts of the double empathy 
problem to understand the enabling and disabling features of autistic sociality, and to develop 
new tools that other researchers can use.  
Research questions raised by the double empathy problem 
In one respect the double empathy problem is not a new one. Social psychologists have for 
many years probed the question of why group differences lead to conflict (Allport, 1979; 
Sherif, Harvey, White, Hood, & Sherif, 1961; Tajfel & Turner, 1986). In a classic study using 
a minimal group paradigm, Sherif illustrated how introducing competition and rewards 
between two randomly allocated groups of young boys was sufficient to create hostility 
towards the outgroup (Sherif et al., 1961). Thus, it does not take much for differences in 
experience to result in a lack of understanding. Beyond the study of psychology, our history 
and news is populated with endless examples of a lack of empathy when humans differ, e.g. 
religion, class, ethnicity, politics, and gender are just some of the grounds upon which 
differences may be fiercely contested. So what is it about the double empathy problem that is 
particular to understanding autism? It could be argued that a difference in neurology is just 
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another type of difference, similar to other contexts which have been extensively researched 
in social psychology. In this respect, could we not just use theories such as the Contact 
Hypothesis (Allport, 1979) to ameliorate differences between autistic and non-autistic 
people?  
There are at least three features that may help to explain what makes the double empathy 
problem in autism distinct and in need of further psychological investigation. The first reason 
is that, unlike other double empathy contexts, there is a significant barrier in terms of non-
autistic people imagining what autistic perspectives entail because doing so requires 
addressing one’s own taken-for-granted sensory configuration. The relationship between our 
senses and the way they are cognitively processed is established early in cognitive 
development (Johnson & Hannon, 2015). There are many examples in popular culture of the 
extent to which people struggle to understand other’s sensory experience of the world. Take 
for instance debates about colour constancy, the subjective ability of humans to perceive the 
colour of objects constantly across different illumination settings (Logvinenko, Funt, Mirzaei, 
& Tokunaga, 2015). Visual scenes typically comprise a number of different wavelengths, 
both from a given object of focus (e.g. an apple) and the surrounding illumination (e.g. 
midday sun or dusk). Photoreceptors in the eye may thus detect a range of wavelengths and it 
is left to the visual system to subtract an approximate composition of illumination to maintain 
constant perception of the coloured object in question (McCann, 2005). Usually this results in 
insignificant differences in the colour perception of the object, however sometimes the 
perceived differences can be large, such as the colour of the dress identified in Figure 2, 
which remains the same under the shaded yellow and blue light.  
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FIGURE 2: “THE DRESS”. SAME COLOURS UNDER YELLOW AND BLUE BOXES 
 
In 2015, a viral image of a dress similar to the one depicted above (in that it could be 
perceived either as black and blue or white and gold), produced intense public reaction with 
people unable to accept why others could perceive the colours differently from themselves 
(Winkler, Spillmann, Werner, & Webster, 2015). The debate reflects how people can have 
different paradigms of thought (Marková, 1982) and in particular the ongoing difficulty 
people have in imagining other people’s sensory configurations, even when they have a 
plausible scientific explanation as to how such differences are possible. Thus, sensory 
differences represent a fundamental disjuncture within the double empathy problem which is 
unique to autistic-neurotypical interactions.  
This raises an important question when considering autistic to non-autistic relations. With 
different sensory experiences, and with markedly different social histories from which to 
draw upon, how can each party adequately interpret and predict what the other is thinking? 
Perspective-taking, the ability to imagine other people’s point of view, is considered a vital 
part of social life (Tager-Flusberg, 2007), yet although autistic difficulty in imagining 
neurotypical perspectives are well-documented, it is also true that neurotypical people 
struggle to understand autistic perspectives (Brewer et al., 2016; Sheppard, Pillai, Wong, 
Ropar, & Mitchell, 2016). Neurotypical people do not have the experiential resources from 
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which to fully understand and empathise with autistic ways of sense-making. Perspective-
taking is thus an under-researched two-sided issue and addressing a critical feature of the 
double empathy problem involves understanding more about the two-sided nature of 
perspective-taking between autistic and non-autistic people.  A provisional research question 
is therefore:  
Sub question 1a: What can a two-sided approach to perspective-taking between 
autistic and non-autistic people reveal about our understanding of the double empathy 
problem?   
This question is developed further in the literature review in Chapter 3 which focuses on 
perspective-taking research. It highlights how there is a methodological precedent for 
unidirectional approaches; that is, approaches which focus solely on characterising social 
deficits in the autistic individual. Consequently sub-question 1 has an associated 
methodological component: 
Sub-question 1b: What is the methodological viability of exploring bi-directional 
approaches within autistic/non-autistic relationships? 
Chapter 4 will address the methodological aspects of sub-question 1b, and explain the 
rationale for using and updating Laing et al.’s (1966) Interpersonal Perception Method. 
Together, these two questions form the basis of Study 1 (Chapter 5) which explores 22 
relationships involving young autistic adults and their family members. Through exploring 
both sides of such social relations, it shows autistic adults were fairly accurate at predicting 
how they would be rated by their family members, but that family members often under-
estimated such abilities. Chapter 8 discusses the implications of these findings for 
understanding the double empathy problem.  
42 
 
A second challenge which is unique to the double empathy problem is that in order to 
understand its limiting effects on autistic sociality, we need to have some appreciation of 
what potential for social interaction that neurodivergence involves. However, most studies of 
autism have either focussed on the individual, divorced from meaningful social context, or 
they have explored autistic interactions in a cross-neurological situation, where the autistic 
individual is constantly encouraged to adhere to neurotypical norms of social relating (e.g. 
Kremer-Sadlik, 2004; Ochs & Solomon, 2004). We therefore know little about 
neurodivergent intersubjectivity outside of conventionlised forms of social interaction, and by 
extension we are unaware of the degree to which the double empathy problem is limiting 
autistic sociality.  
Reports from autistic authors suggest that much autistic potential remains undiscovered, with 
autistic people “demonstrating significant introspection, imagination and awareness of minds 
outside of our own” (Yergeau & Huebner, 2017, p. 276). Understanding social potential of 
autistic people can shed light on how the double empathy problem restricts such potential 
being realised in cross-neurological settings. One way in which this can be achieved is 
through investigating interactions between autistic people to understand what features of 
neurodivergent communication exist when neurotypical norms are removed. Autistic authors 
have also long since reiterated the point that they feel it is easier to socially connect with 
other autistic people than it is neurotypical people (Nicholas Chown, 2014; Dekker, 1999). 
This frames the following sub-question: 
Sub-question 2a: What features of neurodivergent interaction are evident when 
neurotypical norms are not present?  
Chapter 3 examines literature related to bi-directional social studies of autistic relationships, 
highlighting the potential danger that neurotypical assumptions are not only embedded in the 
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social context, but also the research context which interprets autistic behaviour (Ridout, 
2017). Thus sub-question 2 also gains an additional methodological component: 
Sub-question 2b: Can viable methods be developed for understanding autistic 
interactions on their own terms? 
Chapter 4 explores the methodological challenges of this question further and discusses the 
abductive process through which studying video-gaming between autistic participants 
emerged as an idea. Sub-question 2 thus forms the basis of Study 2 (Chapter 6) which 
examines the distinctive features of shared understanding in neurodivergent interactions. The 
study finds that although often fragmented, autistic-to-autistic interactions demonstrate very 
intense pockets of tight coordination, achieved through complimentary features of generously 
assuming common ground and having a low demand for tight social coordination. The impact 
in terms of understanding more about the double empathy problem is discussed further in 
Chapter 8.  
A third challenge that is specific to the double empathy problem is the extent to which culture 
informs expectations of autism for both autistic and non-autistic people. In the absence of 
available information, people use representations from culture to create default expectations 
about the behaviour and thinking of others (Schutz, 1932). The social construction of autism 
(i.e. the label of autism and the meaning it is given through representations in culture) is 
therefore an important focus of critical analysis because it can “loop” back into interpersonal 
relationships, altering identity and behaviour (Hacking, 1996; McGeer, 2004).   
However, studying the social construction of autism gains an even greater impetus when one 
considers the socio-political context of who shapes the narrative of autism in popular culture. 
Certainly, autistic voices have been largely excluded from the research process (Milton, 
2014), which has contributed to a pathologising discourse that “privileges neurotypical 
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minds” while undermining and delegitimizing “autistic concepts of identity and community” 
(Yergeau & Huebner, 2017, p. 274). In popular culture too there are many examples of the 
stigmatising representations of autism being a burden (Huws & Jones, 2011), an unloved 
condition (Jones & Harwood, 2009), and as people “occupying a separate world” (Brownlow 
& O’Dell, 2009). In addition, controversies such as the MMR debate and the refrigerator 
theory of autism (i.e. emotionally cold mothering causes autism: Evans, 2013) have greatly 
increased stigma associated with the label. It is therefore of little surprise that such 
representations should impact interpersonal dynamics between autistic people and others. A 
recent study which examined autistic perspectives on the stereotypes used to describe autism 
revealed common perceptions that autistic people are perceived as “weird” and that negative 
stereotypes result in bullying and exclusion (Treweek, Wood, Martin, & Freeth, 2018). This 
therefore leads to the following Sub-question 3: 
Sub-question 3a: How does the social construction of autism affect non-autistic 
interactions with autistic people?  
Chapter 3 examines literature related to the social construction of autism and the resources 
people use to make sense of the label of autism. The literature is varied, highlighting both 
positive and negative consequences of disclosing a diagnosis. Indeed, the relationship 
between attitudes and behaviour is rarely linear (Glasman & Albarracín, 2006), thus it is 
important to understand the dynamic between self-reported perceptions of behaviour and 
one’s actual behaviour. While there have been many studies examining non-autistic 
perceptions of autistic people (e.g. Chambres et al., 2008), analysing how this plays out 
behaviourally presents more of a challenge because interactions are difficult to replicate, 
especially if one wishes to compare the effects of a label with a control group that has no 
label. Consequently, sub-question 3 was further developed to ask: 
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Sub-question 3b: Can a viable method be developed to explore: (i) the relationship 
between self-reported perception and actual behaviour within a simulated interaction, 
and (ii) the differences between groups where the identity of the online agent 
(autistic/non-autistic) is altered?  
These questions resulted in the development of new research software called Dyad3D, which 
served as the basis for Study 3 (Chapter 7). Chapter 4 details the iterative development of this 
tool for the purposes of understanding the effects of the label of autism. Chapter 7 presents 
findings from Study 3 which show how the label of autism resulted in significantly higher 
perceptions of utility by participants compared with a control group where no diagnostic 
information was disclosed. Moreover, participants also felt that they were more helpful 
towards autistic collaborators, however this did not significantly predict whether participants 
actually were more helpful in the game itself. Thus, the findings both show positive 
discrimination, and a potential mistaken belief about how helpful participants actually were 
which could explain why autistic people might feel negatively discriminated against. Chapter 
8 discusses how this informs our understanding of the effects of the label of autism on non-
autistic attitudes and behaviour.  
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3) LITERATURE REVIEW 
Theories about social impairment in autism 
This chapter examines existing literature related to understanding the nature of social 
impairment that people on the autism spectrum experience. This body of research is broad, so 
for the purposes of understanding the double empathy problem it is divided into three sub-
sections. The first section deals with what are termed unidirectional approaches. These are 
approaches which attempt to understand social impairment through only looking at the 
individual social competence of autistic people. From initial research on autism by Kanner 
(1943) and Asperger (Wing, 1981), this has been the traditional approach used by 
researchers. The review will focus specifically on perspective-taking, since this reflects a key 
social feature identified in the section on double empathy above, and, will evaluate the 
strengths and weaknesses of classic studies to understand how the present thesis should tackle 
such methodological challenges in Study 1.  
The second section explores what are termed bidirectional approaches. These are approaches 
which consider the two-way interdependence between autistic people and non-autistic people, 
through studying the psychology of non-autistic attitudes and behaviour towards autistic 
people, or through studying interactions between autistic and non-autistic people. This body 
of literature relates to the second challenge regarding the double empathy problem, which is 
how we understand the social potential of autistic people in optimised settings. Again, the 
strength and limitations of these studies will feed into refining the research question for Study 
2. 
The third section will address what is termed the social constructions of autism, that is 
literature which explores the wider social-cultural context through which people make sense 
of the term autism. This relates to the third double empathy social feature identified in 
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Chapter 2 regarding the processes underscoring the way in which non-autistic people extend 
social opportunities towards autistic people. With a focus on the label of autism, this 
literature will help to refine the research question for Study 3.  
Thus, each of the literatures reviewed will connect with the three features of the double 
empathy problem outlined in Chapter 2, and will refine the research sub-questions further for 
each of the three empirical studies in the following chapters.  
Unidirectional approaches 
In the preceding section it was discussed how a major feature of the double empathy problem 
is the difficulty people have in imagining other people’s perspectives. The question of 
perspective-taking, in the form of Theory of Mind research (ToM), represents the most well-
documented approach to researching social impairment in autism. ToM is the ability to 
impute mental states to oneself and others (Premack & Woodruff, 1978) and has often been 
cited as fundamental to navigating daily social life (Carruthers, 2009; Froese, Stanghellini, & 
Bertelli, 2013; Tager-Flusberg, 2007). Through inferring, predicting and explaining the 
intentions of others, humans exercise a uniquely social psychological ability to recognise, 
understand, and share knowledge about divergent perspectives (Tomasello et al., 2005). 
However, ToM research has traditionally focussed only on the individual with autism and 
characterising their perceived deficits in social functioning from the norm, with the question 
of who or what autistic people are interacting with rarely problematised (See Chapter 2). The 
development of the unidirectional approach arguably has a methodological basis which is 
why it is important to understand its development.  
Early assessments of ToM in autism explored false-belief attributions. Wimmer and Perner 
(1983) showed that neurotypical children develop false-belief attribution at specific 
developmental stages between years six to nine. Adapting Wimmer and Perner’s design, 
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Baron-Cohen et al. (1985) presented participants with two characters, Sally and Anne, and 
asked where Sally will look for her marble (which had been moved by Anne while Sally was 
temporarily absent from the room) (Baron-Cohen, 1985). The task examined first order 
theory of mind (knowing that Sally may have a mistaken belief about the location of the 
marble), and second order theory of mind (knowing the content of Sally’s mistaken belief, in 
this case where she will look for the marble). Children with autism performed significantly 
worse than neurotypical children and children with Down’s syndrome, leading Baron-Cohen 
et al. to conclude that autism involved a specific developmental delay in the acquisition of 
ToM skills (Baron-Cohen, 1985). However, while children with autism were significantly 
impaired in performance of the Sally-Anne test, the test proved less conclusive for people 
with a diagnosis of Asperger’s syndrome, who could successfully execute second order ToM 
skills (Bowler, 1992). This result raised questions about the validity of the Sally-Anne task, 
which uses abstract targets (e.g. dolls not humans) and is decontextualized to real social 
situations (e.g. the participants share no prior history with either Sally or Anne).   
The response to such challenges was methodological, not theoretical, as researchers aimed to 
build tests with greater discriminatory power and reflected much less on the unidirectional 
assumptions of ToM itself. To increase methodological complexity researchers aimed to 
integrate more contextual information into the presentation of perspective-taking stimuli in an 
effort to probe “a more sophisticated level of social cognition” (Baron-Cohen, 1989, p. 294). 
Happé’s (1994) ‘Strange stories task’ (SST) presented participants with a series of vignettes 
about everyday situations where people say things they do not literally mean. Vignettes 
included 12 scenario types (lie, white lie, joke, pretend, misunderstanding, persuade, 
appearance/reality, figure of speech, sarcasm, forget, double bluff and contrary emotions), as 
well as six control stories that did not involve inferring mental states but instead depicted 
unforeseen mechanical situations (Happé, 1994, p. 133). Happé recorded the justification 
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given by participants to the “why was X said?” question as either correct/incorrect, and also 
whether a mental or physical reason was given. While all participants found the physical 
control stories easy, the participants with autism had a much higher tendency to provide 
incorrect mental states as a justification (mean = 4.6 answers) than the controls (mean = 1.9), 
or mentally handicapped participants (mean = 0.7). This finding supported the specific 
developmental delay hypothesis, the idea that autistic symptoms stem from a specific delay in 
ToM cognition.  
The Strange Stories Task (and subsequent variations, e.g. Simon Baron-Cohen et al., 1999; 
Kaland & Møller‐Nielsen, 2002) therefore highlighted the important role of context in 
perspective-taking. By diversifying the range of mental state attributions to be made across 
scenarios involving lying, joking etc., the test was able to discriminate more effectively 
between the three groups of autistic subjects with varying ToM ability, providing a more 
continuous measurement of their ToM than the false-belief tasks alone (Happé, 1994, p. 142). 
However, because these methods were still rooted in a unidirectional application, many facets 
of how perspective-taking unfolds in everyday life were not being accounted for in the 
literature. For example, although more ecologically valid, the Strange Stories Task, remains 
abstract because the mentalising of others’ mental states does not depend on the target in 
question. There is no perceiver-target relationship from which participants can infer an 
understanding of others; instead they must interpret abstract characters and situations which 
may potentially bear little resemblance to personal experiences. Moreover, everyday social 
interactions often encounter misunderstandings precisely because actors make assumptions 
about others and the knowledge they share. Social psychological research has long since 
shown how identity can lead to biases in perception of Self and Other (Jones & Nisbett, 
1971), and can act as an important constraint in knowledge production between people 
(Gillespie & Cornish, 2010b). 
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Concerns about the validity of ToM as a theory and how it has been methodologically 
operationalised have grown significantly over the years. There now exist many critiques 
concerning what ToM is (e.g. folk theory, cognitive module, social problem solving, 
simulation: Rajendran & Mitchell, 2007), what it should measure (e.g. processes of cognition, 
developmental trajectory, conceptual knowledge depth: Apperly, 2012) and what causes it to 
be impaired (e.g. defective meta-representation, impaired reasoning, impaired inner language:  
Boucher, 2012). There are also concerns about the relationship between ToM and social 
understanding. While ToM may impact our ability to build and manage social relations 
(Caputi, Lecce, Pagnin, & Banerjee, 2012), our social experiences and social relations inform 
ToM (Perner, Kloo, & Gornik, 2007), contributing to its development throughout 
adolescence (Dumontheil, Apperly, & Blakemore, 2010). Yet the issue of whether ToM is the 
primary cause of impaired social understanding, or the secondary effect, has been rarely 
problematised (Rajendran & Mitchell, 2007; Froese, Stanghellini, & Bertelli, 2013).  
There are also many contextual factors which shape our understanding of others but which 
are not accounted for in abstracted perspective-taking methods, such as the history of the 
perceiver-target relationship, the perceiver’s desired future relationship with the target, and 
the possibility that perceivers may also be motivated to be inaccurate in their perceptions 
(Ickes, 1993, p. 587). For instance, informal caregivers of people with aphasia will often 
downplay their burden of caregiving, while care-receivers similarly underestimate burdens 
(Gillespie, Murphy, & Place, 2010). Such asymmetries, far from being accidental, are in fact 
deliberately maintained in order to protect the positive identity of the person with aphasia. 
However, such identity management is absent from research in relationships involving 
autistic people. This limitation of the abstracted unidirectional approach highlights why the 
present thesis examines autistic sociality as an interactionally achieved phenomenon rather 
than a property of individual minds alone. 
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Wider problems associated with unidirectional approaches include placing a disproportionate 
responsibility for misunderstandings experienced on the shoulders of autistic individuals. 
This is both unfair and inaccurate because it is often based on the assumption that 
neurotypical people deploy ToM consistently and successfully (Yergeau & Huebner, 2017). 
However, research has shown that neurotypical people are inaccurate in their assessments of 
others (Epley, 2014), and struggle particularly in understanding how they are uniquely 
viewed by specific others (Ickes, 1993; Kenny & Depaulo, 1993). Real life social competence 
involves degrees of accuracy (Apperly, 2012). Experimental evidence suggests people 
serially adjust from their own egocentric view to account for others’ minds (Epley et al., 
2004), more easily mentalising targets which are similar to the perceiver (Komeda, 2015). 
Within the dynamic flow of interaction, representations of others’ beliefs are much harder to 
distinguish from one’s own (Keysar, Lin, & Barr, 2003), and information about conflicting 
beliefs are much harder to hold in memory to inform subsequent judgements (Apperly et al., 
2008). In short, the situational characteristics, (i.e. who are we perspective-taking with and 
what are we perspective-taking about?) matter when it comes to understanding how ToM is 
deployed in everyday life.  
Therefore there is considerable theoretical support for more ecological measures of 
perspective-taking as such measures may be better suited to producing consistent research 
findings which are reflective of actual behaviour (Hill & Bird, 2006; Klin, 2000). There is 
also empirical support from studies such as Royers et al. (2001) and Spek et al. (2010) which 
used a variety of different cognitive assessments but found that ecologically based methods 
had the most discriminative power in identifying autistic individuals. In recent years research 
has diversified to consider several aspects of perspective-taking including mindreading 
(interpreting the mental states of others), first impressions (initial perception of others), 
metaperception (imagining how others perceive the world), and interactionally achieved 
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social understanding (e.g. intersubjectivity). Consequently, such diverse research interests 
have resulted in an expansion of methodological apporaches. Methods such as thin slice 
judgements (brief exposure to stimuli such as video: Grossman, 2015), using 
autobiographical stimuli (e.g. Faso et al, 2015), and rich narrative stories (e.g. reading about 
autistic characters and not just neurotypical ones: Komeda et al., 2013) will be covered in the 
next section since they have been used bi-directionally, (i.e. they have been applied to 
understand both sides of the autistic/ non-autistic social dynamic).  What the current literature 
review highlights in terms of the double empathy challenge of imagining other perspectives, 
is that there is both impetus to be more bidirectional (e.g. consider the perspectives of non-
autistic in addition to focussing on autistic perspective-taking), but that there is a 
methodological gap in terms of operationalising bi-directional approaches, with 
unidirectional approaches having much more historical precedent. Consequently, research 
sub-question 1 necessitates a methodological component (b): 
Sub question 1a: What can a two-sided approach to perspective-taking between 
autistic and non-autistic people reveal about our understanding of the double empathy 
problem?  
Sub-question 1b: What is the methodological viability of exploring bi-directional 
approaches within autistic/non-autistic relationships? 
Chapter 4 will discuss further how Study 1 will seek to bridge this methodological gap.  
Bidirectional approaches 
In recognition that social ability requires understanding more than one perspective, there is a 
growing body of research that has begun to look at how autistic people are perceived by non-
autistic people, in addition to the well-documented research on autistic awareness of 
neurotypical others. These studies have embraced a variety of methods including studies of 
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expressions, first impressions, narratives, interactional tasks and ethnographic research, 
revealing that neurotypical perception and behaviour towards autistic people is shaped by 
biases and, moreover, neurotypical attitudes and behaviour should be considered a constituent 
part of the social barriers autistic people face.  
Studies of expressions produced by autistic people have helped to reveal more about 
neurotypical interpretations, showing that autistic people are just as expressive, but that 
identifying the motivation for such expressions is difficult. Brewer et al. (2016) investigated 
how neurotypical and autistic participants compared in their emotional recognition of facial 
expressions produced by neurotypical and autistic posers. Their results showed that 
neurotypical facial expressions were recognised better than autistic facial expressions 
regardless of the diagnosis of the perceiver, yet autistic participants were better at recognising 
their own facial expressions compared to neurotypical facial expressions. These results are 
important because they highlight that difficulties in perceiving autistic people may be 
attributable to idiosyncratic facial expressions, rather than an absence of emotional awareness 
and comprehension as has previously been thought (Brewer et al., 2016, p. 9). Moreover, 
since autistic facial expressions are idiosyncratic, double empathy extends to more than a 
binary division between autistic and neurotypical dispositions, since autistic people may 
experience difficulty in interpreting each other.  
Faso et al. (2014) examined posed and natural facial expressions produced by autistic people 
and typically developing adults which were rated by 38 female non-autistic participants in 
terms of intensity, naturalness and emotion displayed. Raters were blind to the diagnosis of 
the posers. Again, countering the idea that autistic people are unable to express emotions, 
their study showed that autistic facial expressions were rated as more intense and were 
identified with greater accuracy (although this effect was strongly influenced through angry 
expressions). However, naturalness of expressions was positively identified for the typically 
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developing posers but not the autistic posers. Thus, although there are differences in facial 
expressivity between typically developing adults and autistic adults, these differences are 
more related to style than a lack of expressivity altogether. Likewise Sheppard et al. (2016) 
covertly filmed autistic and typically developing participants reacting to four different 
scenarios from the researcher (e.g. telling a joke, providing a compliment) and showed the 
video reactions to naive neurotypical participants who had to identify the event that had 
triggered a reaction. Participants were more successful at interpreting neurotypical reactions 
than autistic reactions, however participants also rated autistic reactions as equally expressive 
to neurotypical reactions. There were, however, differences in the extent to which 
participants could explain the expressions they observed, with participants more likely to 
suggest possible mental states of autistic targets than neurotypical targets, perhaps because 
they were more uncertain about the motivation for the observed expression and were thus 
conjecturing with a greater range of possibilities than for neurotypical posers. Thus, research 
on autistic expressions has furthered understanding about the double empathy problem 
through highlighting difficulties in social understanding experienced by neurotypical people. 
Specifically, autistic people are very expressive, but neurotypical people may find such 
expressions ambiguous and consequently struggle to understand the social meaning of such 
behaviours.  
Moving beyond the study of facial expressions, research has examined the social 
consequences of first impressions which can have a cascading effect on the outcomes of 
social interactions with autistic people, “inaccurate inferences about people with ASD may 
present social barriers that limit personal and professional opportunities” (Sasson, Morrison, 
Pinkham, Faso, & Chmielewski, 2018, p. 4). Sasson and Morrison (2017) explored whether 
first impressions of adults with autism improved with diagnostic disclosure for typically 
developing adults. The ecological basis of the stimulus was achieved through a ‘High Risk 
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Social Challenge Task’ (Gibson et al. 2010) which is a performance-based measure of social 
skill involving a mock 60 second audition for a reality game show. Stimulus participants (40 
adults, 20 autistic and 20 typically developing) matched on gender, age and IQ were filmed 
completing the task, and 215 participants rated the videos in 4 different conditions: (1) a no 
label condition where no additional information was supplied with the video, (2) an accurate 
label condition which supplied the correct diagnostic status of the target, (3) a mislabelled 
condition where the opposite diagnostic information was supplied, and (4) a schizophrenia 
label condition. Participants rated 10 items (e.g. awkwardness, attractiveness, likelihood of 
starting a conversation, willingness to live near). In general, first impressions of autistic 
adults were less favourable than typically developing adults. However, the impressions 
became more favourable when the correct diagnostic information was disclosed indicating 
that the diagnosis may provide an explanation for what was perceived to be social or stylistic 
differences. Yet even with a diagnosis, ratings lagged behind those of typically developing 
stimulus participants who were mislabelled as autistic. Interestingly autism knowledge on 
behalf of the raters, and not age, gender or IQ, was associated with more favourable first 
impressions of autistic adults. This study therefore highlights how disclosure of a diagnostic 
label intervenes in the standards used to evaluate autistic people, but that this is only broadly 
applicable because autistic adults are still rated more poorly.  
Further studies from Sasson et al. (2017) examined the willingness of neurotypical peers to 
interact with autistic people based on thin slice judgements. Across three independent studies 
impressions of autistic people were found to be significantly less favourable in comparison to 
typically developing people. The impressions were consistent for both adults and children 
being rated, and did not differ between duration of stimulus or repeated exposure. Particular 
areas of negative perception involved non-verbal cues, such as body posture, prosody and 
facial expression. Moreover, the manner in which the stimulus was presented also affected 
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impressions. Negative first impressions of autistic adults were associated when audio and/or 
visual information was supplied, but not as present when only the transcript of speech was 
evaluated (Sasson et al., 2017, p. 7). Such negative impressions translated in a reduced 
intention to engage with autistic children being perceived. These findings therefore highlight 
how the label of autism, the medium in which the interaction is experienced, and knowledge 
of autism are all contextual factors which shape the perception of autistic adults by 
neurotypical people. Thus in terms of understanding the double empathy problem, this 
research highlights that negative biases are embedded in the situation and not wholly 
reflective of neurological differences, and that such biases can negatively impact the prospect 
of future social opportunities being extended towards autistic people by typically developing 
people.  
Other studies have used narrative vignettes to explore attitudes towards autistic characters 
(Komeda, 2015; Komeda et al., 2013). Komeda et al. (2013; 2015) used stories involving 
characters with autism and typically developing characters which were based on the Social 
Responsiveness Scale (Constantino et al., 2003). Each story had an accompanying target 
sentence which summarised the message of the story in a way that Komeda et al. (2013) 
claim was congruent with an autistic perspective (e.g. “Yohei concentrates too much on parts 
of things rather than seeing the whole picture”) or incongruent (e.g. “Yohei concentrates too 
much on the whole picture rather than seeing the parts of things”). After reading the stories, 
participants were asked to identify the target sentence. Typically developing participants were 
more effective in retrieving stories about typically developing characters, and autistic 
participants were more effective at retrieving stories about autistic characters, suggesting that 
there is a similarity bias between perceiver and target which assists social understanding 
(Komeda, 2015), a finding which supports the dispositional differences argument of the 
double empathy problem. Brosnan and Mills (2016) also used narrative vignettes to explore 
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the attitudes of 120 college students who were either informed that the protagonist was a 
typical college student or one with a clinical diagnosis. In comparison between clinical labels 
(autism spectrum disorder, Asperger’s syndrome, schizophrenia) they found no differences in 
terms of positive or negative affect. However, there were overall differences between clinical 
and typical conditions, with affective responses significantly more positive to participants 
believing the characters to belong to a clinical group than when they thought they were a 
typical student. This suggests an overarching positive discrimination bias associated with 
labels, but the specific effects of the label of autism are less clear cut.  
Thus, studies of expressions, first impressions and vignettes have highlighted neurotypical 
people have difficulty and are often unfavourable in perceiving autistic perspectives. 
However, autism knowledge, perceiver-target similarity, the manner in which the interaction 
is experienced all shape the dynamics of understanding. Disclosing a diagnosis can improve 
perceptions, but this does not account for all negative perceptions, nor may it necessarily be 
distinct in effect from disclosing other types of diagnostic labels, suggesting a degree of 
ambiguity associated with the way people with different experiences interpret the label of 
autism. Certainly, the evidence presented strongly supports the double empathy argument that 
misunderstandings and misinterpretations are a two-way phenomenon in autistic-to-
neurotypical encounters.  
Given the evidence of neurotypical biases in social perception of autistic people, it is 
particularly important to consider bi-directional research that has explored interactions. 
Interactions hold the highest ecological validity for understanding aspects of the double 
empathy problem, and although they have less experimental control, their rich insights can 
help to reveal more about how biases play out in social relations. Usher et al. (2017) analysed 
impressions of dyads where one member was autistic and the other member non-autistic. 
Participants were matched on age and gender but did not know about anyone else’s 
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diagnostic status. Participants were paired up and invited to talk for five minutes to 
familiarise themselves. Afterwards participants completed a questionnaire rating how they 
perceived their partner and how they thought they would be perceived by their partner. The 
methodology is a reformulation of Laing et al.’s (1966) Interpersonal Perception Method 
(although it is labelled “Perception and Metaperception Questionnaire”) where participants 
orientate to a series of questions which probe direct and meta-perspectives on the interaction 
experienced. The findings highlighted that autistic participants were more accurate in 
assessing whether they were liked by non-autistic partners than vice-versa. Moreover, 
adolescents in general based their metaperception of others on their own direct perception of 
others (Usher et al., 2017). The tendency to like one’s peers was associated with traits of 
social reciprocity and initiative, which the study claims to be trainable skills. A limitation of 
the study however is that it did not qualitatively explore the rationale behind ratings so it is 
hard to make sense of the processes involved in constructing perceptions, or how potential 
differences in neurotypical and autistic sense-making unfold interactionally. Moreover, 
participants were unfamiliar with each other, thus it would have been particularly useful to 
know what interactional aspects participants used to inform their ratings. As discussed above, 
a key component of interpersonal relations is the history of the perceiver-target relationship 
(Ickes, 1993), thus using a five minute interaction as a stimulus to understand meta-
perception raises questions of ecological and construct validity.  
Ethnographic research on autistic sociality in everyday social life, most notably through the 
Ethnography of Autism Project at UCLA, has helped to illustrate real-life agency of autistic 
people and the processes through which autistic and neurotypical people navigate each 
other’s sense-making. The Ethnography of Autism Project examined autistic sociality across 
a variety of social domains (e.g. dinnertime conversations), recording over 600 hours of hours 
of video data involving autistic children (Ochs & Solomon, 2010). Findings showed that 
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family members played a critical role in facilitating autistic socio-cultural perspective-taking 
through question and answer sequences (adjacency pairs), which scaffolded appropriate 
context for the autistic children observed (Kremer-Sadlik, 2004). In turn this enabled autistic 
children to more accurately identify communicative intentions of their conversational 
partners. However, in other situations such as those which depend on more implicit 
inferences about meaning, autistic children struggled, highlighting how autistic sociality 
consists of a range of possible co-ordinations, which in different circumstances may either 
open up or close off opportunities for intersubjectivity. Describing an “algorithm” for 
understanding this process, Ochs and Solomon (2010) state that: “the sociality of persons 
with ASD and the neurotypical population are not categorically distinct. Rather, autistic 
sociality waxes and wanes in relation to societal and interactional conditions” (Ochs & 
Solomon, 2010, p. 86). A key principal to emerge from ethnographic research is recognising 
perspective-taking and language as an interactional accomplishment, yet at the same time, 
language for autistic people may not always be pragmatically orientated as some 
communication may be purely experiential (e.g. echolalic speech) (Sterponi, de Kirby, & 
Shankey, 2014; Sterponi & Shankey, 2014). Far from lacking a desire for social motivation 
(Chevallier, Kohls, Troiani, Brodkin, & Schultz, 2012) ethnographic research shows autistic 
people are very much driven towards interactions of any form, whether it is with inanimate 
objects (White & Remington, 2018) or other animal species (Solomon, 2015). Therefore, a 
constituent barrier within the double empathy problem is the question of how neurotypical 
people can adequately work with autistic people to build shared understanding, while at the 
same time not imposing a more restrictive idea of social normativity onto the broader 
phenomenon of autistic interactional behaviour.  
However, an additional consideration of using interactional methods is whether neurotypical 
assumptions about autistic behaviour are embedded in the research process itself. Jaswal and 
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Akhtar (Jaswal & Akhtar, 2018) identify at least four classic behavioural traits (including eye 
contact, pointing, motor stereotypies and echolalia) that scientists have interpreted as 
signifying diminished social motivation. However, testimonies from autistic people highlight 
alternative explanations which are indicative of a desire to engage, for example many autistic 
people do not maintain eye gaze in order to manage cognitive load and stay focussed on the 
interaction (e.g. what is being discussed). Moreover, cultures differ in their levels of what is 
appropriate eye contact during conversation, and many non-autistic people may demonstrate 
repetitive behaviours as a coping mechanism for anxiety and stress (Jaswal & Akhtar, 2018, 
p. 12). Indeed, a deficit in social motivation is a hypothesis that “fits squarely within an 
entrenched paradigm” of considering autism as a social disorder (Jaswal & Akhtar, 2018, p. 
46). Analysing interactions between autistic people would provide valuable insight into the 
social possibilities for autistic people when neurotypical norms are not imposed, but this 
raises questions about how to mitigate neurotypical assumptions embedded within the 
research process itself in order to interpret neurodivergent interactions on their own terms. 
These challenges are addressed in Chapters 4 and 6 below.  
Consequently, the literature on bi-directional approaches highlights two sub-questions to 
serve as the basis of Study 2. First, ethnographic research has highlighted how autistic people 
have greater social ability than observed in abstract tasks, an ability which remains largely 
unexplored in interactions between autistic people. The similarity hypothesis which 
underscores the basis of the double empathy problem (namely that differences in neurological 
disposition result in two-way difficulties in understanding) shows that perceiver-target 
similarity improves understanding, thus studying interactions between autistic people can 
provide new insights into autistic sociality, particularly when neurotypical assumptions may 
withhold such sociality. This question forms the basis of sub-question 2a: 
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Sub-question 2a: What features of neurodivergent interaction are evident when 
neurotypical norms are not present?  
However, there remains an outstanding methodological challenge in terms of how it is 
possible to identify neurodivergent interactions on their own terms. Consequently sub-
question 2 requires a methodological component (2b): 
Sub-question 2b: Can viable methods be developed for understanding autistic 
interactions on their own terms? 
These questions will be explored further in Chapter 4, and form the basis for studying 
neurodivergent interactions in Study 2 (Chapter 6).  
Social construction of autism 
Building on bi-directional approaches outlined above, research has also explored the wider 
socio-cultural context which underpins how autism is understood. This research understands 
autism as more than a diagnostic status, it also operates as a social construction, with people 
drawing on popular representations in culture and science to inform their everyday behaviour, 
identification and attitudes towards autism (Hacking, 1996, 1999; McGeer, 2009; Ortega, 
2009). However, this distinction of autism as a social construction has taken time to be 
recognised. According to Hacking, “there is a constant drive in the social and psychological 
sciences to emulate the natural sciences, and to produce true natural kinds of people” 
(Hacking 1999, p.104), whereby Hacking refers to “natural kinds” as a form of essentialism, 
where entities are composed of stable and identifiable properties like elements in a periodic 
table. Research on autism has traditionally grown out of a clinical biomedical view which 
aligns with such essentialism principles, thus the lived reality of autism (i.e. the 
developmental, phenomenological and social dimensions of autism) has typically been 
viewed as mere “downstream” effects of a biological origin. Yet analysing the socio-cultural 
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context in which autism is understood reveals important insights about the barriers autistic 
people face in their sociality, and the role other people have in shaping them. Since people 
are self-conscious and self-aware, the way in which they act is by no means independent of 
the descriptions society gives to them. Representations of autism shape autistic self-identity 
(McGeer, 2004) and how others identify with themselves and behave (e.g. parents: Robinson, 
York, Rothenberg, & Bissell, 2015), which in turn can reinforce the original description 
(Hacking, 1999).  
Hacking’s ideas about the reciprocal relationship that exists between representations and 
behaviour (which he terms “the looping effect”) has been more extensively explored within 
the field of social representations research (Moscovici & Hewstone, 1983; Moscovici, 1984). 
Although not specific to autism, Moscovici elucidated many of the processes through which 
modern society establishes, contests and transforms knowledge (Jovchelovitch, 2002; Serge 
Moscovici, 2000). Knowledge is more than just content, it is values, beliefs and ideas (e.g. 
the intertwining of neurodiversity movements with neurodiversity research paradigm), while 
society is not homogenous, but comprised of many different groups with different identities 
and politics (e.g. autistic people, family members, carers, pro-cure groups). Processes of 
human interaction shape and reproduce meaning and critically these processes are “grounded 
within situated social networks” (Jovchelovitch, 2002, p. 121), such as institutions (Foucault, 
1976). This is especially true for understanding autism when one considers the struggle for 
autistic voice to reclaim their own narrative from institutional framings (Bagatell, 2007).  For 
example, the classification of autism focuses on behavioural abnormalities and omits 
advantageous behaviours and the role of society in shaping behaviours (Kapp et al., 2013). 
Deficit-focussed terminology such as describing autism as a “disorder” or as minds that have 
“faulty circuits” that require “fixing” increases the negative stigma around autism (Kenny et 
al., 2016; Smukler, 2005). Controversies such as the false link between the MMR vaccine and 
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autism continue to divide opinions both within science (Dixon & Clarke, 2013) and the wider 
public (Provencher, 2007).  
The media are another institution which have rarely presented a balanced view of autism, 
which inevitably feeds into peoples’ expectations. Research on media coverage has shown 
that autism is associated with a number of negative stereotypes, being variously represented 
as occupying a separate world (Brownlow & Dell, 2009), as a burden or tragedy that “breaks” 
parents (Clarke, 2011; Huws & Jones, 2011), as dangerous, uncontrolled and broken 
individuals (Jones & Harwood, 2009; Sarrett, 2011; Smukler, 2005), and as being “weird” 
individuals (Treweek et al., 2018). Different media outlets have different interests: for 
example general interest magazines tend to view autism in terms of genetic, neurological and 
statistical arguments, whereas magazines whose target audience are women tend to describe 
autism from the perspective of mothers who are in a battle to achieve normality (Clarke, 
2011).  
Therefore, it is important to research further the effects of the social construction of autism on 
interpersonal perception and behaviour by non-autistic people. A key window into 
understanding this process is studying the effects of disclosing the label of autism. For 
example, Gernsbacher et al. (2017) examined the effect of specifying context (e.g. social 
identity and reference group) when assessing autistic traits in autistic and non-autistic 
participants. Both autistic and non-autistic participants completed self-report questionnaires 
about autism. They demonstrated that when the term “people” in question items is 
manipulated to the respondents’ in-group (i.e. match the way in which the perceiver identifies 
as autistic or non-autistic) it resulted in decreased self-reported difficulty in interacting and 
communicating. Likewise, when “people” was specified to an out-group it resulted in 
significantly more difficulty in interacting and communicating (Gernsbacher et al., 2017). 
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Labels can also be used to highlight further contextual factors which affect social perception 
of autistic people. Chambres et al. (2008) presented 88 adults with video clips of autistic 
children behaving in a “problematic” or “non-problematic” way. Although there is a lack of 
discussion about what constitutes “problematic” behaviour from a neurotypical or autistic 
standpoint, their study showed evidence of positive discrimination. When participants were 
informed about the diagnosis of the child they were perceived more positively than 
participants naive to the diagnosis. However, this finding is sensitive to context. First, women 
judged the children less severely than men; however when the diagnosis was revealed their 
scores were comparable.  This suggests that disclosure of a diagnosis has more effect when 
the evaluator is a man, because male baseline evaluations are much lower. Second, perception 
depended on the type of evaluative dimension used. For social ability, irrespective of the type 
of behaviour produced, children were rated more positively when their diagnosis was made 
salient. However, for the cognitive dimension, it only improved perception about non-
problematic behaviours (such as working on a computer). Finally, disclosing a diagnosis 
actually had a negative effect on emotional abilities of the children rated. Thus the effects of 
disclosing a diagnosis on social perception is subject to additional situational dynamics (i.e. 
the type of behaviour, the evaluative dimension used and the gender of the perceiver).   
A study by Grossman et al. (2015) examined the effect of different media (still images, 
audio-visual, video-only or audio-only information) on judging children with high 
functioning autism. The stimulus comprised of 1 to 3 second exposure to clips/images of the 
children and typically developing adults were asked to judge the social awkwardness. 
Findings showed that if the diagnostic status of the children was not disclosed participants 
judged the children with high-functioning autism to be significantly more socially awkward. 
The findings were consistent across modalities examined and highlight that there is a 
negative bias towards the way autistic people are perceived socially, which knowledge of the 
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diagnosis can partially correct. In another study (as discussed above), Sasson et al. (2017) 
filmed 20 autistic participants and 20 typically developing participants take part in a mock 
interview for a reality TV show. Segments of the interaction were presented to college 
students in five different modalities: (1) audio-only, (2) visual-only, (3) audio-visual, (4) 
static image, and (5) transcript of speech content. Importantly the “transcript-only” modality 
had not been studied in Grossman et al’s (2015) study, which Sasson et al. found to be the 
only modality where autism stimulus participants were not rated significantly worse than 
typically developing participants. Moreover, the audio-visual modality produced less 
favourable ratings for awkwardness than the audio or transcript modality. These findings 
suggest that the way participants presented themselves, rather than the content of what they 
said, defined negative impressions of autistic people. Moreover, across further experiments 
first impressions of autistic participants were shown to be less favourable than typically 
developing participants and consistent across short and longer glimpses of social interaction. 
This evidence supports the idea that many of the non-verbal cues including prosody, facial 
expression and body posture, that may be idiosyncratic for autistic people, are associated with 
negative social characteristics. Moreover, in another study of first impressions (Sasson and 
Morrison, 2017), autism knowledge on behalf of the speakers was associated with more 
favourable impressions of autistic adults. Thus the evaluative baseline people use when a 
diagnosis of autism is disclosed may involve degrees of favourability based on personal 
understanding, highlighting a potential opportunity to further improve the attitudes of those 
who are already positively inclined towards autistic people.   
Labels can also impact identity. In an analysis of the effects of discovering their diagnosis, 
Powell and Acker (2016) explored the reactions of 74 adults diagnosed with Asperger’s 
syndrome. The majority of people who received a diagnosis had positive responses, claiming 
that it provided “an alternative to self-blame” but also that it triggered regrets about what 
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could have been possible if they had received a diagnosis earlier (Powell & Acker, 2016, p. 
79). Many autistic people feel that being autistic results in widespread bullying and exclusion 
(Treweek et al., 2018). For parents, however, a diagnosis can have the effect of isolation and 
stigma, because the disability of their children has no physical signs to others (Chell, 2006; 
Gray, 2002).  Robinson et al. (2015) investigated parents’ experiences of getting their child 
diagnosed. Analysing interviews with parents, they discovered that diagnosis of a child 
affected parents’ own sense of identity, allowing parents to “regain” control of their role as a 
parent as they are better positioned to understand their children. Yet at the same time parents 
can also feel stigma that isolated them from their family and wider community (Gill & 
Liamputtong, 2013).  
The literature reviewed has therefore highlighted contextual factors that shape non-autistic 
perception of autistic people, such as the type of behaviour being observed, the gender of the 
perceiver, and the medium in which the interaction is experienced. The label of autism is an 
important window for all stakeholders (autistic people, parents, non-autistic people) to re-
orientate to social situations involving autistic people and use a more favourable evaluative 
baseline. However, although disclosing a diagnosis can result in more positive impressions, it 
does not appear to completely eradicate the tendency to still view autistic people negatively 
compared with typically developing people. Moreover, autistic people commonly report 
having faced negative attitudes and behaviours as a result of their autism, which reflects a 
potential disconnect between self-reported positive attitudes and negative behaviour in the 
psychology of non-autistic people. However, to investigate this disconnect requires methods 
which probe further the interactions shared between autistic and non-autistic people, since the 
studies reviewed have focussed mainly on experimental data and brief psychological 
encounters. Methodologically this presents a challenge of how to create interactions with 
autistic people where both self-report and behavioural data can be captured.  
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One technique which has been used previously to analyse the psychology of interactions is 
through virtual games (Blascovich et al., 2002; Gillespie, Corti, Evans, & Heasman, 2018). 
Cyberball (Williams, Cheung, & Choi, 2000) is a virtual ball tossing game used to examine 
social ostracism, whereby participants are led to believe they are playing with others online, 
when in truth they play with a virtual agent that is programmed to deliberately exclude the 
participant from the game. This minimalist format has the advantage of providing a gradable 
way to manipulate the independent variable of levels of ostracism, although its task simplicity 
means that behavioural responses to ostracism are not measured. Games such as these are 
advantageous because (1) interactional tasks have reasonable ecological validity, even in a 
laboratory setting, since everyday professional life is comprised of collaborations with 
unknown others; and (2) since interactions are simulated (i.e. the participants believe they are 
interacting with someone when actually they are not), the process is fully replicable, and 
interactions across different experimental groups can be compared (Blascovich et al., 2002). 
This method is particularly useful for research on autism where, due to heterogeneity of 
autistic behaviours and social aversion to interactions with unfamiliar others, it is very 
difficult to obtain large participant samples for a cross-neurological study. A computer-
mediated interaction can potentially copy the behavioural aspects of one autistic person for 
many non-autistic collaborators, or even deceive non-autistic collaborators into 
psychologically believing they are interacting with an autistic person.  
Thus, the research sub-question 3 is further refined around a methodological focus (b): 
Sub-question 3b: Can a viable method be developed to explore: (i) the relationship 
between self-reported perception and actual behaviour within a simulated interaction, 
and (ii) the differences between groups where the identity of the online agent 
(autistic/non-autistic) is altered?  
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These questions will be explored further in Chapter 4, and form the basis for studying the 
effects of the label of autism using Dyad3D software (Chapter 7).   
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4) METHODOLOGY 
This chapter outlines the methodological approach of the thesis. Before discussing the 
methodological challenges identified in Chapter 3 for each respective study, it is important to 
acknowledge a wider methodological challenge concerning the validity gap between research 
conducted on autism and the research interests of autistic people themselves (Nick Chown & 
Beardon, 2017; Jaswal & Akhtar, 2018; Pellicano et al., 2014b; Verhoeff, 2015). This chapter 
first sets the context for this issue and outlines the motivation for taking an abductive 
approach to research, which “provides a way to think about research, methods and theories 
that nurtures theory construction without locking it into predefined boxes” (Tavory & 
Timmermans, 2014, p. 4). This approach aligns with the exploratory nature of the thesis, 
especially since it is through experiences of working with autistic people that I initially 
conceived ideas for researching the double empathy problem, and was able to continually 
draw insight regarding the methodological process for each of my three empirical studies. 
Yet abductive reasoning is more than an approach for addressing concerns about validity. It 
also touches upon a wider move within the field to adopt a more participatory model of 
research on autism out of moral and ethical concern for its impacts (Fletcher-Watson et al., 
2018). There is a growing impetus to engage in participatory research in studies of autism as 
a response to concerns that autistic voices are excluded from the research process (Milton, 
2014). I discuss this debate and document the steps I have taken as a researcher to be 
participatory, particularly given my positionality as a non-autistic researcher. In the final 
section, I consider the methodological choices made for the empirical chapters of this thesis, 
including limitations and why they were chosen over other approaches.  
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Abductive analysis 
Abductive analysis is a creative inferential process which prioritises the surprising 
phenomena observed over a given hypothesis itself (Zittoun, 2017) in order to develop a 
hypothesis with the best explanatory scope (Tavory & Timmermans, 2014). The pragmatist 
philosopher Charles Sanders Peirce (1839–1914) developed abduction into an explicit theory 
of inference in comparison to the more established inductive and deductive inferencing. 
According to Peirce, abduction is distinct from other forms of reasoning (i.e. induction and 
deduction) in its ability to generate new ideas because its starting point for inquiry remains 
the surprising phenomenon observed and not the hypothesis itself (Peirce, 1998). In contrast, 
induction begins with a specific hypothesis and merely generalises it, whereas deduction 
“evolves the necessary consequences” (Peirce, 1998) of a specific hypothesis. Thus induction 
and deduction are rules about how to generalise preconceived theories into larger theories, 
whereas abduction is a process of constructing new theories on the basis of the surprising 
phenomena observed (Lahlou, 2011; Timmermans & Tavory, 2012).   
Abductive analysis has the following structure: 
The surprising fact, C, is observed;  
But if A were true, C would be a matter of course,  
Hence, there is reason to suspect that A is true.” (Peirce, 1998, p. 151) 
This structure differs from other logical models in its freedom to correct its initial premise 
(A) in light of new or surprising evidence. Abduction may be considered as a “creative 
synthesis – a new unique creation based on the recombination of past and present semiotic 
resources” (Zittoun, 2017, p. 189). This process means the researcher remains open to 
changing or updating their investigation based on the phenomena they observe, which makes 
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it suited to navigating some of the theoretical pitfalls within the field identified in Chapter 3 
(e.g. such as thinking of social perspective-taking only through the lens of theory of mind and 
neglecting presence and relevance of autistic testimony as a result).  
Figures 3 and 4 below illustrate the differences between deduction, induction and abduction. 
Deduction draws a conclusion about the case which is forced by the theory, with a tendency 
to move from general to specific observations. Induction, on the other hand, theorises about a 
possible conclusion on the basis of a given case, with a tendency to move from specific to 
general observations.  In Figure 3, the classic syllogistic reasoning of Socrates being mortal is 
made inductive by making the theory component falsifiable (i.e. there may be some immortal 
humans that are unknown to us). 
FIGURE 3: EXAMPLES OF DEDUCTIVE AND INDUCTIVE REASONING 
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Where deductive and inductive reasoning attempt to conclude something about the case on 
the basis of a theory, abduction takes as its starting point a surprising case. It is supposed to 
be surprising because it stands out against the backdrop of assumed knowledge and 
understanding. It is an idea that does not fit neatly into existing knowledge and therefore 
requires further exploration. Moreover, the process remains open to the possibility that other 
explanations and other data are yet to be discovered, thus instead of attempting to conclude 
something about the surprising phenomenon observed, abduction aims to develop a theory 
with the best explanatory scope currently possible.  
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FIGURE 4: EXAMPLE OF ABDUCTIVE PROCESS 
 
Although psychological science is often modelled on a hypothetico-deductive form of 
reasoning, which blends deductive and inductive models together into a cautious, step-wise 
process of accepting or rejecting the null hypothesis (Hacking, 1999), abduction more 
accurately describes the more intangible creative processes which enable hypotheses to be 
generated in the first place. Yet while the hypothetico-deductive model of investigation 
functions in a similar way to the abductive process (in that both involve exploring different 
theories and encountering different data), in my opinion, it remains more vulnerable to losing 
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investigative “fidelity” precisely because researchers believe so strongly in the syllogistic 
power of the method and lose sight of the real-world phenomena that started the inquiry. 
Abduction, on the other hand, holds the surprising phenomena as a primary focal point 
against which any method developed, or data gathered, is compared and handled. In Figure 4 
above, although simplistic, through treating the surprising case as the baseline against which 
everything is compared and interpreted, all subsequent reasoning remains tightly anchored, 
helping to preserve investigative fidelity. 
Thus, with regards to research on autism we are at a turning point in the field, where 
researchers are now critically evaluating their taken-for-granted assumptions about what 
constitutes social behaviour, a move driven by the well-documented obsession with 
validating methods in light of theory (e.g. developing more accurate tests of theory of mind) 
rather than validating theory according to real-world phenomena (e.g. validating theory of 
mind against accounts from autistic people). It is thus moving from a hypothetico-deductive 
model to an abductive model, not only to reduce validity gaps between methods and real-
world phenomena, but also because the inherent openness of the abductive process (i.e. being 
receptive to encountering new data) is a means through which a more participatory model of 
research can be achieved in terms of autistic involvement in the research process. More 
specifically to the structure of this thesis, abduction is how the investigative journey started, 
because it was through the surprising observation of how other people misunderstood 
Cambell, and the extent to which this inhibited his independence, that I became interested in 
researching the double empathy dynamic between autistic and non-autistic people.  
Abduction provides the foundation for participatory research to be possible, and it is through 
several participatory activities that I have been able to refine my research ideas. Before I 
describe my own abductive process behind each of my three empirical studies, it is necessary 
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to reflect first on what participatory research is, what issues it raises itself, and how I 
navigated them in the course of my own engagement activities.  
Participatory research 
Within research on autism, there is currently a great drive towards a participatory model of 
research (Jivraj et al., 2014; Pellicano et al., 2014a). This drive has been brought about, in 
part by a need to reflect the priorities of the communities studied (Crane, Adams, et al., 2018; 
Pellicano et al., 2014a) but also because researchers want “to increase the relevance and 
broaden the implementation of health research by involving those affected by the outcomes 
of health studies” (Jivraj et al., 2014, p. 782). Participatory research in studies of autism 
however, extends beyond issues of research validity and equitable relationships; it also 
requires emotional sensitivity (Milton, 2016) in working with vulnerable, marginalised 
populations who are disempowered by current societal structures, especially when part of that 
disempowerment originates from the stigma produced by research itself. Habermas’ (1984) 
concept of communicative action provides a theoretical foundation for understanding the 
nature of these moral and ethical concerns. In his Theory of Communicative Action, 
Habermas critically evaluates how people justify themselves to others (Okshevsky, 2016), 
observing that all communicative actions involve inherent claims about validity that extend 
beyond the propositional content of the utterance alone (Jovchelovitch, 2011). Language is 
not merely a representational system of the world around us, it is performative, creating 
social actions, social contracts, and ultimately societies itself, and critically examining the 
rationality of how mutual understanding is achieved is central to resisting coercive and 
strategic manipulation. The types of in-built claims that are associated with speech acts 
include claims about “the validity of our ways of cognitively stating a situation in the world, 
its rightness in a given context and our own positioning and behaviour as speakers” 
(Jovchelovitch, 2011, p. 134). To enable ideal and equitable speech between interlocutors 
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requires certain conditions to be met so that both parties can fairly question such claims being 
made. For example, both parties should at least ensure that: there is the same chance to speak, 
the same chance to listen, access to the same information, relevant implicit knowledge is 
made explicit, there is no deception (i.e. no hidden or ulterior motive for engaging that is not 
made explicit), and all those who are affected by decisions must have an equal opportunity to 
participate (Brown & Goodman, 2001; Duckett et al., 2017; Habermas, 1984). 
Bringing this theoretical insight back to the question of participatory research on autism, we 
can observe the dangers associated with researchers who treat participatory research as a type 
of methodology, (i.e. as a tool that can bolster a particular study in terms of meeting ethical 
review board criteria and ecological validity critiques). It violates the principle that both 
parties have equal access to shaping decision-making, because the opportunity for dialogue is 
confined by the time boundaries of the study in question, which is set by the researcher. 
Participatory research as a methodological tool means the researcher is free to step in and out 
of the participatory framework according to their strategic aims whereas, by contrast those 
they study, i.e. autistic people, experience an ongoing challenge of having their voices heard 
and recognised which only happens when researchers, institutions and funding bodies decide 
to create a platform for such voices to be heard. Thus participatory research, although 
theoretically aimed at creating equitable partnerships between different stakeholders, is often 
used as an instrument for research rather than a philosophy about research (Heasman, 2018). 
Under these conditions the researcher’s power is reinforced rather than redistributed.  This 
may help to explain the concern that autistic people are often spoken for rather than being 
allowed to speak up about their concerns (Fletcher-Watson et al., 2018). It is for this reason 
that participatory research needs to be seen as an ongoing abductive process of generating 
holistic knowledge throughout one’s intellectual life-journey, rather than a specific time-point 
where autistic voices are permitted to enter. Participatory research is ultimately a 
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fundamental philosophical position concerning how you build knowledge about and with the 
people who are stakeholders in that knowledge.  
Habermas’ framework also highlights the need to make explicit one’s aims in interacting. Not 
all aims may be possible to divulge before research for various reasons (See section on Ethics 
below). Yet even if researchers seek to be honest, they may still fail to reflect on the social 
and cultural capital personally gained by their involvement in participatory research because 
it is rarely discussed. The framework which surrounds researchers, including the institutional 
pressures to publish in high impact journals, to be frequently cited by other studies, and to 
publish frequently and consistently in order for career progression, all create pressure on a 
participatory activity to be successful. Thus for participatory research to represent an 
opportunity to readdress the power gap between researchers and participants (Nelson & 
Wright, 1995), there needs to be critical reflection about the researcher’s positionality within 
the process and an attempt to make salient, and where ethically reasonable, redistribute one’s 
social and cultural capital and create more enabling institutional contexts (Aveling & 
Jovchelovitch, 2014). 
Issues of positionality and the more implicit social and cultural benefits of engaging in 
participatory research have been highlighted in other fields, perhaps most noticeably in cross-
cultural contexts where educated, western and economically-secure social scientists attempt 
to understand cultures that have a very different socio-cultural structure (Aveling & 
Jovchelovitch, 2014; Campbell, Nair, Maimane, & Nicholson, 2007; Gillespie, Reader, 
Cornish, & Campbell, 2014). After all, no view can claim to be “from nowhere” (Haraway, 
1991; Nagel, 1986), and all knowledge is arguably a product of the context in which it is 
developed (Bourdieu, 1977). 
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To summarise Chapter 4 so far, I have considered different methodological framing issues 
that shape the reasoning, morals and ethics of research on autism, highlighting that an 
abductive, creative participatory approach is a necessary response to some of the systemic 
challenges facing research on autism. The following section will now detail how these 
processes have fed into the current thesis (and thus illustrate abduction in action), describing 
the effect of participatory activities, positionality, socio-cultural capital and ethical concerns 
on the intellectual trajectory of the three empirical studies.   
Abductive development of thesis methods 
The abductive origin of the thesis (i.e. the surprising case observed) has already been 
documented in Chapter 1, namely the experience of seeing how the attitudes and behaviours 
of other people shape Cambell’s opportunities and levels of comfort. The experience was 
surprising because of the extent to which autism is understood to be a problem of individual 
functioning, yet difficulty in daily living is also connected to the socio-cultural context. I 
became interested in the two-way effects observed in interactions between autistic and non-
autistic people. Yet I was also acutely aware that Cambell was only one autistic person, as 
through conversations with his mother Sally I learned about the adage “if you’ve met one 
person with autism then you have met one person with autism”. If I was to pursue research in 
the area I needed to broaden my own experiences especially given that I am not autistic 
myself. Yet a central challenge for research on autism is recruiting participants who are 
dispersed throughout the population, with research projects restricted by location access and 
communication reach (Warnell et al., 2015), which can result in biased sample sizes and a 
reduced ability to replicate studies (Bàrbara et al., 2016).  
Fortunately, the commencement of my doctorate coincided with the opening of Matthew’s 
Hub, a charity based in East Yorkshire which supports young autistic adults. This represented 
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a great opportunity to both build my participant network, but more importantly to spend 
considerable time learning and getting to know members so that my research could be 
directed by their interests and concerns. More holistic engagement which extends beyond the 
confines and specific research studies has since been identified by autistic people as a key 
priority for participatory research (Fletcher-Watson et al., 2018). The conversations I had 
with members of Matthew’s Hub helped to set directions for my first two empirical studies. It 
emerged very quickly that many members had difficult relationships with family members, 
and sparse relationships with people outside of the charity. Members also felt strongly that 
society did not understand their complex and specific needs, yet other autistic people did. 
Thus not only did members demonstrate nuanced psychological awareness of Self in relation 
to Others, which literature on autism often overgeneralises in terms of deficit (Nicolaidis et 
al., 2011), but their observations clearly indicated that a constituent part of their social 
impairment was associated with neurotypical expectations and assumptions of behaviour. 
These insights helped to set the context for studying family relationships involving autistic 
people.  
Likewise, the research question for Study 2 emerged from spending time at Matthew’s Hub 
where I observed members partaking in video-gaming, during which they were able to 
successfully coordinate with each other and demonstrate very complex forms of 
intersubjectivity. For example, members were able to integrate multiple perspectives such as 
their virtual location in the game relative to their partner, as well as perspectives of characters 
in the game in relation to each other, and cultural references that the narrative of the game 
may touch upon. Clearly in the naturally occurring activity of video-gaming, members of 
Matthew’s Hub were demonstrating a level of social coordination which in other domains of 
social life were not so consistently deployed. This observation tied in to research on autistic 
sociality (Ochs & Solomon, 2010) (discussed in Chapter 3), highlighting how some domains 
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of social life afford better opportunities for maximising social opportunities than compared 
with unfamiliar domains involving shifting events, disrupted plans and unexpected social 
encounters (e.g. a late bus) (Ochs & Solomon, 2010, p. 70).   
Thus, at Matthew’s Hub I had discovered a particular social domain in which social 
interactions between autistic people appeared to flourish, namely video-gaming, which was 
socioculturally organised by autistic members themselves. By virtue of both dissolving into 
the community and maintaining my academic participation, I was able to recognise the value 
of researching a context where the imposition of neurotypical norms had been minimised. It 
connects with a vital part of the double empathy question that had yet to be explored, namely 
better understanding the social potential of autistic people that is compromised in cross-
neurological encounters. Given the double empathy principle that the wider disjuncture 
between the dispositional outlooks of social actors, the more likely there will be a wider gap 
in two-way empathy, it follows that autistic-to-autistic interactions are improved precisely 
because both actors are autistic and share more common ground. This view has significant 
support from the perspectives of autistic people themselves, who claim that it is easier to 
relate to other autistic individuals because of an absence of social protocol (Chown, 2014; 
Dekker, 1999). Thus, participation at Matthew’s Hub gave rise to the research question of 
Study 2, which seeks to understand what the enabling intersubjective features are of autistic-
to-autistic interactions.  
The inspiration for Study 3 was more indirect. Through participation at Matthew’s Hub I 
became aware of the gap in socio-cultural capital. I am a funded researcher who has 
institutional status and the power to receive recognition for producing empirical knowledge 
about autism, when at the same time the people I was studying were struggling to find 
employment despite being intellectually able. Conversations about why employment was so 
difficult included the feeling that society was poorly placed to understand autistic people or 
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meet their complex needs in the workplace. Disclosure did not always improve things, since 
members felt public understanding about autism was weak and misguided at best. These 
reports compare with research on the perspectives of autistic people which have highlighted 
that autistic people feel they are perceived as “weird” and that there are many negative 
stereotypes in popular culture (Treweek et al., 2018). I therefore began to question whether 
there was more I could be doing as a researcher to empower the autistic voices encountered in 
my research.  
This resulted in launching a public exhibition, Open Minds, which drew on my institutional 
connections with the London School of Economics to create a public platform that could 
empower autistic voices and cultivate informed dialogue around autism (See Figure 5). In 
December 2016 I applied to the LSE Knowledge Exchange and Impact fund to host a public 
exhibition at the LSE which would feature people in the community I had researched. Over 
two months I worked with Lydia Meredith, a professional photographer, building a visual and 
auditory portfolio of autistic adults, carers and parents, and Becky Lyddon from Sensory 
Spectacle who very kindly donated her installations for distorting sensory experiences to 
provide a window into what it would be like for visitors to have hypersensory needs. I 
addition I also made an animated video, Walking with Cambell, (Heasman, 2017b) based on 
my experiences of being a carer, which illustrated the complex ways in which Cambell is 
connected to the world around him. The exhibition ran for three weeks from 27th March to 
21st April 2017 and reached over 1,500 visitors.  
A post-exhibition questionnaire surveyed the reactions of 51 visitors. 98% claimed that the 
exhibition had helped improve their empathy and understanding of autistic experiences. 
Qualitative feedback included “I didn’t realise that autistic people have so many constraints. 
It’s an eye opener”, and “I thought the interactive setup was very powerful, particularly the 
audio that allowed the voices of the portrait subjects to share their experiences”, and “A 
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wonderful exhibition with great social impact. I hope the LSE supports ventures like this in 
the future too – it’s so crucial to situate research in the real world”. The Walking with 
Cambell video was particularly effective in encouraging lay people to question their taken-
for-granted assumptions about autism, and is now used by a number of local councils and 
charities as part of their autism awareness training with over 1,800 views on YouTube (as of 
28/08/2018).   
FIGURE 5: VISITORS TO THE OPEN MINDS EXHIBITION 
 
Open Minds enabled me to readdress some of the power imbalances that exist between the 
researcher and those they study by providing new opportunities to build and bridge social 
capital. It allowed me to connect staff at Matthew’s Hub to other charities, such as Project 
Aspie, to discuss new possibilities for employment for people on the spectrum. It led to two 
national awards from the Economic and Social Research Council, UK, as a finalist for 
Outstanding Early Career Impact and a winner for Future Career Promise, which allowed 
me to bring issues of autism inclusion, acceptance and understanding to policy makers and 
research funders. It also brought me into more contact with more researchers, including in 
particular Dr Laura Crane who invited me to share my experiences of the project with early-
career researchers through an event called #Aut2Engage in February 2018. This further 
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enabled me to reiterate the importance of addressing gaps in social and cultural capital and 
building longer, more holistic, participation that extends beyond the strategic purpose of 
research papers alone (Heasman, 2018)). Around this time another researcher I was able to 
connect with was Dr Damian Milton, at which point I discovered the ontological framework 
the double empathy problem that helped to explain the bi-directional nature of social 
interaction that I was interested in. This provided an opportunity to sharpen my theoretical 
focus for Study 2 and 3 around the double empathy framework (discussed above Chapter 2), 
and to interact more with autistic academics (e.g. through PARC organised events) which 
helped to advance aspects of my research. For example, when presenting Study 2 at 
Nottingham University to PARC, I was asked why I had not used a neurotypical control 
group in order to compare the intersubjective dynamic between neurodivergent and 
neurotypical interactions. After answering by saying that it was important to study 
neurodivergence on its own terms and avoid a comparative design, because this inevitably 
reinforces a deficit view of autism, I was asked to make a point of this rationale in my 
published paper, which I subsequently did so. Thus through dialogue with autistic people I 
have sharpened my theoretical approach (focussing on the double empathy problem), 
improved my use of language in alignment with the majority preference of autistic people 
(i.e. changing from “people with Asperger’s” used in Study 1 to “autistic people” 
thenceforth), and integrated autistic perspectives into my analysis (e.g. autistic inter-rater 
reliability in Study 2).  
Through public engagement activities I gained wider exposure to the societal issues facing 
autism, particularly its poor understanding in the public domain. The influence of culture on 
understanding and supporting autism echoes findings of Study 1 where family members 
would see their autistic relatives in terms of the label, an act which could affect their ability to 
probe further about the causes of misunderstanding in their relationships. I was thus attracted 
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to the research question of understanding the double empathy problem at a societal level, and 
was motivated to design a method to systematically examine the effects of the label of autism 
on the social perception of autistic people. This took shape in the form of developing a 
computer-mediated interaction that could deceive participants into thinking they were 
interacting with others and thus facilitate an exploration of how different labels produce 
different psychological effects. In doing so the study helped to connect to disparate themes 
emerging from conversations with autistic people, who report negative discrimination 
associated with diagnostic disclosure of autism, and research data which suggests diagnostic 
disclosure results in positive discrimination. To illustrate the organic and abductive unfolding 
of the thesis research trajectory, I have included a simplified abductive map below: 
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FIGURE 6: ABDUCTION MAP OF THE THESIS 
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Methodological considerations of the empirical studies 
Study 1 
As discussed in Chapter 3, there is a discrepancy between everyday perspective-taking and 
the abstract measures used in research. Through conversations with Dr Alex Gillespie, we 
began to explore the viability of a method from psychiatry called the ‘Interpersonal 
Perception Method’ (IPM), which takes as its starting point a relational view where 
misunderstandings are understood to be the result of the difference between perspectives 
rather than the fault of any one individual (Laing, Phillipson, & Lee, 1966).  
The theory behind the IPM reasons that our self-identity is not a construct distinct from our 
meta-identity, but rather interwoven. For example, one’s sense of identity is formed by “my 
looking at me with my view of other’s view of me […] even if a view by another of me is 
rejected it still becomes incorporated in its rejected form as part of my self-identity” (Laing et 
al., 1966, p. 5). This thought echoes the earlier intellectualism of figures such as Mead who 
identified the Other as a constituent part of forming one’s sense of Self, both through real 
interactions (i.e. co-present interactions where you may come to learn how you are perceived 
by others) and imagined interactions (i.e. our regulation of behaviour according to our 
perceptions of what a generalised other may think) (Mead, 1934). The way in which we 
mediate each other’s experiences and behaviour therefore calls for a method which takes the 
dyad as its basic unit of analysis, rather than attempting to understand interactions as the sum 
of individual psychological properties alone. Moreover, since perspectives are reciprocal, in 
the sense that we typically respond to the last thing that we think someone else is thinking 
(which in turn serves as the stimulus for the next response), misunderstandings are common 
in relationships, since a misalignment of perspectives can “spiral” new meanings (Laing et 
al., 1966, p. 29). The project of teasing apart the basis of misunderstandings therefore 
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involves mapping perspectives, both direct on one’s sense of Self and Other, and also meta-
perspectives, to examine the relational differences between perspectives.  
The IPM has scope for different forms of deployment in research. Laing et al. (1966) 
originally used the method to understand marriages and rather ambitiously attempted to map 
all of the possible configurations that exist between people using a 720 question survey which 
took over an hour to complete. The survey probed direct perceptions, meta-perceptions and 
meta-meta-perceptions, triangulating differences and similarities to explore seven constructs 
of agreement, disagreement, understanding, misunderstanding, realization, failure of 
realization and the feeling of being misunderstood. This method is extremely convoluted and 
obfuscates what are potentially much simpler concepts of agreement, misunderstanding and 
perceived misunderstanding.  
Subsequent attempts to use Laing et al.’s method have resulted in deployments which have 
expanded its use from purely personal relationships and simplified some of its complexity. 
Assa-Eley and Kimberlin (2005) used an adapted version of the IPM to explore relationships 
between pharmacists and patients. They developed a seven-item questionnaire which 
focussed on key aspects of the pharmacy-patient relationship such as benefits associated with 
discussing how to use medication and drug side-effects (Assa-Eley & Kimberlin, 2005, p. 
47). Since it was relatively short, questions were administered through telephone interviews. 
Analysis focussed on two constructs: agreement, which was defined in terms of the alignment 
of scores between direct perspectives on the questionnaire; and understanding, which was 
defined in terms of alignment between the pharmacist’s predicted rating by the patient, and 
the patient’s actual rating. Similarly, Kenny et al. (2010) examined doctor-patient 
communication using a 19-point questionnaire administered to both parties after 
consultations. Their interest was to compare perspectives both within-dyads and between 
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dyads using multi-level modelling and reflects how the method can be deployed across large 
populations to benchmark institutional trends in service provision.  
However, even with the simplified questionnaires used above, people with disabilities may 
struggle to fulfil the requirements of traditional survey tasks. Autistic people, for example, 
can be easily overwhelmed by excess information (Van Hees, Moyson, & Roeyers, 2015), 
while discussing social topics may increase anxiety. Talking MatsTM are a communicative 
system developed by Joan Murphy for helping people with communicative difficulties 
(Murphy, 2000). Talking MatsTM involve picture cards for different communicative items 
(e.g. topics such as “what do you want to do today?”) which the user can place under 
different headings arranged on a large mat to indicate their response. Talking MatsTM have 
successfully been used to research people with communicative difficulties such as stroke 
patients, people with acquired brain injury and dementia, showing that is has helped improve 
communication (Pettit, Tönsing, & Dada, 2017). The advantage as a system for 
communicating include its visual simplicity which keep topics being discussed in focus due 
to their physical presence in front of users. This system has been successfully combined with 
elements of the IPM to explore interpersonal relationships between people with aphasia and 
their caregivers (Moore & Gillespie, 2014).   
In our study we used an adapted version of Talking MatsTM to simplify the presentation of 
rating conditions to participants. Thus, three different rating mats were presented which 
explored (1) rating of Self, (2) rating of Other, and (3) predicted rating of Self by Other.  
Through triangulating these three rating dimensions it is possible to analyse levels of 
disagreement in the relationship, which is the difference in perspective between members of a 
dyad, as well as the extent to which members in a dyad adjust from their own view of Self to 
consider the perspectives of Others (e.g. the difference between their view of Self and their 
predicted view of Self by Others). Figure 7 below outlines the constructs explored: 
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FIGURE 7: CONSTRUCTS EXPLORED BY THE IPM 
This framework was particularly beneficial for analysing misunderstandings in autistic family 
relationships because of the potential for multiple origins of misunderstandings. First, it may 
be the case that since perspective-taking involves serial adjustment from one’s own 
worldview (Epley, Keysar, Van Boven, & Gilovich, 2004) a misunderstanding occurs 
because one fails to adequately decentre from their own perspective to take into consideration 
the perspectives of others. Autistic people have been characterised as egocentrically anchored 
in their own perspective (Frith & De Vignemont, 2005), which can be explored through 
comparing ratings of Self with perceived ratings by Other. Second, misunderstandings may 
arise from inaccurate perceptions of others, perhaps due to different biases in perception such 
as stereotypes. Again, the IPM can explore this possibility by comparing one’s predicted 
rating by Other with their actual rating by Other.  
A limitation of the IPM method is that it has potentially less control compared with vignettes. 
The differences in perspective observed will be particular to the relationship and not 
necessarily indicative of broader autistic sociality. Additionally, there is also the challenge of 
what topics to rate given that each relationship is idiosyncratic. To address these concerns, I 
provided a context guide to help participants understand how to situate the topics being rated. 
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For example, the ability to do “everyday activities” included examples such as washing up 
and taking the bus.  
FIGURE 8: EXAMPLE RATING MAT FROM STUDY 1 
 
Pilots were also conducted involving open-ended interviews to generate key topics, and then 
a refinement of using actual topics themselves. An additional consideration in terms of 
selecting topics was the number of topics to rate. Given there were three different rating 
conditions for each participant to complete, there was a danger that too many topics would 
result in saturation of attention and focus. Through piloting I experimented with 17 topics (as 
in the study by Moore and Gillespie) but I found this was exhausting for participants. I thus 
reduced to 12 topics which seemed to be much more manageable by participants. There were 
also some topics that were hard to contextualise and thus abandoned.  For example, we had a 
category for “likes” (e.g. “how much does (person) like to go to the cinema?”) which we 
abandoned, since preferences vary so much between people we could not develop a broadly 
representative selection of topics without significantly increasing the number of topics rated.  
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A further challenge was how to navigate a within-dyad analysis (i.e. how members of a 
relationship compare) and a between-dyad analysis (i.e. how autistic people compare against 
family members). For the within-dyad analysis I used a non-parametric Wilcoxon matched-
pairs signed-rank test, because it could not be assumed that the data were normatively 
distributed between autistic and family member perspectives, and the matched-ranking 
overcame challenges of idiosyncrasies within dyads. This statistic was performed to examine 
which topics experienced the greatest misalignment in perspective. Additionally, I also 
examined the mean scores provided by autistic participants compared with their family 
members to understand broader trends in rating behaviour between autistic participants and 
their family members. To further support this data I asked participants to explain their 
motivations for rating by giving examples where possible. This qualitative insight was 
essential for understanding the causes of misunderstanding in addition to numerical 
misalignment.  
Study 2 
A central challenge of understanding intersubjectivity is that so much meaning is intrinsic to 
the interaction since utterances take place against the backdrop of assumed shared 
understanding (Garfinkel 1964). This challenge is amplified due to the potential for cross-
neurological misunderstanding between myself as a researcher and the autistic people whose 
interactions I aimed to interpret. Methodological considerations for Study 2 can therefore be 
broken down into four key parts: (1) how is intersubjective data selected and captured; (2) 
how is intersubjectivity operationalised as an analytical concept; (3) how does one overcome 
the challenge of analysing intersubjectivity from “outside” of the social action; and (4) how 
does one avoid implicitly imposing neurotypical norms into the interpretation and analysis of 
neurodivergent interactions? 
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My method for eliciting data on intersubjectivity was participant observation in the form of 
video recording the naturally occurring video-gaming sessions at Matthew’s Hub. I chose 
video recording for a number of reasons. Video-gaming is an object-mediated activity in 
which multiple perspectives are apparent in any given moment. Not only are players 
responding to each other, they are also responding to characters in the game as well as events 
and rules of the game. For this reason, I video-recorded interactions so that I could better 
understand who was speaking and who it was directed to when transcribing, features which 
audio recording on its own would have obscured. In addition, video recording is a standard 
method used in conversation analysis, both within research on autism specifically (e.g. Ochs 
& Solomon, 2010) and in the social sciences more broadly (Pink, 2013). However, there are 
limitations to this method. First, participants can have a heightened degree of self-awareness 
due to the presence of recording equipment in the room (Pink, 2013). During the study, many 
participants were curious about the recording equipment and would ask questions while the 
game was loading. This could potentially result in altered behaviour during game-play. As it 
turned out, once the participants began engaging with the game their attention did not return 
to the recording equipment, as evidenced by the absence of any verbal or visual interaction 
with the equipment, thus it was not a significant problem. Another consideration was my 
need to be in the room in case there were any technical difficulties associated with the 
equipment, which meant I was part of the social field being researched. Again, as with the 
recording equipment, participants’ focus remained fixed on the game and each other with less 
attention on me. Exceptions to this practice were instances such as swearing at the game 
when participants would then become aware of my identity in terms of my academic purpose, 
and then laugh; however, in such cases I would reassure participants that it is not a problem 
and the action would quickly resume once again. In any case, for the purposes of analysis, all 
researcher turns were removed from the data.  
93 
 
The second challenge I faced was the question of how to operationalise intersubjectivity, 
which has been used to describe a variety of phenomena in the social sciences, from 
automatic orientation to others, to building shared understanding (Fuchs & de Jaegher, 2009; 
García-Pérez, Lee, & Hobson, 2007; Gillespie & Cornish, 2010b; Schegloff, 1992). My goal 
was to understand the features that allowed neurodivergent participants to build shared 
understanding; however, because such features could be idiosyncratic and hard to recognise 
from the outside, I was limited in what my unit of analysis would be. For this reason, I 
decided to focus only on explicit forms of intersubjectivity (i.e. what was said between 
interlocutors during the interaction). The limitation of this approach is that I could not 
account for the full variety of the unconventional ways in which social coordination may be 
achieved between neurodivergent participants. I did consider the possibility of using 
reconstructive interviews, where participants could provide commentary on their own video 
recordings in a method similar to subjective evidence-based ethnography (Lahlou, 2011). 
This would allow participants to relive their own experiences of the interaction without 
interfering with it in real time, providing insight into their internal processes and potential 
implicit communication, as well as what is explicitly communicated via language. However, I 
did not pursue this option in this particular study design because my goal was to understand 
common features of neurodivergent intersubjectivity across a number of interactions rather 
than a micro-analysis of specific moments. A reconstructive-interview method would require 
an additional stage of triangulation, similar to a qualitative version of the IPM, in order to 
detect similarity across the potentially thousands of micro-moments which are described from 
multiple viewpoints of the participants. Such a project would be valuable, but not within the 
logistical possibilities of a one-person research project.   
An advantage of the decision to focus on intersubjectivity through explicit forms of language 
also had methodological precedence in the form of Conversation Analysis (CA). CA 
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examines the dynamics of everyday talk-in-interaction and seeks to describe the structures 
which enable social action to be organised and developed (Wooffitt, 2005). Everyday social 
encounters have an interactional order because “once individuals – for whatever reason – 
come into one another’s immediate presence, a fundamental condition of social life becomes 
enormously pronounced, namely, its promissory, evidential character” (Goffman, 1982, p. 3). 
These orders are produced routinely and are in many cases automated (Schegloff, 1986), but 
can draw upon and have consequences for, social structures including relationships and 
identity (Goffman, 1982). CA’s main focus therefore, is not on the semantics of language use 
but rather the function of language as a constituent and observable part of organising social 
activity (Seedhouse, 2004). Turn-by-turn analysis can help to reveal patterns of 
intersubjectivity that enable interlocutors to build shared understanding and coordinate action 
(Seedhouse, 2004), which was ideally suited to the research question of Study 2. However, it 
is also important to note that not all of the CA principles, and indeed the ethnomethdological 
principles CA inherits from (Garfinkel, 1964), are adopted for the study. For example, in 
exploring neurodivergent features of intersubjectivity, Study 2 aligns with the 
ethnomethodological goal of attempting to know the methodical basis underpinning the way 
in which actions are produced and recognised (Heritage, 2009), yet it differs in its 
understanding of the extent to which intersubjectivity is contingent on mutually agreed social 
norms. CA in particular has the concept of preference organization – the way in which 
initiative and response sequences of interaction are characterised as socially affiliative 
(Robinson & Bolden, 2010). Although CA aims to be descriptive, preference organisation 
inevitably exerts normative pressure onto the interpretation of moments such as silences, 
hesitations and disclaimers as representing a threat to an interlocutors ‘face’ and as damaging 
the progressivity of intersubjective effort. However, to understand neurodivergent 
intersubjectivity one must consider a broader approach to intersubjectivity than that proposed 
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by the tight social rules explored through micro-analysis in CA. Indeed, research on other 
disabilities which involve communicative impairment, e.g. aphasia, has shown how 
intersubjective processes may be embodied and distributed in ways which are initially not 
apparent to a neurotypical observer (Goodwin, 2004). Thus Study 2 does not aim to prescribe 
and value which interactional moments count as being intersubjective, but rather seeks to 
describe the distinctive features of interactions between autistic participants.  
A third methodological consideration of Study 2 was how to develop a framework and 
process for analysing intersubjectivity. For this purpose I reviewed existing frameworks used 
to analyse intersubjectivity. Initiative-response analysis (Linell, Gustavsson, & Juvonen, 
1988) is a framework designed to examine dominance and coherence in an interaction 
between speakers.  It treats each turn in a conversation as a unit of meaning and analyses 
qualities such as whether the turn initiates a response from a partner, whether it responds to a 
turn from a partner, how dominant or submissive the turn is in length and assertiveness, and 
how distal the turn is in terms of relevance to what has just been said. The framework, 
although complicated, makes key contributions towards Study 2, highlighting the possibility 
of (a) systematically analysing turns of dialogue as part of a co-produced sequentially 
organised action, and (b) building a profile of the dyad as a whole rather than focussing on 
individual speakers. Both of these factors are constituent elements of intersubjectivity, and 
are built into the coding framework used in Study 2. Each turn is rated relatively in terms of 
how it connects to the prior turn, thus the analytical unit being larger than 1-turn is preserved.  
Other interaction frameworks have adopted similar principles, focussing on logical coherence 
between utterances (e.g. Roter & Larson, 2002), affect (e.g. Bales, 1999; Nelson, Grahe, & 
Ramseyer, 2016) and dominance (e.g. Angus, Watson, Smith, Gallois, & Wiles, 2012). There 
are also more automated measures of intersubjectivity (Nelson et al., 2016; Ramseyer & 
Tschacher, 2014). I decided not to use automated frameworks since they apply normative 
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criteria to interactions (e.g. in Ramseyer & Tschacher, 2014, a lack of interaction synchrony 
is operationalised in terms of unreciprocated body movements, which would not suit an 
exploratory analysis of neurodivergent forms of interactions where behaviours may be more 
idiosyncratic). I also aimed to describe intersubjective moments rather than validate good and 
bad forms of intersubjectivity. This connects to the double empathy principle where 
differences in interactional style are understood relationally rather than as deviations from an 
idealised form. Thus, the operationalisation of intersubjectivity focussed on the most 
common descriptive aspects of existing interaction frameworks: coherence, affect and 
symmetry. 
Finally, in taking these measures to be descriptive rather than prescriptive, I was also aiming 
to mitigate the potential for imposing neurotypical criteria on the interpretation of 
neurodivergent data. A further measure employed to manage this issue was to explore the 
possibility of training an autistic coder to conduct cross-neurological inter-rater reliability. 
Two potential candidates were sourced from Matthew’s Hub, and an initial training session 
involved showing how to apply the coding framework to 100 lines of dialogue. One coder 
quickly became bored with the activity and decided to discontinue; the second coder however 
enjoyed the activity and was able to code 10% of the transcripts over two sessions taking a 
total of 4 hours to complete. Through discussing how to apply the framework, further 
clarifications were made. For example, “OK” could be scored as coherent if following an 
instruction (e.g. “we will restart”), or it could be ambiguous if following an open-ended 
question, (which track should we race on?”) therefore the coding framework was updated to 
include information about what kind of response is precipitated by the prior turn (e.g. yes/no 
answers to closed questions = high coherence, whereas yes/no answers to open questions = 
ambiguous). Advantages of the framework were its simplicity in scoring (-1 = fragmented 
from prior turn, 0 = ambiguous to prior turn, +1 contiguous to prior turn) which was 
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understood easily, with positive moments (e.g. laughter) and negative moments (e.g. 
criticism) easy to identify.  
Study 3 
The origin of Study 3 emerged through multiple public engagement activities (e.g. Open 
Minds) as well as first-hand reports from members of Matthew’s Hub, who claimed that they 
faced a lot of stigma due to their diagnosis of autism. The decision to focus on diagnostic 
disclosure aligned with methodological and theoretical developments. Studies 1 and 2 had 
explored the micro-aspects of social interaction, yet it was becoming increasingly clear that 
the double empathy problem draws on a cultural context and I wanted to understand more 
about this superstructure. Designing Study 3 faced a number of methodological challenges. 
The first was how to operationalise a study of culture, which is more than just an 
“explanatory device” of human behaviour (Moscovici, 2000, p. 30), it is a dynamic system 
which produces interactions that are meaningful to various different groups in society, which 
in turn shapes culture itself (Zittoun & Glaveanu, 2017). The heterogenous nature of modern 
society means that culture reflects a plurality of systems for meaning-making (Gillespie, 
2008), as evidenced by the possibility for different cognitive outlooks to co-exist within the 
same individual or group (Jovchelovitch, 2002). Studies of culture may broadly be 
categorised into either micro-level ethnographic methods of data collection and analysis, such 
as participant observation and focus groups which produce very rich and detailed 
observations about mind, relationships and interactions vis-à-vis culture (e.g. Goffman, 
1958), or they examine macro-level symbolic structures through media analysis or large 
vignette-based studies to draw insight about general attitudes and trends over time (e.g. 
Foucault, 1971). Study 2 already constituted a micro-level analysis of real-world interactions 
between autistic people, and although it would have been interesting to extend this study to 
examine, by comparison, cross-neurological intersubjective contexts such as domestic 
98 
 
interactions, this was not viable within the scope of the thesis given the resource limitations 
and access difficulties I had experienced in conducting Study 1. I was also inclined to 
develop a broader insight about autism and culture given that Study 1 and Study 2 focussed 
so heavily on the specific community of Hull. For these reasons I decided to operationalise a 
study of culture that was at the macro-level.  
An area of psychological research which connects the phenomenon of marginalised groups to 
cultural norms is the study of labels (Thompson, 2014). Previous studies on autism have 
focussed on the effect of labels both in terms of self-identification (Brosnan & Mills, 2016) 
and the effects on non-autistic social actors’ perceptions of autistic people (Aspy & 
Grossman, 2013; Faso et al., 2014). Labels are important for autistic people, a) because they 
are achieved through a diagnostic process which then makes accessible a variety of support 
and services (Robinson et al., 2015), and b) as per Hacking’s work noted above, they have a 
potentially transformative effect on social behaviour, and more specifically on perspective-
taking (See Chapter 5). Therefore there was theoretical precedence in support of my own 
abductive interest in developing a study of the culture which supports or hinders autistic 
sociality through exploring the effect of labels.  
The second challenge was how to operationalise the systematic study of the effect of labels. 
Traditionally, labels have been studied through self-report data, where participants provide a 
report about their identification with a particular label (Thompson, 2014), and through 
vignette-based design whereby participants are presented with a stimulus such as a short story 
or a picture about a character that has a particular label (Hughes & Huby, 2004). Both of 
these methods have limitations. Self-report data can be unreliable because of researcher bias 
whereby participants produce answers that they think the researcher wants to hear, rather than 
those that are reflective of their internal state (Bortolotti & Mameli, 2006). Any experimental 
situation is fundamentally a social situation, in which it is difficult to disentangle the 
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psychology of identity management of the researcher-participant relationship, from the 
manipulation of an independent variable to explore participant-stimulus relationships. 
Vignette-based design on the other hand, is limited by the passive way in which participants 
process a stimulus while they are outside the field of social interaction. This reflects a 
longstanding criticism of labelling theory in general, which is very rarely focussed on 
labelling in everyday interactions (Thompson, 2014). The intersubjective context is important 
because it is only in extreme cases that individuals would chose not to interact with someone 
purely on the basis of a label; rather what is more common is that people commit to an 
interaction and the label has a more diffuse longitudinal effect on the way in which 
interlocutors support and scaffold each other’s opportunities for further coordination. 
I therefore wanted to design a new methodology which would address this perception-
behaviour gap. I thus needed a method which could a) triangulate self-report data with 
behavioural insights in response to a label, and b) create a systematic interaction where 
participants are part of the field of action in which the label could be rendered meaningful. To 
achieve this aim I adopted Heider and Simmel’s (1944) attribution paradigm, whereby 
participants are shown a video in which three two-dimensional shapes move around a scene. 
This procedure was effective in creating a simulated interaction between the shapes which 
participants perceived to be reflective of a social power relation. Thus, even when using a 
minimalist paradigm of two-dimensional shapes, it is possible to create a standardised 
interaction which minimises the influence of contextual variables, and could be used 
potentially to understand the more specific effects of a given label (i.e. if one of the shapes 
was labelled as “autistic”). However, this paradigm still has the limitation that the participant 
is separate from the field of action. Thus we do not get insight about how someone thinks 
they are seen by someone else in relation to a label, nor do we understand behaviourally how 
that interpersonal dynamic plays out.  
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To address this issue, I programmed a computer game-version of Heider and Simmel’s 
paradigm. Computer-mediated interactions are beneficial in psychological research because 
they can provide experimental control without sacrificing a large degree of ecological 
validity. This has been termed the “control-mundane trade-off” (Blascovich et al., 2002, p. 
104). In the developed game, Dyad3D, participants must navigate through a series of mazes 
as a red ball. In order to be successful they must collaborate with a silver ball, which they 
perceive to be another online player but is actually an intelligent virtual agent (IVA), to open 
a series of doors and collect their respective gold bricks to complete the level. Before 
participants began navigating through the mazes, they were superficially able to communicate 
with the IVA through sending a ballistic message about their reflections on handling the 
tutorial phase of the game. This message acted as the independent variable. It was 
manipulated to form three conditions: (1) a no diagnosis condition where the IVA expresses 
difficulty with balancing multiple tasks but skill in navigating; (2) a dyslexia condition where 
a diagnosis of dyslexia is inserted into the aforementioned information; and (3) an autism 
condition, where a diagnosis of autism is inserted into the aforementioned information. In 
every experiment, the IVA was programmed to behave the same way throughout the mazes.  
Specifically, to create a focal point for the study, I programmed the IVA to deliberately take 
an incorrect path during the game which would purposefully frustrate the participant. The 
reason for creating such a misunderstanding was to examine how participants would draw on 
the partial knowledge they have of the IVA to make sense of the sudden breakdown in 
interaction (i.e. potentially bringing the label into focus). To make the misunderstanding 
salient, each level of the game was scored, with faster completion times achieving a higher 
score. Scores were presented on a superficial leaderboard after each level to indicate a 
relative ranking, (e.g. position 4th out of the last ten dyads to complete the level). Following 
the misunderstanding participants were ranked last and finished the game ranked last, thus the 
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misunderstanding is observed to have a detrimental effect on performance in the game. In the 
post-game questionnaire, participants were asked to explain their experience of the game, 
with all participants making reference to the misunderstanding. Further questions probed how 
they interpreted the information supplied by the IVA. Behaviourally, I also recorded actions 
in response to the misunderstanding to compare with self-report questions on levels of 
frustration and coordination. For example, the number of times participants pressed a button 
while the misunderstanding was taking place, and the mean duration of each button pressed, 
could give an indication of levels of frustration. I also measured the mean distance between 
the player and the IVA for each level of the game, and the time difference between collecting 
their respective gold cubes, to understand levels of coordination in the game. Combined with 
a post-game questionnaire, this interactive design allowed me to, a) create a simulated 
interaction which is the same for all participants; b) vary the information provided to 
participants about the identity of their online partner so that I could conduct group 
comparisons between conditions to examine the effect of disclosing diagnosis; and c) 
triangulate self-reported measures with behavioural measures observed in the game. This 
design allowed me to examine the discrepancy in the literature regarding positive 
discrimination observed in self-report studies, and negative discrimination in reports from 
autistic people about everyday social life.  
Ethics 
To conduct psychological research, principal investigators and institutional review boards 
must evaluate whether the proposed study raises any ethical concerns (Corti, 2015). The BPS 
(British Psychological Society, 2018) and the APA (American Psychological Association, 
2016) both detail criteria for ensuring the highest standards of professional conduct and 
ethical responsibility while undertaking research. The BPS identifies four ethical principles 
while the APA identifies five ethical principles. They are in alignment on issues of: (1) 
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respect/people’s rights and dignity (which relates to respecting the dignity and worth of all 
people, their individual and cultural differences, as well as taking appropriate measures to 
safeguard vulnerable people who may be impaired in their decision-making); (2) 
Responsibility/Fidelity and Responsibility (which relates to being aware of the professional 
and scientific responsibilities to participants or animals and to society as a whole, as well as 
using one’s knowledge and skills appropriately); (3) Integrity (which relates to “being honest, 
truthful, accurate and consistent in one’s actions, words decisions, methods and outcomes” 
(British Psychological Society, 2018, p. 7), as well as avoiding conflicts of interest and 
maintaining professional boundaries); and (4) Competence/Justice (which relates to 
possessing the appropriate skills and understanding the boundaries of one’s competence, as 
well as allowing all people to access and benefit to the contributions of psychology). Where 
they differ is that the APA has an additional consideration of “beneficence and 
nonmaleficence”, which states that the motivation of psychologists is to benefit those with 
whom they work, and in order to achieve this the researcher must critically reflect at all times 
about their “personal, financial, social, organizational, or political factors that might lead to 
misuse of their influence” (American Psychological Association, 2016), as well as the 
potential for their judgements to impact the lives of others.  
In alignment with the principle of respect (1), this thesis has taken several measures. Its 
abductive approach described in Chapter 4 has ensured that research has been directed 
through interactions and discussions with autistic people. The language used to refer and 
discuss autism is in accordance with the majority preference of autistic people (Kenny et al., 
2016), and when presenting about research, I have always acknowledged the responsibility 
that comes with speaking publicly about autism which is a key responsibility recently 
highlighted by the Participatory Autism Research Collective (PARC, 2018a). Moreover, it 
has critically reflected on the prevalence of the deficit-model of disability, which is focussed 
103 
 
on characterising and predicting the limitations of autistic people, finding this approach to be 
ontologically and epistemologically flawed, undermining the integrity and rights of autistic 
people in the process. In response this thesis has sought to be descriptive rather than 
prescriptive, and in doing so has focussed on capturing the psychological factors that enable 
social interaction for autistic people, highlighting unrealised potential for perspective-taking 
and social interaction. It has also consulted carefully throughout with autistic academics to 
gain feedback about the validity of methods used.  
In alignment with the principle of responsibility (2), I worked very closely with autistic 
people to build strong relationships which extend beyond the timeframe of the thesis. In 
doing so I have looked to bring new opportunities to the autistic people I have worked with 
and the charity Matthew’s Hub, including creating platforms for their voices to be heard in 
public (discussed in Chapter 4), and exploring the possibility of integrating autistic people 
into the research design through cross-neurological inter-rater reliability. In addition, I have 
remained conscious about the potential impact of my research on society through making 
research outputs accessible and learning from dialogue through social media from users of 
my research. The potential for my research findings to impact society is discussed further 
below.  
In accordance with the principle of integrity (3) I have followed the BPS and APA guidelines 
carefully throughout my research, providing all participants with the opportunity to withdraw 
at any point and to question the nature of the research and my personal goals for completing 
my PhD. Study 3, in using deception, presents a potential challenge to integrity as it is a 
situation where the experimental design is purposely not fully disclosed to participants at the 
beginning of the study. Many steps were taken to ensure integrity which were reviewed 
through three different ethics committees and which are documented in greater detail below.  
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In alignment with the principle of competence and justice (4) I have undertaken training in 
skills relevant to the successful completion of the thesis including qualitative and quantitative 
analysis, teaching, and public engagement skills. In addition I have undertaken personal 
training in programming, graphic design, and video-editing. I have recognised the limits of 
my own ability and knowledge through seeking advice from my supervisor where appropriate 
and consulting experts in the field of autism research.  
Finally, in alignment with the APA principal of “beneficence and nonmaleficence” I have 
investigated different options for translating my research into more accessible forms, such as 
videos, animations and graphically simple power-point slides. This not only allows autistic 
people to understand some of the more abstract theoretical constructs I explore, but equally it 
broadens the reach on my outputs to practitioners, carers and family members who are all an 
integral part of the support structure that may surround autistic people. This is particularly 
important given the empirical contribution from Study 1, that it is very easy to misread 
autistic people.  
In addition to the general standards of ethical practice, research on autism has a number of 
prerequisite ethical considerations. Moreover, the way in which I have operationalised my 
research questions (i.e. investigating real interpersonal relationships autistic people share with 
family members, investigating lived social interactions between autistic people, and 
deceiving participants into thinking they are interacting with autistic people), carries with it 
further considerations which will be relevant to future researchers who may wish to deploy 
these methods. 
Working with autistic people 
Researching with autistic adults requires a number of additional considerations (Lory, 2018). 
Unfamiliar people, changes in routines, and questions regarding their own sociability may all 
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potentially increase levels of stress and discomfort, yet these features form the bedrock of any 
study working with autistic people. In writing about her experiences of being an autistic 
participant in research, Becca Lory (2018) highlights how researchers often only think about 
participants in terms of the moments in which data is elicited and omit important logistical 
challenges of planning, traveling, and adjusting to new routines which can have a detrimental 
effect on finite energy reserves (Lory, 2018). Simple considerations could drastically 
ameliorate the difficulty of participation and improve “the precarious relationship between 
autistic person living on the spectrum and the researchers focused on understanding it” (Lory, 
2018, p. 2).  
For these reasons, an essential step in working with autistic people for Study 1 and Study 2 
was spending time at Matthew’s Hub, which allowed me to familiarise myself with their 
members, getting to know the general concerns and more specifically their concerns about 
partaking in research. All my research with autistic people either took place at Matthew’s 
Hub at a convenient time for the participant, or it involved home visits where participants 
were once again in a familiar and comfortable environment. I made sure to wear clothes 
without patterns in case it should be distracting for my participants. Participants were 
informed well in advance about the opportunity to participate and were free to withdraw at 
any moment, so that participants could get used to the idea of participating in research. In 
addition all participants were provided with a debrief sheet that included details of support 
services available to autistic adults in the event that they felt upset either during or after data 
collection in any of the studies. 
All my participants were above the age of consent and were intellectually able. Additional 
steps were taken due to the possibility that their autism might impact their decision-making 
with regards to participation. Thus, all participants were provided with participant 
information sheets and the opportunity to raise and discuss any questions with myself or staff 
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at Matthew’s Hub. In all cases I sought further guidance from Matthew’s Hub about the 
suitability of participation for members. The main concerns raised by autistic participants 
centred on anonymity and the relevance of the research to everyday life. Confidentiality was 
maintained throughout with individual participant data not circulated back to participants and 
all personally identifying information removed from data. Moreover, all data was stored on 
an encrypted USB drive. This process was discussed in advance with all participants in each 
of the studies in accordance with APA guidelines (American Psychological Association, 
2016, sec. 4.02). Concern about the relevance of research reflects a more widespread issue in 
research in general, where “the evaluation of the research is no longer focused solely on the 
usual scientific criteria […] rather the question of the usefulness of the research and its results 
for the participant becomes a main criterion” (Flick, 2011, p. 7). By nature, this thesis is 
applied since it empirically investigates the phenomena of double empathy and it does so by 
focussing on the most pertinent ways in which it affects the social life of autistic people.  
Investigating misunderstandings in real relationships 
Since Study 1 involved collecting sensitive data, particularly about divergences of 
perspective in family relationships, all data remained confidential and anonymised, with 
dyad-level data not circulated back to participants. This is in accordance with other studies 
which have used the IPM procedure (Moore & Gillespie, 2014) because doing research with 
families presents the risk that they are confronted with aspects of their situation through 
questions from the researcher (Flick, 2009). More specifically to the IPM, discovering the 
presence of previously unknown misunderstandings could have a transformative effect on 
such family relationships. As per all studies, interactions with the researcher were informal 
and relaxed, and included a number of breaks since rating multiple items could be exhausting 
for participants. During the course of the IPM, participants used the topics to draw upon their 
own life experiences, many of which could be challenging. To reduce the potential negative 
107 
 
impact of such recollections, I reminded participants before the study that they were not 
obliged to talk about anything which made them feel uncomfortable or which could have a 
residual effect on their mental health. During the IPM I further reminded participants of their 
freedom to discuss only what they felt comfortable disclosing. A debrief sheet was provided 
to all participants which provided contact details in case there were any follow up questions 
(none received) as well as detailing a list of supports available to participants should they 
wish to speak to someone about their concerns.  
Investigating everyday interactions between autistic people 
Participant observation reduces the distance between the researcher and the situation they 
observe through an extended period of participation in the field. This becomes an “essential 
instrument of data collection” but at the same time can potentially result in less standardised 
data (Flick, 2011, p. 121). Participant observation involves two primary processes, first the 
researchers must find access to the social field and become participants in order to be part of 
the action (Flick, 2011, p. 121). This was initiated prior to the thesis in the summer of 2014 
when I approached Matthew’s Hub about the possibility of learning more about their 
members and conducting research. This allowed me to build participant trust which is an 
essential ethical consideration of working with autistic people. A second process related to 
participant observation is how the observation becomes anchored to a specific research 
question. To achieve this aim it is important the researcher remains open at all times (Flick, 
2009). In this respect, Study 2 would be more accurately described as a focussed observation 
since it centred on a specific activity of video-gaming, which emerged as a topic of interest 
through a wider abductive process detailed in Chapter 4. Further ethical considerations of 
using participant observation as a method centre on the extent to which the researcher is 
directly active in the field. Although I was studying a naturally occurring activity, I was still 
part of the field of action through my presence in the room and my role in setting up and 
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managing the recording equipment. For example, sometimes participants would ask me 
questions about the recording equipment, or questions about a game they were playing. In 
some cases we also had a situation where one player had to leave (e.g. catching a bus) and no 
other player could be found. In such moments I played on the Xbox with the participants so 
that they were not denied the opportunity to continue playing games. All conversational turns 
involving me, and any situations which did not involve autistic-to-autistic interactions, were 
removed from the analysis.  
Using deception in a simulated interaction design 
The main ethical considerations of Study 3 related to the use of deception. Deception is often 
used in psychological research to avoid the Hawthorne effect, the tendency for participants to 
behave according to their beliefs about the researcher’s aims and expectations (Bortolotti & 
Mameli, 2006). The APA identifies three criteria governing the use of deception, including 
(a) that it “has significant prospective scientific, educational or applied value” and that there 
are no non-deceptive alternative procedures feasible; (b) that such deception results in no 
harm; and (c) that the deception is revealed as soon as possible and no later than at the 
conclusion of data collection (American Psychological Association, 2016, sec. 8.07).  
In response to (a), our systematic investigation of the effects of the label of autism on social 
perception and interaction could not have been achieved unless participants believed they 
were interacting with another person. The only methodological alternative would have been 
to source actual autistic participants to be paired with non-autistic participants. However, this 
was logistically impossible considering the very large sample sizes required from power 
analysis (60+) and resource constraints (i.e. one researcher). It would also reduce 
experimental control as participant’s experiences would vary between interactions reducing 
comparative insight between groups. Finally, it would still require an element of deception 
given that non-autistic participants would not be aware that half the participant pool was 
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comprised of autistic participants. A simulated interaction through a video-game was 
therefore justified as an appropriate method for exploring the research question which 
contributes to understanding discrimination towards autistic people in society.  
In response to (b), extensive piloting and three focus groups were conducted to examine the 
potential for the study to result in harm. Beyond frustration with the misunderstanding 
experienced, participants did not report any negative consequences of taking part in the 
research and were happy for other participants to be involved in the same study. Feedback 
from ethical committees also assessed risk of harm to be no greater than might be reasonably 
expected of any situation in life where people are asked to collaborate. As noted below it was 
explained to participants in the debrief the scientific rationale for using deception, with many 
participants amused at finding an explanation for why they experienced a misunderstanding 
in the game. In addition, there was frequent positive feedback from participants claiming that 
they had found the game fun to complete.  
In response to (c) participants were informed about the deception immediately after 
completing the study and were offered the opportunity to ask questions of the researcher 
about the nature of the deception and the aim of the study in general. Moreover, in 
conversations during the debrief, a number of participants mentioned that they enjoyed 
playing the game. One participant even offered to design future maps for the game. This 
feedback indicates that the game not only has minimal risk, but also has the potential to 
create a positive effect for the participants.  
In addition to the measures above, there are also considerations about the violation of 
participants’ autonomy in that deception results in participants being studied in a way that 
they may not have consented to (Bortolotti & Mameli, 2006). However, alternative 
approaches to informed consent involve disclosing to the participant, in advance of the study, 
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the possibility that not all the correct information will be supplied. We chose not to pursue 
this method because the validity of the study was contingent on the belief that participants 
were interacting with another person online, thus doubts about experimental design would 
critically impact how participants make sense of the misunderstanding they experience in the 
game. Another option for informed consent is informed consent by proxy, where a participant 
can nominate a person they trust who is given all the information about the experiment, and 
this proxy can judge whether the research participant should take part (Bortolotti & Mameli, 
2006). We opted for an amended version of this approach since it was not feasible, given the 
online means by which the study was administered, to recruit proxies in addition to 
participants. Instead, we asked all participants whether they would be happy for other 
participants to go through the same experimental procedure. This method is advantageous 
since it provides feedback both about the participants’ autonomy in relation to being deceived 
as well as acting as a proxy for future participants.  
Three IRB approvals for research were granted from the department, research lab and 
university where the study was conducted. A condition of approval focussed on monitoring 
the deception closely, both in terms of the impact of the deception study on the wider 
participant pool and the impact of the deception on the participant and whether they would 
object to another person being subject to the same deception. To monitor impact on the study 
we asked participants if they had participated in any other deception studies at the research 
lab, and whether they had suspicions during the study of being deceived. We also examined 
the detailed descriptions provided by participants to see if they voiced concerns about 
deception in the study. In the debrief we also asked participants if they would be happy for 
other participants to go through the same process. This protocol was similar to that observed 
in Corti’s (2015) doctoral thesis which also used deception to create simulated interactions. If 
at any time a participant voiced ethical concerns regarding participation or the participation 
111 
 
of others, all trials would cease and the protocol be re-evaluated.  In addition, extensive 
piloting involving 183 participants and three focus groups, helped to provide feedback about 
the game and ensure its development and protocol was in-line with ethical considerations of 
participants as well as guidelines provided by the APA and BPS.  
  
112 
 
5) TWO-SIDED PERSPECTIVE-TAKING 
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6) NEURODIVERGENT INTERSUBJECTIVITY 
  
125 
 
Introduction  
  
126 
 
 
  
127 
 
Method 
 
  
128 
 
 
  
129 
 
Results 
 
  
130 
 
 
  
131 
 
 
  
132 
 
 
  
133 
 
Discussion  
  
134 
 
 
  
135 
 
 
  
136 
 
 
  
137 
 
7) DIAGNOSTIC DISCLOSURE OF AUTISM 
Non-autistic collaborators over-estimate how helpful they are towards online partners 
that disclose a diagnosis of autism 
Abstract 
Research on how autistic people are perceived by neurotypical people indicates that 
disclosing a diagnosis leads to a positive discriminatory bias; however, autistic testimonies 
indicate that diagnostic disclosure often results in negative discriminatory behaviour. We 
report on an exploratory study to compare people’s self-reported helping behaviour with their 
actual helping behaviour towards an assumed autistic collaborator. We led 256 participants to 
believe that they were interacting online with a real person to play Dyad3D, a maze 
navigation game where players must work together to open doors and complete the levels. 
However, participants were actually playing with an intelligent virtual agent (IVA) that is 
programmed to behave the same way across all interactions. This design enabled us to 
manipulate the diagnostic status of the IVA that participants received prior to collaboration 
across three conditions: no disclosure, dyslexia disclosure and autism disclosure. We use this 
method to explore two research questions: (1) is Dyad3D viable in creating a simulated 
interaction that could deceive participants into believing they were collaborating with another 
human player online? and (2) what are the effects of disclosing an autism diagnosis on social 
perception and collaboration? Combined with a post-game questionnaire, we compared 
differences between diagnostic conditions and differences between self-reported behaviour 
and actual behaviour in the game. Our findings show that Dyad3D proved to be an efficient 
and viable method for creating a believable interaction (deception success rate >96%). 
Moreover, diagnostic disclosure of autism results in the IVA being perceived as more 
intelligent and useful, but participants also perceived themselves to be more helpful towards 
the IVA than they actually were. We evaluate the strengths and limitations of the current 
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method and provide recommendations for future research. The source code for Dyad3D is 
freely available (CC-BY-NC 4.0) so that the study is reproducible and open to future 
adaptation.  
Introduction 
There is a growing interest in the role non-autistic people play in shaping social opportunities 
for autistic people (Milton et al., 2018). While the abilities of autistic people to understand 
the perspectives of neurotypical others has been well documented, typically developing 
people have been shown to experience difficulties in interpreting autistic perspectives 
(Heasman & Gillespie, 2018b; Jaswal & Akhtar, 2018; Sheppard et al., 2016), which can 
potentially have longer-term consequences for social opportunities for autistic people (Sasson 
et al., 2017).  To date a number of studies have explored how autistic expressions and 
behaviour are perceived by non-autistic people through vignettes and thin-slice judgements 
(e.g. utilising video, image and audio), showing that disclosing a diagnosis of autism 
significantly improves evaluations (e.g. Brosnan & Mills, 2016; Chambres, Auxiette, 
Vansingle, & Gil, 2008; Faso, Sasson, & Pinkham, 2014). However, reports from autistic 
people indicate that disclosure of a diagnosis can also result in stigma and negative 
discrimination (Davidson & Henderson, 2010; Powell & Acker, 2016; Treweek et al., 2018), 
resulting in a gap in the literature in connecting self-reported perceptions with actual 
behaviour.  
We examined the effect of the label ‘autism’ on social perception and behaviour on 256 
participants through an online collaborative video-game, where the participants believed they 
were interacting with a human partner to navigate through a maze, when in fact they were 
interacting with an intelligent virtual agent (IVA), programmed to behave the same way for 
all participants. We examined social perception and behaviour of participants in three 
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conditions, (1) a no disclosure condition, (2) a dyslexia disclosure condition, and (3) an 
autism disclosure condition.  
Studies of how autistic people are perceived by non-autistic people 
Research on how autistic people are perceived by non-autistic people has found evidence of 
both positive and negative discrimination when a diagnosis of autism is disclosed. Using a 
variety of stimuli (still images, audio, video), evidence suggests that when no diagnostic 
information is provided, autistic people are perceived as more socially awkward (Grossman, 
2015), idiosyncratic (Brewer et al., 2016), less attractive and less likeable resulting in reduced 
intention to pursue social interactions (Sasson & Morrison, 2017). These judgements can 
form very quickly (e.g. based on brief exposure to video: Grossman, 2015) and show little 
change with increased exposure to stimulus (Sasson et al., 2017). Studies which have 
manipulated the diagnostic status of stimuli presented to participants have shown that 
knowing someone has a diagnosis of autism can result in significantly more positive social 
evaluations (Chambres et al., 2008) and improved affective attitudes (Brosnan & Mills, 
2016). However, such effects are shaped by a number of contextual factors, such as the 
gender (Chambres et al., 2008) and the identity of the perceiver (Gernsbacher et al., 2017), in 
addition to the medium in which the stimulus is presented (e.g. audio-visual stimulus versus a 
speech transcript: Sasson & Morrison, 2017). Moreover, even with knowledge of a diagnosis, 
ratings have been shown to lag behind those of typically developing targets who were 
mislabelled as autistic (Sasson & Morrison, 2017). Thus knowledge of a diagnosis only 
partially corrects for negative interpretations of autistic behaviour and, moreover, positive 
effects are not always consistently observed.  
Autistic testimonies also indicate that autistic people are misunderstood by non-autistic others 
resulting in stigma (Chell, 2006; Nick Chown & Beardon, 2017; Dekker, 1999; Treweek et 
al., 2018). Moreover, media representations have largely focussed on autism as an illness that 
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is a burden to others (Brownlow, Bertilsdotter Rosqvist, & O’Dell, 2015; Clarke, 2011; Huws 
& Jones, 2011; Sarrett, 2011), framing autism in terms of a deficit rather than a difference 
from a neurotypical majority norm (Kapp et al., 2013; Ortega, 2009; Ridout, 2017; Smukler, 
2005). In turn, this has contributed to stigma experienced by autistic people in interpersonal 
relationships (Hacking, 1999; Heasman & Gillespie, 2018b). There is therefore a gap in terms 
of connecting the self-reported positive discriminatory behaviours observed in research using 
vignettes, and the actual behaviour of non-autistic people towards autistic people. Yet 
exploring this perception-behaviour gap presents a methodological challenge in terms of 
establishing a standardised interaction so that comparisons across groups can be observed.  
Methods for simulating interactions 
Studies of how autistic people are perceived have traditionally used vignettes. Vignettes are 
passages of text, images, or other types of stimuli (e.g. video) which present a hypothetical 
situation to participants to elicit a response, either observed or self-reported (Grbich, 2013; 
Hughes & Huby, 2004). They are a common technique used in social research to elicit data 
and can be used to incorporate a variety of detail about social situations; from abstract 
pictures and short text which impose low cognitive demand, to more elaborate immersive 
video and audio which draw upon participants’ own experiences (Kinicki, Hom, Trost, & 
Wade, 1995). Vignettes can be used to explore automated and intuitive psychological 
processes, for example Heider and Simmel’s (1944) classic attribution paradigm, where 
participants observe shapes moving around a scene, explores how participants impute human 
social behaviour to abstract entities. 
Although vignettes provide a controlled way to present context to participants, they remain 
limited by the extent to which participants interpret them in a way which is divorced from the 
pressures of real social life (Hughes & Huby, 2004). One limitation of studies which use 
vignettes is that they lack a key social psychological feature involved in human behaviour: 
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understanding Self from the social position of Others (Mead, 1934).  In vignette studies, 
participants are not active in the social field they evaluate; rather they evaluate psychological 
targets knowing that the targets themselves do not perceive them in return. Moreover, while 
participants passively observe vignettes presented to them, they remain active social agents in 
the research setting, behaving in response to instructions and expectations of the researcher, a 
phenomenon known as response bias or the Hawthorne effect (Furnham, 1986; McCarney et 
al., 2007).  
Confederate-based studies aim to situate the participant in a controlled social setting where 
they are interacting with a confederate (i.e. a participant who is actually working for the 
researcher). This type of design has been classically illustrated, for example through Asch’s 
study of conformity, where participants were led by the majority of confederates to report an 
incorrect answer in judging the lengths of a line (Asch, 1956), and Milgram’s study of 
obedience (1963), where participants were led to believe that they were causing harm to a 
participant (the confederate) in another room. The advantage of confederate-based studies is 
that they minimise the impact of potential response biases by focussing more on observed 
behaviour than self-reported data. However, confederate studies require additional 
methodological considerations, including formalised procedures for interaction and extensive 
training to ensure consistency of behaviour participants are exposed to (Corti & Gillespie, 
2015).  
An alternative approach to simulating interactions is through virtual environments, which 
enable interactions to be replicated while immersing the participant within a social world or 
scenario (Blascovich et al., 2002; Gillespie et al., 2018). Instead of using the actual presence 
of others, virtual environments use computer-generated avatars to represent human 
interactants (Bailenson, Beall, Loomis, Blascovich, & Turk, 2004; Blascovich et al., 2002). 
Virtual environments allow researchers to decouple rendered behaviour from actual 
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behaviour through controlling audio-visual perceptual channels (Bailenson et al., 2004; Yee, 
Bailenson, & Ducheneaut, 2009). Moreover, they are adaptable, facilitating research into 
abstract or more socially complex scenarios. For example, Cyberball (Williams et al., 2000) 
is a virtual ball tossing game used to examine social ostracism, whereby participants are led 
to believe they are playing with others online, when in truth they play with a virtual agent that 
is programmed to deliberately exclude the participant from the game. This minimalist format 
has the advantage of providing a gradable way to manipulate the independent variable of 
levels of ostracism. Alternatively, virtual environments can encompass a high degree of 
social complexity (Gillespie et al., 2018), both in terms of the identity that avatars portray and 
the communication systems used between avatars (Evans, 2012). “Second Life” is an 
example of a massively multiplayer online role-playing game (MMORPG) used in 
psychological research, where users have no task-specific focus other than their own interest 
in exploring and socialising (Boelstorff, 2008; Evans, 2012). Building on such ideas, we 
developed Dyad3D as a tool that could be used to simulate interactions with participants 
while controlling an independent variable of diagnostic disclosure. 
Dyad3D design 
To explore how disclosing a diagnosis of autism affects social perception and behaviour of 
non-autistic people, we adapted Heider and Simmel’s (1944) social attribution paradigm, 
which involves two-dimensional geometric shapes moving around a box, into a three-
dimensional ostensibly computer-mediated game. The participant plays as a sphere which 
moves around a maze and must work with another sphere-shaped avatar, an intelligent virtual 
agent (IVA), that participants believe to be human. Since the IVA follows the same path 
regardless of participants’ actions, it is possible to create the illusion of a collaborative 
computer-mediated task and thus create a standardised experience of interacting which is the 
same for all participants.  
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Combined with a questionnaire administered after the game, this format allows us to examine 
(1) variation between self-report perception and actual in-game behaviour; and (2) variation 
between groups of participants who have received different labels for the IVA. Since we were 
interested in understanding the effects of disclosing a diagnosis of autism prior to the task, we 
accordingly grouped participants into an “autism” condition (i.e. where participants are led to 
believe they are playing with an autistic participant) and a control condition (i.e. where no 
information about a diagnosis is disclosed). We also included an additional group with 
another diagnosis, dyslexia, to observe whether differences in comparison to the control 
condition were specific to the label of autism or a diagnostic label in general. Dyslexia was 
chosen since it is a well-known label to describe difficulties in processing information, there 
are no associated physical indicators, and like autism it can involve difficulties in planning 
and organisation (Gooch, Snowling, & Hulme, 2011) which are relevant to the nature of the 
game in which participants must handle multiple tasks (exploring, navigating, coordinating 
action).  
While advances in graphics and immersive virtual environments provide the opportunity for 
replicating detailed social situations, we based our study on the minimalist paradigm of 
Heider and Simmel which uses basic geometric shapes, because it provides control (e.g. there 
are no non-verbal interpersonal cues) and we were curious to see if disclosing a diagnosis of 
autism, which is defined as a social disability, would affect participants’ perceptions and 
behaviours in a predominantly logical game task. In addition, for practical reasons a 
minimalist abstract design provides a baseline for the game to be iteratively expanded in 
terms of ecological complexity by researchers for further use, with the source code freely 
available at: https://bitbucket.org/enghoff/dyad3d.  
The design process for Dyad3D was iterative over 18 months involving 183 participants, with 
interviews and focus groups after pilot sessions feeding into further developments of the 
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game. The structure of the game (described with associated pictures below) involves 
navigating through a maze with an IVA that behaves the same way for every participant. 
Dyad3D ostensibly requires collaboration (hence the name “Dyad”), because some doors in 
the maze can only be opened by the player, and other doors can only be opened by the IVA. 
However, the game is configured so that the participant progresses successfully in the initial 
levels before a misunderstanding occurs where the IVA deliberately goes the wrong way in 
the maze and leaves the participant trapped in a prison which severely reduces the 
participant’s overall score. This perceived “misunderstanding” provides a reference point for 
participants to discuss and evaluate what went wrong given the partial information they have 
about their partner. Every participant has the same experience of the interaction unfolding 
because the IVA is programmed to follow a specific path.  
Manipulation of the independent variable (i.e. the diagnostic disclosure) is achieved through 
an option at the start of the game where participants are invited to reflect on their 
performance in the tutorial of the game through typing a message that is sent to the “online 
partner”. Diagnostic disclosure is contained in the message participants receive from the IVA, 
with participants randomly assigned to one of three conditions: a no diagnostic disclosure 
condition, a dyslexia disclosure condition, and an autism disclosure condition. Behaviour in 
the game was recorded and a post-game questionnaire examined self-reported perception of 
the collaboration. The research aims were thus as follows: (1) to examine whether Dyad3D 
was viable in creating a simulated interaction that could deceive participants into believing 
they were collaborating with another player online, and (2) to examine the effects of 
disclosing an autism diagnosis, both in terms of (2a) comparing self-reported social 
perception scores with actual behaviour in the game, and (2b) examining the qualitative 
explanations provided by participants about their experience of participation.  
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Method 
Ethics 
BPS and APA procedures regarding informed consent and ethical guidelines were followed, 
with ethical approval granted by the researcher’s university ethics committee (ref: 000674). 
Participants were briefed about the nature of the study (i.e. they were informed that they 
would be navigating through a series of mazes with an online collaborator) and were 
informed of their right to withdraw at any time. All participants stated after participation that 
they were happy for people like them to go through the study.  
Materials and measures 
Dyad3D game 
Dyad3D involves navigating through four mazes of increasing complexity by opening doors 
to reach a rotating gold cube at the end of each level. The participant plays as a 3-dimensional 
virtual ball and navigates by using arrow keys on the keyboard. To successfully complete the 
mazes the participant must work with another ball, the IVA, to open a series of doors, and to 
free each other from a prison at the start of each level. Some doors can be unlocked by the 
player, and some can be unlocked by the IVA.  
The game is structured into three parts. In Part 1 the participants completed a tutorial where 
they were systematically introduced to different elements required to complete a level (e.g. 
Figure 1a). The tutorial lessons included: (1) navigating to move and ‘collect’ gold cubes by 
colliding with them; (2) learning how to search for hidden buttons to open doors and collect 
the gold cubes; (3) learning that some doors can be opened by the red player (participant), 
and some opened by the silver player (IVA), thus collaboration is required; (4) learning how 
to free the other player from a prison (same process as unlocking doors); and (5) familiarising 
with a full game scenario including receiving a score based on time remaining in the level.   
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1h) 
 
Figure 1: 1a) starting Part 1, involing tutorial training for movement; 1b) starting Part 2, where 
participants are invited to reflect on the tutorial and send this information to their online partner (the IVA); 
1c) the information received from the IVA in the control condition; 1d) starting Part 3, where the 
participant must navigate through the maze. The IVA is the silver ball and the human participant is the red 
ball; 1e) a leaderboard providing a score and ostensible ranking which is shown after every level; 1f) 
Level 3 misunderstanding where the IVA, despite immediately unlocking the participant from the prison, 
chooses instead to take an incorrect route through the maze wasting valuable time; 1g) the leaderboard 
after Level 3 which reflects a sharp drop in ranking to last position, 10th; 1h) Level 4 where the participant 
is faced with the option of collecting a gold cube before helping the IVA, or freeing the IVA first.  
 
In Part 2, participants had the opportunity to reflect on their progress in the tutorial and send a 
message to their online partner (Figure 1b). Ostensibly, this aimed to aid collaboration by 
sharing information about strengths and weaknesses. After sharing information, participants 
were taken to an artificial loading screen and waited for 14 seconds to be “paired” with 
another available partner online (in truth, the IVA). This was designed to further the illusion 
that participants were playing with other humans (and thus need to be temporally 
coordinated) and not directly with an IVA. In the next window, participants were told they 
had been successfully paired with a “partner” (Figure 1c). They then received a message from 
the IVA, in which information about the diagnostic status of the IVA is contained. We chose 
a statement that offered both positive and negative feedback, indicating difficulty with 
organisational skills but a strength in navigational ability. For participants in the autism 
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condition, the information received was: “I found balancing multiple tasks tricky since I am 
autistic but my control is good”. For participants in the dyslexia condition, the information 
had the words “since I am dyslexic” substituted. Participants in the control condition 
received: “I found balancing multiple tasks tricky but my control is good”. To further the 
strength of the deception, fake 24-digit identification numbers were created which matched 
the style of the participants own anonymous ID (as administered by Prolific). These IDs were 
displayed at the top of all subsequent screens in the game along with the information shared 
by the player and IVA (Figure 1d).  
Part 3 involved playing the game, where participants progressed through four levels of mazes 
(Figure 1d). At the start of each level the dyad had 1000 points which decreased by eight 
points a second, with the time stopping when both players picked up their respective gold 
cubes. In addition, the player and IVA alternated in terms of who started the level in a prison 
and required support from the other to be freed.  
The game was designed so that the first two levels were completed very easily and the IVA 
appears cooperative in terms of efficiently moving and opening doors, freeing the player from 
the prison and picking up the gold cube at the end of the level. A fake leaderboard was 
provided after each level which provided a ranking for performance, ostensibly based on the 
last ten dyads to complete the game (Figure 1e). In the third level, however, the IVA 
deliberately took the wrong path through the maze and ignored the participant waiting to be 
freed from the prison (Figure 1f). This negatively impacted the score for the level resulting in 
a low ranking (Figure 1g).  
In the final level of the game, participants were presented with a choice between collecting 
their own gold cube before freeing their partner from prison (thus reciprocating the 
experience of themselves being trapped and ignored by the IVA in the previous level), or 
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freeing their partner from the prison and then proceeding to collect the gold cube (Figure 1h). 
This choice was designed to understand behaviourally how participants responded to the 
misunderstanding that occured in the prior level.  
Since the scores in the game were aggregated for the levels, participants continued to be 
ranked last (e.g. 10th) after the fourth level despite their efforts. The leaderboard thus 
provided a benchmark about the severity of the misunderstanding experienced in the third 
level. Each participant therefore experienced the same ranking of performance: after level 1 = 
they were ranked 4th out of the last ten dyads to register a score; level 2 = 3rd, level 3 = 10th, 
and level 4 = 10th. 
Behavioural measures 
Dyad3D records 11 variables of user input (Table 1). It records the score; calculates mean 
distance between the player and IVA for each level (spatial proximity); mean time difference 
between the player and IVA collecting their respective gold cubes at the end of the level 
(cube coordination); and mean keystrokes by the user for each level. In addition, it also 
calculates the number of keystrokes made by the user when they are trapped in the prison on 
the third level and ignored by the IVA (measure of frustration), and the mean duration of 
each keystroke in time. In the fourth level, it records whether participants free their partner 
from prison before collecting their own gold cube (termed altruistic behaviour), or whether 
they collect the gold cube before freeing their partner from prison (termed selfish behaviour).  
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Table 1   
List of behavioural measures from the Dyad3D game 
Measure Levels Description 
Points score 1-4 A score calculated for the tutorial and for each level in 
the game. 8 points = 1 second. Each level starts with 
1000 points and reduces continually into minus figures. 
Mean distance (spatial 
proximity) 
1-4 The average distance between the Player and the IVA 
for each level. Measured after the Player or IVA are 
freed from prison and thus working together to 
complete the level. Unit measurement based on Player 
diameter.  
Cube coordination 1-4 Calculates the time difference between the Player and 
the IVA collecting their respective gold cubes.  
Leadership 1-4 Identifies who picks up the gold cube first, the Player 
or the IVA. 
Keystroke count 1-4 Counts the number of times the Player hits an arrow 
button during the levels of the game. 
Mean keystroke 
duration 
1-4 Calculates the mean duration a key is held down during 
the game.  
Bump count 1-4 Counts the number of times the Player and the IVA 
make contact for each level.  
Prison keystroke count 3 Calculates the number of times the Player presses a 
keyboard button when trapped in the prison during the 
3rd level misunderstanding.  
Mean prison keystroke 
duration 
3 Calculates the mean duration a key is held down while 
the payer is trapped in the prison during the 3rd level 
misunderstanding.  
Priorities (prosocial or 
selfish) 
4  Identifies whether the Player chooses to free the IVA 
from prison first before collecting a gold cube 
(prosocial behaviour) or whether they choose to collect 
their own gold cube before freeing the Player. 
Response time 4 Measures the time between the Player unlocking the 
IVA from prison to when they actually free the IVA 
from prison. 
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Questionnaire 
Qualtrics was used to administer a post-game questionnaire for participants. Given the 
priority of first impressions in forming judgements about autistic people (Sasson & Morrison, 
2017), we asked participants if they found the information supplied by their partner as useful 
through a closed-ended question. We further invited participants to explain why they found 
the information useful or not useful. We also asked participants whether they believed the 
information provided by their partner affected their own behaviour in the game to understand 
participants’ perceptions about the relationship between diagnostic disclosure and its impact 
on their behaviour in the game.  
Additionally, we wanted to understand if there were differences in how participants explained 
the interaction, thus an open-ended question invited comments on the following points: (1) 
what worked well in your collaboration? (e.g. useful information shared, hunting for hidden 
buttons, freeing from prisons, opening doors, deciding which route to take, dividing up search 
areas); (2) What could have been improved in your collaboration? (3) Is there anything you 
could have done differently to support your partner? (4) Is there anything your partner could 
have done differently to support you? (5) What impressions do you think your partner has of 
you through their experience of playing the game? 
The Interpersonal Perception Method 
In addition to exploring the effects of diagnostic disclosure, we included rating scales to 
explore additional perspectives on the task, since social interactions typically comprise 
multiple perspectives on Self, perspectives on Other, and perspectives on how one is being 
perceived by others (Heasman & Gillespie, 2018b; Ichheiser, 1943; Mead, 1934). The 
Interpersonal Perception Method is a way of systematically analysing the relations between 
these perspectives (Laing et al., 1966) and has most typically been methodologically 
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operationalised into rating scales (Gillespie et al., 2010; Kenny, 1988; Moore & Gillespie, 
2014). 
When identifying items to rate we considered criteria from previous studies of social 
perception of autism. However, we were also limited by the nature of the interaction through 
the video-game where there is no facial or auditory dimension of engagement. Chambres et 
al. (2008) used three evaluative dimensions of cognitive, social and emotional items for 
assessing vignettes of a six-year-old autistic child’s behaviour that participants were either 
informed or uninformed about their diagnosis. We accordingly included items of 
‘intelligence’ (cognitive), ‘helpfulness’ (social) and ‘frustration’ (emotional). We also 
included ‘skill’, since the game is dependent on the ability to interact with the computer 
which participants may feel was a critical factor in the collaboration.  
Participants 
A total of 183 participants took part in the pilot study phase to help iteratively develop the 
game. Participants for the pilots were sourced from the participant pool of the research lab 
belonging to the researchers’ university. Since the pilot phase exhausted available 
participants, the full study sourced participants online through a paid participant service 
provided by Prolific.  
345 participants took part in the full study online, to which all results and findings relate. To 
ensure sample validity through the online recruitment process, we used multiple 
inclusion/exclusion criteria. First, a demographic restriction was applied given the cross-
cultural variation in identifying and understanding autism (Mandy, Charman, Puura, & 
Skuse, 2014; Obeid et al., 2015). We therefore recruited participants who had English as a 
first language. Following recruitment, additional inclusion/exclusion criteria were applied. 
We included an attention check by embedding a closed-ended question within the post-game 
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rating scales that had to be false (“were you unable to finish the game with your partner?”). 
Participants who failed the attention check were removed from the sample (n = 39). A 
manipulation check was also included to see if participants were aware of the information 
provided. Those that claimed they did not receive any information or that they did not 
remember the information shared (n = 23) were removed from the analysis. We conducted a 
deception check through analysing the free text provided by participants in response to a 
question which asked them to explain their experience of the study. Participants who 
mentioned the belief that they were playing with a computer and not a human were excluded 
(n = 9). 
Additional criteria for exclusion included participants who: (1) did not complete the game or 
the questionnaire (n = 5), (2) who copied and pasted unintelligible text for open-ended 
questions (n = 3), (3) rated artificially (e.g. the same score for all items in the questionnaire) 
(n = 5), (4) had technical problems during the study (n = 5), and (5) took the study more than 
once (n = 2).  
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Table 2  
Participant details  
 Control  
(n = 80) 
Dyslexia  
(n = 83) 
Autism  
(n = 93) 
 χ2  p 
Gender 
Female 
Male 
Unspecified 
 
45 
34 
1 
 
45 
36 
2 
 
47 
43 
2 
0.7286 0.948 
Nationality 
UK 
US 
Other 
 
50 
25 
5 
 
52 
23 
8 
 
58 
27 
8 
0.776 0.941 
Diagnoses disclosed by participants1 
Depression 
Anxiety 
Autism 
OCD 
Epilepsy 
PTSD 
Borderline personality disorder 
Chronic fatigue syndrome 
 
4 
4 
 
 
3 
6 
1 
 
1  
 
 
1 
 
1 
2 
1 
1 
 
1 
1 
2.27 0.321 
Gaming experience 
Experienced 
Intermediate 
Novice 
 
30 
36 
14 
 
41 
34 
8 
 
32 
49 
11 
6.085 0.193 
1Significance measured in terms of comparing across conditions the proportion of participants 
with a diagnosis versus those without a diagnosis. 
 
 
Participants were randomly assigned through the survey software Qualtrics to one of three 
conditions: (1) a control condition (where no diagnostic information was disclosed); (2) a 
dyslexia condition (where a dyslexia diagnosis was disclosed); and (3) an autism condition 
(where an autism diagnosis was disclosed). In the debrief, participants reported that they were 
happy for other participants to go through the same process, while two participants 
voluntarily contacted the researchers after the study to express their enjoyment of playing the 
game and their surprise that they were playing with an IVA and not a human.  
Method of analysis 
To explore RQ1 (how viable is Dyad3D in creating a simulated interaction that could deceive 
participants into believing they were collaborating with another player online?), we asked 
participants in the post-game questionnaire to rate the quality of the deception on a six-point 
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scale, from not believable at all (= 0) to very believable (= 5). Additional checks included: (1) 
the qualitative responses provided by participants were examined to see if any reference was 
made to the IVA which questioned whether it was actually human; (2) we examined whether 
attributions of intentionality to the IVA were made by participants; (3) participants were 
asked in the debrief whether they would consent to other participants taking part in the study; 
and (4) we categorised feedback volunteered by participants who contacted the lead 
researcher after the study was complete.  
To address RQ2a (comparing self-reported social perception scores with actual behaviour in 
the game) one-way ANOVAs were run to explore the effect of condition (no disclosure vs 
dyslexia disclosure vs autism disclosure) on survey responses and behavioural data from the 
game. For ordinal data, non-parametric Kruskal-Wallis one-way ANOVAs were used. Where 
significant effects were observed, post hoc tests with Bonferroni correction examined specific 
differences between conditions.   
To address RQ2b (examining the qualitative explanations provided by participants to 
understand the role of diagnostic disclosure on their experience of participation) we analysed 
participants’ text responses. Specifically, we analysed participants’ statements about why the 
information supplied by the IVA was useful or not useful with a process of iterative coding 
(Neale, 2016). Iterative coding involves open-coding participants’ responses, before sorting 
codes into categories based on the links between codes (Heasman & Gillespie, 2018b). Four 
main categories resulted from this process, e.g. the category of “tolerance” was formed from 
statements where participants said the IVA information led to lower expectations, higher 
confidence, greater patience, and increased empathy. The category of “redundant” emerged 
from statements about the shortcomings of the IVA, since some participants deemed the 
information shared as superfluous, inaccurate, unhelpful, and misleading. The category of 
“explained misunderstanding” covered statements that specifically linked the IVA 
156 
 
information to the misunderstanding experienced in the third level of the game (thus no 
iteration required). Finally, the category of “ambiguous” included statements that were 
merely descriptive (e.g. “he said how he did the tutorial”), provided tangential information 
(e.g. “we couldn’t pick the colour”) and statements which did not provide meaningful 
context, (e.g. “yes it did”).   
Results 
There were no statistically significant associations between gender and experimental 
condition χ(2) = 0.409, p = 0.815, with a male to female ratio between 0.76, 0.80 and 0.91 
across conditions. There were no statistically significant differences between experimental 
conditions in the time taken to complete the tutorial, (F(2,254) = 0.310, p = 0.734) suggesting 
participants were of comparable ability to play the game.  
RQ1: How viable is Dyad3D in creating a believable interaction? 
Ratings of the quality of the deception were strong with a mean score of 3.83 out of a 
maximum of 5.00 across conditions. There were no significant differences between 
experimental conditions in rating deception quality as determined by one-way ANOVA 
(F(2,253) = 0.062, p = 0.940). Nine participants mentioned the belief that they were playing 
with a computer and not a human, which represented 3.4% of participants when added to the 
256 participants who had passed all of the other inclusion/exclusion criteria. Moreover, all 
participants surveyed made attributions of intentionality to the IVA, as shown by references 
to the IVA’s mental states, emotions and skill/experience. All participants also indicated that 
they would consent to others taking part in the study, showing that the nature of the deception 
did not result in significant discomfort for participants. Taken together, these data indicate 
that Dyad3D was successful in creating a believable interaction.  
RQ2a: Differences between self-reported and behavioural measures 
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Kruskal-Wallis H tests showed a statistically significant difference between conditions 
regarding the extent to which information provided by the collaborator was perceived as 
useful, H(2) = 12.74, p < 0.002, with a mean rank score higher for the autism 
(autismusefulness_of_info = 140.81) and dyslexia (dyslexiausefulness_of_info = 133.38) conditions than 
for the control (controlusefulness_of_info = 107.69) condition. Post hoc pairwise comparisons 
showed a significant difference between the control and autism conditions (p = 0.002) and the 
control and dyslexia conditions (p = 0.028). The results suggest disclosing a diagnosis 
significantly increased the extent to which participants found the information supplied by the 
IVA as useful.  
There was a statistically significant difference between conditions in the extent to which 
participants reported that information provided by the IVA affected their helpfulness in the 
game, H(2) = 8.02, p = 0.018, with a mean rank score higher for the autism 
(autisminfo_affected_helpfulness = 135.96) and dyslexia (dyslexia info_affected_helpfulness = 131.36) 
conditions than for the control (control info_affected_helpfulness = 113.81) condition. Post hoc 
pairwise comparison with Bonferroni correction showed a significant difference between the 
control and autism conditions (p = 0.020) but not the control and dyslexia conditions (p = 
0.109). The results suggest disclosing a diagnosis increased the extent to which participants 
perceived they acted more helpfully during the game, but only significantly for the autism 
disclosure and not the dyslexia disclosure condition.    
However, although participants in the autism condition showed a greater tendency to 
prioritise their partner’s interest (freeing their partner from prison before collecting their own 
gold cube) than prioritising their own interests (picking up the gold cube before releasing 
their partner from prison) compared with the control and dyslexia condition (mean ranks: 
controlpriorities = 138.59; autismpriorities = 117.88; dyslexiapriorities = 129.01), this difference was 
not significant H(2) = 5.13, p = 0.077. Further Chi-square comparisons showed no significant 
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association between perceiving oneself to be helpful with actual helping behaviour χ(1) = 
0.185, p = 0.667. These findings compare with parametric one-way ANOVAs which found 
no significant differences between conditions for mean time to complete levels (F(2,254) = 
0.811, p = 0.446), mean spatial proximity between the participant and their other player 
across the levels (F(2,254) = 0.654, p = 0.521), or mean frustration (measured as the mean 
time participants hold down a keyboard key while trapped in the prison), (F(2,245) = 2.770, p 
= 0.65). These results suggest that despite participants in the autism condition believing they 
were more helpful compared with participants in the control condition, they did not 
significantly differ from the control group when it came to actual helping behaviour in the 
game.  
There was a significant difference between conditions in participants rating their partner’s 
intelligence, (H(2) = 7.452, p = 0.024) with participants in the autism condition rating their 
partners higher than the control or dyslexia condition (mean rank scores:  autismintelligence_other 
= 155.67 controlintelligence_other = 124.12 dyslexiaintelligence_other = 141.40). Post hoc pairwise 
comparison with Bonferroni correction showed a significant difference between the control 
and autism conditions (p = 0.019), but no significant difference between the control and 
dyslexia conditions (p = 0.788). This result was consistent when analysing the differences 
between rating one’s own intelligence and rating their partner’s intelligence (H(2) = 8.327, p 
= 0.016), with post hoc pairwise comparison showing significant differences between the 
autism and control condition (p = 0.023). The results suggest a difference in effect between 
diagnostic labels, with a disclosure of autism leading to significantly higher perceptions of 
intelligence than a disclosure of dyslexia when compared with the control group.   
Criteria where no significant differences between conditions were observed include: 
participants rating the IVA’s skill (H(2) = 1.080, p = 0.583), helpfulness (H(2) = 0.097, p = 
0.953), frustration (H(2) = 0.475, p = 0.789); perceived ratings by the IVA in terms of 
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intelligence (H(2) = 5.605, p = 0.61), skill (H(2) = 0.407, p = 0.816), helpfulness (H(2) = 
1.151, p = 0.563) and frustration (H(2) = 0.568, p = 0.753); perceptions of teamwork in terms 
of spatial proximity (H(2) = 0.877, p = 0.645), calmness (H(2) = 1.363, p = 0.506), efficiency 
(H(2) = 0.845, p = 0.655), or understanding (H(2) = 0.285, p = 0.867); desire to collaborate 
again with the IVA (H(2) = 3.12, p = 0.210); and participants rating their own intelligence 
(H(2) = 2.002, p = 0.368), skill (H(2) = 0.406, p = 0.816), helpfulness (H(2) = 4.584, p = 
0.101) or frustration (H(2) = 0.705, p = 0.703). Taken together, these results indicate that 
disclosing a diagnosis results in positive discrimination in terms of higher perceptions of 
intelligence, finding information provided by the IVA as more useful and resulting in greater 
tolerance, and more positive perceptions of being helpful towards the IVA. However, in each 
case these effects were significant for the autism condition in comparison to the control 
condition, but not so for the dyslexia condition (where participants were only significantly 
different from the control condition in terms of finding the information provided by the IVA 
as more useful). This suggests that positive discrimination observed due to the disclosure of 
an autism diagnosis is specific to autism and not the wider presence of a label in general.  
The findings also highlight a potential “decline” in effectiveness of disclosing a diagnosis, 
from initial positive perceptions of its utility, to reduced helping behaviours. Figure 2 shows 
the mean rank difference for the autism and dyslexia condition compared to the control 
baseline. It highlights how the distribution of responses become more similar to the control 
condition as the questions move from initial first impressions, to attitude towards partner, to 
belief about helping in the game, to actually helping in the game. This convergence towards 
the control distribution for both diagnostic groups suggests a potential diluting effect of the 
labels, where people initially respond positively to the label but are either unsure about how it 
impacts their behaviour or are mistaken in the extent to which it actually does so, which 
results in a reduced tendency to actually help more.   
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FIGURE 2: COMPARISON OF MEAN RANK DIFFERENCES FOR EXPERIMENTAL CONDITIONS 
 
RQ2b: Explanations provided by participants about their perception and behaviour 
towards the IVA  
Explanations provided by participants about the utility of the IVA information was 
categorised into three types (See Table 3), which accounted for 80% of all participants.  
These categories included: (1) participants who felt that the information supplied was 
redundant or inaccurate and of no use to facilitating the game collaboration (termed 
“information redundant”); (2) participants who claimed that the information provided helped 
them to make sense of why they were left in prison by their partner (termed “information 
explained misunderstanding”); and (3) participants who claimed that the information 
provided led to greater tolerance, either because it led to greater confidence in themselves, 
prepared them to be more patient, or incentivised them to help more (“information led to 
greater tolerance”). The remaining comments (20% of participants) were ambiguous, either 
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
First impression of
stimulus ("was
information
supplied by partner
useful?")
Coded reflections
on stimulus
("information led to
more tolerance")
Attitude towards
partner's abilities
("how would you
rate their
intelligence?")
Believing stimulus
led to more helping
behaviour
Actual helping
behaviour observed
in the game
D
if
fe
re
n
c
e
 i
n
 m
e
a
n
 r
a
n
k
 f
ro
m
 c
o
n
tr
o
l 
g
ro
u
p
Item assessed
Kruskall-Wallis mean rank difference from control 
condition baseline
autism condition difference dyslexia condition difference
161 
 
because they did not provide an explanation, made tangential comments not related to the 
question, or ignored the question altogether. 
Table 3 below summarises the frequency and distributions of the coded statements. It 
highlights a trend in which participants in the autism condition were less likely to see the 
information they received from the IVA as redundant and significantly more likely to claim 
that it led to greater tolerance in comparison with the control condition (autism condition = 
48%, control condition =18%). The dyslexia condition showed a similar trend but it was not 
significant compared with the control condition.  
Table 3 
Frequency and distribution of coded statements from participants about the information received from the IVA 
 No. of coded statements (% of participants) Kruskall-Wallis 
 Control (n = 80) Dyslexia (n = 83) Autism (n = 93) H 
Information redundant 37 (46%) 33 (40%) 28 (30%) 3.456 
Information explained 
misunderstanding 
4 (5%) 8 (10%) 12 (13%) 3.137 
Information led to 
greater tolerance 
14 (18%) 23 (28%) 44 (48%) 12.169* 
Ambiguous statements 26 (33%) 22 (27%) 15 (16%) 1.642 
* p-value < 0.05. Post hoc pairwise comparisons with Bonferroni correction showed a significant difference only 
between participants in the autism condition and the control condition (p = 0.002).  
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FIGURE 3: COMPARISON OF PARTICIPANTS’ STATEMENTS ABOUT INFORMATION PROVIDED BY 
THE IVA 
 
The finding that participants in the autism condition are significantly more likely to report 
that the IVA information led to greater tolerance compares with increased perceptions of 
behaving in a more helpful way (reported above). It is also noticeable that diagnostic 
disclosure aids interpretations about the misunderstanding experienced, with 13% of 
participants in the autism condition linking the diagnosis to the misunderstanding compared 
with only 5% of participants in the control condition, although this is not significant at α < 
0.05. Thus diagnostic disclosure of autism leads to increased perceptions of tolerance and 
increased likelihood that it will help to explain the misunderstanding experienced in the 
game. However, we also found that the same disclosure of a diagnosis can potentially have 
the opposite effects, being perceived as redundant information. Table 4 illustrates the range 
of statements provided by participants. 
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Table 4 
Illustrative examples of reasons provided by participants for finding the information useful 
 Illustrative example 
Category Control  Dyslexia  Autism  
Information redundant The information was so 
generic as to be useless in 
trying to formulate a 
strategy. 
 
 
They stated they were 
dyslexic, but I didn't find 
that to be particularly 
useful information. It tells 
me nothing of their ability 
to perform the task. 
 
They just said they were 
autistic, which wasn't really 
relevant. 
 While I understood what 
they was trying to share it 
was not useful to me 
 
I guess it was useful but 
I'm not sure what being 
dyslexic has to do with 
rolling a ball through a 
maze. 
I did not know how to alter 
my playstyle through the 
information they shared 
with me, such as them being 
autistic. 
 
Information explained 
misunderstanding 
They said they were not 
good at multitasking, 
which may explain why 
they did not notice my gate 
could have been unlocked. 
My partner shared they 
were dyslexic and had 
trouble with multiple tasks, 
and that might have 
explained why during one 
game they navigated 
through half the maze but 
failed to rescue me from 
the prison? 
 
My partner explained that 
he was autistic which made 
it difficult for him to multi-
task which explained why 
perhaps he forgot to do 
things in one of the games. 
 A little, he said he wasn't 
good at multi-tasking 
(probably why he forgot to 
let me out as soon as he 
was able to) but he was 
good at manoeuvring the 
ball. 
 
It tempered my frustration 
when my partner forgot to 
let me out of prison in one 
of the games. 
It was useful because I can 
somewhat understand how 
they performed the way that 
they did. 
Information led to 
greater tolerance 
They told me they were 
good at steering, which 
they were, and they told 
me they weren't great at 
multitasking which I had in 
mind when they forgot to 
free me until the end. 
It allowed me to be more 
empathic to the person 
controlling the other ball, 
and told me I didn't need to 
worry about their control 
of the ball 
 
 
He said as he was autistic he 
was not very good at 
focusing on multiple tasks at 
once, which made me more 
patient when I was locked in 
prison and only he could 
move. 
 
 I think I had left him 
confident and calm, so that 
we could play this game at 
our best 
they said they were 
dyslexic but still good at 
following orders , I was 
ready to give them a bit 
more help of needed but 
they navigated just fine 
They mentioned that they 
struggled to juggle multiple 
tasks at once due to 
suffering with autism. This 
was useful to know and was 
evident in some of the 
games that we played. As a 
result I tried to work as 
quickly as I could to 
complete my sections of the 
games, in order to 
compensate for times where 
my partner may have 
struggled to cope with 
multiple scenarios in the 
game. 
 
164 
 
Thus, although disclosing a diagnosis of autism generally results in more positive views 
(seeing disclosure from the IVA as useful, perceiving oneself to be more helpful) it can also 
lead to negative views (seeing the disclosure as redundant and useless). These differing 
reactions help to explain why disclosing a diagnosis may arouse anxiety for autistic people, 
because it is a cost-benefit decision which autistic people in particular may find especially 
hard to evaluate given that it would require a nuanced social reading of others.  Moreover, the 
lack of an association between participants perceiving themselves to be helpful and helpful 
behaviour suggests a bias in overestimating one’s own prosocial behaviour towards autistic 
people.  
Discussion 
The first research aim (RQ1) was to create a simulated interaction for exploring the 
psychological effects of labels exposed to different groups of participants. Dyad3D, 
combined with a post-game questionnaire, proved to be a very efficient means of gathering 
simulated interactional data. Participants found the interaction highly believable, with an 
average quality of deception rating of 3.83 out of 5, with only 9 participants (3.4% of 
participants passing all other inclusion/exclusion criteria) explicitly expressing doubt about 
whether the IVA was human. All sampled participants also made attributions of 
intentionality, including mental/emotional states when describing the behaviour of the IVA 
showing that participants were psychologically orientated to the IVA as another human 
player. The nature of the deception was also unproblematic, with all participants providing 
feedback that it was efficient, believable and enjoyable. Thus Dyad3D was successful and 
efficient in creating a believable controlled interaction that could be used to generate insights 
about the differential effects labels produce on social perception and collaboration. A 
contribution of the study is therefore to make the source code for the game freely available at: 
https://bitbucket.org/enghoff/dyad3d. 
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The second research aim examined the effects of disclosing a diagnosis and was split into two 
parts. RQ2a compared self-reported data in the post-game questionnaire with behaviour 
recorded in the game. Our findings concur with existing reports that the label of autism has a 
broad positive effect on social perception (Sasson et al., 2017), resulting in higher perceptions 
of intelligence of the IVA, and perceiving information communicated by the IVA as having 
more utility. However, there is also evidence to suggest that there is a diluting effect on the 
positive discrimination the label initially establishes. Although participants find diagnostic 
disclosure about autism useful, they are less likely to believe it impacts their own ability to 
provide help in the task. In addition, there was no significant association between participants 
who believed that the IVA diagnostic disclosure made them more helpful compared to 
whether they were actually helpful during the game. These findings help to explain why 
diagnostic disclosure, despite enhancing social perceptions by others, can still result in 
negative discrimination in terms of behaviour as reported by autistic people themselves 
(Davidson & Henderson, 2010; Powell & Acker, 2016; Treweek et al., 2018).  
RQ2b further highlighted why diagnostic disclosure is not straightforward, since there were 
varied reactions towards the information supplied by the IVA. Although most participants 
found the information to be useful, they were less likely to articulate why. Many participants 
felt that the diagnosis of autism explained the misunderstanding experienced in the game, yet 
a smaller number of participants also felt that the diagnostic disclosure was redundant 
information. These varied reactions highlight why diagnostic disclosure is a risky decision for 
autistic people. The label of autism can ameliorate confusion associated with a 
misunderstanding, but it can also potentially exasperate underlying frustrations depending on 
the cognitive frame of the perceiver.  
These findings contribute to understanding the double empathy problem, a term used to 
describe the differences in mutual understanding which arise between autistic and non-
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autistic people on account of their different neurological dispositions (Milton, 2012; Milton et 
al., 2018). While interactions between autistic people have been shown to exhibit 
complimentary features (Heasman & Gillespie, 2018a), interactions between autistic and non-
autistic people have been shown to be subject to a number of biases (Heasman & Gillespie, 
2018b; Sasson et al., 2017), with the label of autism playing a central role in sense-making 
processes. The findings here highlight how non-autistic people may over-estimate their own 
helpfulness towards autistic people, which in turn, would mean they are less likely to see 
validity in the claims made by autistic people that they are not helpful; or, due to the 
paradoxical effects of helping (or even perceiving that one is being helpful: Gillespie & Hald, 
2017), this bias may even lead to expectations that autistic people should be grateful. 
There are many situations in social life where this can have a pivotal effect on quality of life, 
such as employment situations (Heasman, 2017a) and judicial processes (Crane, Wilcock, et 
al., 2018). Understanding that the label of autism can lead to improved social perceptions, 
helping to explain the nature of misunderstandings, but that this may also result in a mistaken 
belief about how helpful one actually is, highlights that diagnostic disclosure remains a risky 
decision. This raises a further question concerning how diagnostic disclosure can lead to 
more consistent and sustained positive effects on social perception and behaviour. Studies 
have begun to explore the relationship between autism knowledge and the psychological 
effects of disclosing a diagnosis of autism (Crane, Wilcock, et al., 2018; Gillespie-Lynch et 
al., 2015; Sasson & Morrison, 2017). It is possible that such effects may be associated with 
increased self-awareness of one’s own taken-for-granted assumptions towards others with a 
diagnosis. For instance, testimonies from primary caregivers and parents often bring such 
reflections into focus through the adage “If you’ve met one person with autism then you have 
met one person with autism” (Shore, 2009). Consequently, a potential avenue for improving 
the positive effects associated with a diagnostic disclosure of autism could be through making 
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people aware of a bias in the extent to which they are helpful towards autistic people. In 
many ways this bias is understandable, since it protects the positive identity of the perceiver 
and brings their self-perception into line with their ideal Self as presented in the research. 
Beyond this, however, there is also the challenge of how to improve understanding about the 
appropriate considerations a diagnostic disclosure of autism should raise, since some 
participants did not feel that it was relevant information for the collaboration.  
In summary, this study has helped to illustrate both positive and negative discrimination 
resulting from a diagnostic disclosure of autism, with social perception more favourable than 
actual social behaviour. Future research using simulated interactions can further differentiate 
the factors affecting social perception and behaviour of non-autistic people towards autistic 
people, and in doing so potentially evolve the current design into an intervention for 
correcting biases that contribute to the double empathy problem. A central contribution of the 
study is therefore to make the source code for Dyad3D freely available. The study is 
reproducible and opens up the possibility for future studies to implement more ecological 
features into the game (e.g. varying the form in which the stimulus is presented which has 
been shown to shape social perceptions: Sasson et al., 2017)), and to improve the sensitivity 
and diversity of behavioural measures.   
Limitations 
There were limitations in our approach to each research question. Limitations pertaining to 
RQ1, the viability of the deception, stem from the use of a computer-mediated task which is 
contingent on people’s ability to interact with others via a computer interface. While this 
provides a means for replicating the experience of an interaction efficiently, it also raises 
questions about the validity of the interaction, because the identity of the IVA is not open for 
questioning. The internet, and the development of networked virtual worlds, have created 
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multiple opportunities for the same individual to present their identity in different ways 
(Gillespie et al., 2018) and consequently people are aware that virtual interactions may be 
risky and not authentic (Evans, 2012). Thus there may be levels of doubt associated with the 
authenticity of the interaction studied even if it is not explicitly mentioned or reported by 
participants when asked to rate the quality of deception. Moreover, such doubts may be 
furthered because of a lack of ability to see, hear or verbally interact with the IVA which 
means such concerns about validity cannot be questioned. Enhancing the strengths of the 
deception may be achieved in a number of ways, for example through incorporating the 
ability to send messages in the game (which has been added as a configurable option to the 
current game setup), or by changing aspects of the game structure itself (perhaps the player 
and IVA could share resources or empower each other’s abilities), or by changing the way in 
which the stimulus is presented (e.g. a pre-recorded webcam of the “online” player). 
Limitations pertaining to RQ2a, which compares self-report and behavioural data, highlight 
concerns about the social aspects of the game and what it reveals about interpersonal 
dynamics. In the present study we deliberately presented a minimalist situation to see what 
knowledge participants would import to the disclosure of a diagnosis, particularly since in 
real life discovering someone’s diagnosis may not always be associated with adequate 
auxiliary information about the diagnosis. Thus it was interesting to find that even in a 
predominantly cognitive task with minimal information about the diagnosis, disclosure 
resulted in positive evaluations of the IVAs’ intelligence and utility of information shared. 
However, in this context there is no reason not to be generous in social perceptions. 
Perceptions might change if the consequences were higher (e.g. job hiring) where there was a 
major investment in the outcome of the interaction.  
Another challenge of the present design is that Dyad3D is a primarily goal-orientated activity 
which may supersede the social obligation to help one’s partner. Although a social 
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component exists in the game in terms of freeing the other player from prison and having to 
share responsibility for opening different doors in the game between player and IVA, it is still 
possible to play the game in a primarily strategic way. Revising structural aspects of the game 
and associated behavioural measures should therefore be explored to build a more 
ecologically valid understanding of social interaction. For example, there could be individual 
scores for each player which are then aggregated to form an overall score for the dyad. This 
could help boost an understanding of teamwork and collective identity. Likewise, there could 
be a reward system which benefits the dyad if close spatial proximity is maintained. No 
significant differences were observed in mean distance between players, mean time to 
complete levels, mean time between collecting gold cubes, mean keystrokes or mean 
keystroke duration. These null results indicate that the significant behavioural differences 
observed should be interpreted with a degree caution and highlight room for improving the 
way behavioural measures operationalised in the game detect meaningful action. 
Limitations pertaining to RQ2b, understanding the explanations provided by participants, 
highlight a potential bias in terms of memory retrieval. In-game activity may deplete 
attentional resources required to accurately report on one’s interaction. Moreover, Dyad3D 
used deliberately simple and intuitive input controls of the arrow keys, yet even this can place 
a demand on users not familiar with computers or navigation via keyboard inputs, which 
represents another potential distraction from accurate reporting. The ability to ostensibly 
exchange messages (i.e. a chatbot interface) could represent more valuable qualitative data, 
as instead of asking participants to report on the interaction in hindsight, one can observe 
their actual attempts at communication to build a social understanding of the situation. To 
help address this challenge, a configurable chat interface option has already been included in 
the existing source for the game.   
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8) DISCUSSION 
The central aim of this thesis has been to understand the processes that underscore the double 
empathy problem which inhibits autistic sociality. This chapter will first discuss the 
limitations raised by the novel methodologies developed before evaluating the contributions 
of the thesis towards the central aim and potential directions for future research.  
Limitations 
Beyond the limitations already discussed in the chapters for each of the three empirical 
studies, it is important to note that there are additional limitations associated with the sample 
and access to participants. Studies 1 and 2 sourced participants from one local community 
which may not be representative of the wider diversity of people on the spectrum. For 
example, Hull, where data collection took place, has a predominantly Caucasian lower socio-
economic status demographic. The prevalence of autism diagnosis has been shown to be 
associated with socio-economic status (Durkin et al., 2010), while misconceptions about 
autism differs across cultures (Obeid et al., 2015). Moreover, there is also a sampling bias, 
since those participating reflect those who are willing to take part in the research, who are 
intellectually able and do not have significant language deficits. Thus the sample is not 
representative of the spectrum of autistic people. These challenges are not unique to this 
particular research project, but are challenges facing autism research in general and wider 
psychological science (Henrich, Heine, & Norenzayan, 2010; Kapp et al., 2013). Sampling 
issues are particularly relevant given the dynamic model of sociality this thesis outlines, 
where context, such as one’s background knowledge, plays an important part in bridging 
understandings. If, as the double empathy problem suggests, dispositional differences in 
neurology contribute to two-way breakdowns in understanding between neurotypical and 
autistic actors, then would we observe increased difficulties when additional divergences are 
involved? For example, would the neurodivergent intersubjectivity observed in Study 2 
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between autistic people be applicable when actors come from different cultures or ethnic 
backgrounds? If social disability arises from a mismatch between the individual and their 
environment, is it possible that such disabling effects can be amplified where there is an 
intersection between neurodivergence and other socio-cultural factors? Certainly, if, as the 
evidence in this thesis presents, it is possible to identify factors which would potentially 
ameliorate disabling aspects of the double empathy problem, then it is also possible that 
disabling aspects can be amplified when factors contribute to increased differences. It is not 
possible within the scope of this thesis to explore all possibilities of how dispositional 
differences affect social interaction. The contribution of this thesis is to at least provide new 
indicators about previously unexplored factors that affect the double empathy problem. 
Another limitation, not addressed within the specific studies themselves, is the potential for 
knowledge created within the thesis to “loop back” and affect the way autistic people see 
themselves and each other. Looping (See Chapter 3, p. 61-63) refers to the process whereby 
knowledge created about autism affects the social construction of autism (i.e. the way people 
make sense of autism and communicate with each other). Throughout the course of the thesis 
there were many engagement activities with autistic people (e.g. Open Minds outlined in 
Chapter 4, p. 81) resulting in dialogue, both verbal and through social media platforms such 
as Twitter, where autistic people have expressed a feeling of liberation and validation in 
response to my research outputs (e.g. Tweet received on 05/08/2018:“All of this [referencing 
findings of Study 2] is how I prefer to communicate. Just observe my son and I together. 
Thank you for your useful research and for your respectful interpretation of results”). 
However, in terms of a looping effect on data gathered, I do not think that there was 
sufficient time for my initial research outputs to affect the way autistic people presented 
themselves in Study 2, nor non-autistic participants in Study 3, thus it is unlikely that my data 
were impacted as a result of my research activities.  
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A final limitation relates to the investigative angle of the thesis. As mentioned in Chapter 2 
(p. 16-19), the framing of the three studies has been governed by the assumption that autistic 
sociality is not solely determined by individual abilities but is also shaped by socio-cultural 
factors. This assumption has directed research interests away from the traditional and salient 
social difficulties autistic people may demonstrate as individuals, with my attention instead 
focussed on the psychology of non-autistic social actors, and the possibilities (not limitations) 
for shared understanding between neurodivergent people. This is thus a positive framing 
which is no doubt influenced by my own positionality through my personal connection to 
Cambell and autism in general. Yet this positive framing raises questions about the extent to 
which my expectation and experience shaped the findings, particularly since I have used an 
abductive methodological approach, wherein one’s position within the field of action is part 
of the process of generating ideas. However, an advantage of detailing the abductive logic 
used is that it provides greater transparency about how my positionality and experience has 
influenced the direction of investigation. Certainly, it has been advantageous to remain open 
and positively orientated towards autistic people since this has provided a level of sensitivity 
in inquiry (e.g. discovering that interactions during video-gaming showed sophisticated social 
coordination) which a hypoethtico-deductive model could not achieve (since it proceeds in 
small incremental and theoretically governed steps, whereas Study 2 was an intuitive leap 
based on a surprising observation). Thus, my positionality within the field of action meant 
that previously unrecognised unconventional social forms of relating could be empirically 
observed and analysed. Moreover, each of the three studies documented has been systematic. 
Study 1 used numerical ratings to drill down into qualitative explanations provided by 
participants. Study 2 developed a systematic rating framework for mapping neurodivergent 
interactions, with analysis directed by consistent and fragmented clusters of dialogue. Study 3 
provided no associated context with the disclosure of an autism diagnosis, and the 
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comparative design with a no disclosure condition and a dyslexia condition provided a 
controlled systematic way for quantitatively analysing self-report and behavioural data. 
Studies 1 and 2 also involved inter-rater reliability adding rigour to the process. These 
systematic approaches aimed to largely mitigate the potential for positive bias in the 
construction and interpretation of the research undertaken.  
Contributions of empirical studies 
Previous research on autistic sociality has often been (a) framed by a deficit model of 
cognition, (b) studied in predominantly cross-neurological situations, and (c) analysed in 
terms of the individual with a diagnosis with much less critical reflection on the role of others 
in perceiving and responding to autistic people. Consequently, although the social challenges 
are widely recognised and reasoned to be two-way (Milton, 2012), there is a paucity of 
research for understanding how the social potential of autistic people is manifested 
interactionally that considers both autistic and non-autistic perspectives. 
To facilitate a two-sided exploration of autistic sociality, the central research question about 
the processes which underscore the double empathy problem was distilled in terms of three 
areas of social life for investigation: the relationships autistic people share with others, the 
activities that autistic people are naturally motivated to engage in, and cultural effect of the 
label of autism on non-autistic social perception and behaviour (these areas of social life were 
different foci of interest for each study, although as a phenomenon social life is not so 
divisible and indeed their features were present in each study).  
A central feature of relationships is that they comprise multiple perspectives on Self and 
Other (Ichheiser, 1943; Laing et al., 1966), yet in addition to the well documented difficulties 
of autistic people imaging neurotypical perspectives, difficulties in imagining autistic 
perspectives may also contribute to gaps in mutual understanding (Sheppard et al., 2016).  
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Study 1 examined perspective-taking from both sides of real relationships involving autistic 
adults and their family members; Study 2 examined interactions between autistic people and 
their neurodivergent ways of creating shared understanding; and Study 3 examined assumed 
interactions with an autistic online collaborator and the effects of diagnostic disclosure on 
non-autistic social perception and behaviour. 
RQ1: What is the bi-directional nature of perspective-taking between autistic and non-
autistic people? 
Study 1 implemented the IPM methodology, resulting in three significant findings. First, 
within relationships misunderstandings were shown to be two-sided, experienced by both 
autistic adults and their family members in terms of making inaccurate predictions about how 
they would be rated by their partner. This finding is significant because it provides empirical 
evidence in support of existing reports from autistic people about how a constituent part of 
their social impairment is being misunderstood by non-autistic others (Milton, 2014; Ridout, 
2017). A second finding was to show that at a group level, autistic participants correctly 
predicted that they would be negatively rated by their family members on a number of topics 
related to social life, despite themselves disagreeing with such views. They were also able to 
articulate, in some cases, the thought processes behind their family members’ rating. This 
finding is significant because previous research has theorised that autistic people struggle to 
take other people’s perspectives because they are unable to decentre from their own 
worldview (Frith & De Vignemont, 2005). A third finding was to show that family members 
inaccurately predicted poor perspective-taking by their autistic relations, attributing such 
difficulty to the label of autism. This confirmatory bias which negatively affects the 
evaluation of autistic social potential by their family members illustrates the process of 
“looping effects” of the social construction of autism (Hacking, 1996) and provides evidence 
in support of autistic claims of being misrepresented or misunderstood by non-autistic others 
(Chown, 2014; Milton, 2017; Yergeau & Huebner, 2017). 
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Together, these findings reveal a two-sided perspective-taking dynamic which results in 
under-recognised autistic social potential and suggests the need for further research on the 
contextual factors surrounding real life-autistic relationships. For example, the finding that 
autistic participants could successfully differentiate their own perspectives from that of their 
family members suggests that there could be a significant difference between abstract 
measures of perspective-taking, and real-life perspective-taking with familiar others. Unlike 
abstract scenarios, interpersonal relationships involve a shared history between perceiver and 
target which acts as a vital resource to make inferences about other people’s dispositions 
(Ickes, 1993). One can imagine that autistic participants in Study 1 had significant experience 
about being informed of their poor perspective-taking or unconventional social behaviour by 
their family members, which would have led them to predict negative ratings. Likewise, 
family members may have drawn on the frustration of such interpersonal experiences in their 
over-generalisation of autistic egocentrism. Abstract and real-life perspective-taking involve 
markedly different processes and resources, thus in comparison to the well-documented 
implicit theory of mind tasks where autistic participants have performed poorly (Baron-
Cohen, Leslie, & Frith, 1985; Baron-Cohen, Wheelwright, Hill, Raste, & Plumb, 2001),  
Study 1 highlights that perspective-taking is not purely a universally deployed cognitive 
ability, but rather an interactional achievement sensitive to contextual resources.  
Study 1 also has limitations. It focusses on  explicit perspective-taking, where participants are 
presented with topics and asked to explain their thoughts about specific others, whereas 
studies of autism have largely focussed on implicit theory of mind (Rajendran & Mitchell, 
2007). The differences between more intuitive perspective-taking and consciously effortful 
perspective-taking have been researched in terms of a dual-system approach to cognition 
(Frith & Frith, 2008), with autistic participants struggling more in the former than the latter 
(Schuwerk, Vuori, & Sodian, 2015), although some studies find that autistic adults are poor at 
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both (Hutchins et al., 2016). Indeed, the observed ability of autistic adults to “hack out” 
through using effortful processes the correct answers to more intuitive perspective-taking 
questions has been interpreted as a problem in experimental design rather than an asset of 
social ability (Happé, 1994), since there is the concern that autistic participants are able to 
arrive at correct answers without truly understanding the underlying concepts (Hadwin, 
Baron-Cohen, Howlin, & Hill, 1996). Certainly in Study 1 autistic participants were less 
forthcoming than their family members in providing explanations for the ratings, but it is 
unclear whether this was due to a lack of deeper understanding or a difficulty in articulating 
such thoughts to the researcher. It could also be argued, on theoretical grounds, that “hacking 
out” inferences about other people’s dispositions is not an anomaly but rather a common 
process in relationships, since we never truly know other people’s minds but rather make 
approximations based on the partial knowledge we have. For instance, Perner et al. (2007) 
has examined the relationship between episodic memory and theory of mind, showing a 
strong link between theory of mind and the ability to re-experience past events (Perner et al., 
2007). While successful perspective-taking is likely to involve a combination of implicit and 
explicit perspective-taking skills, the first step in developing such skill is the ability to 
recognise that there are differences in perspective, which the participants in Study 1 were 
able to identify. A second step is whether the socio-cultural environment supports the 
development of perspective-taking beyond initial recognition, which Study 1 suggests may 
not be optimised, because autistic participants do not communicate the reasoning for their 
ratings as often as family members, while family members themselves may be negatively 
influenced by the label of autism.      
From the perspective of family members, there could be several explanations as to why they 
may fail to detect the perspective-taking potential autistic participants demonstrated. As 
mentioned above, there may be problems with verbal feedback, with autistic participants not 
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making their thought processes salient to others on a regular basis. Rather than reflecting a 
deficit in perspective-taking, this may highlight difficulty in articulating and negotiating 
perspectives interactionally, which appears from the non-autistic viewpoint as a mentalising 
issue rather than communication problem. Low verbal feedback may have a cascading 
influence on processes of intersubjectivity, since other non-autistic interlocutors are not 
optimally placed to support and build on shared understanding, but must rather make their 
own assumptions, which could amplify any underlying bias associated with the label of 
autism. There may also be a memory bias, because autistic perspective-taking abilities may 
not be consistently deployed but rather sporadically occur in social interactions, with failures 
to perspective-take remaining more salient in memory than successes. This is because 
successful perspective-taking meets normative expectation and thus could remain undetected 
in terms of neurotypical awareness. Another explanation for failing to detect autistic 
perspective-taking is ability may be associated with an overgeneralisation of egocentrism 
because other autistic traits have typically been interpreted from the viewpoint of the 
neurotypical perceiver. For example, autistic traits such as repetitive and fixated interests may 
amplify perceptions of egocentrism, because they are behaviours which appear to not seek the 
involvement of others (Jaswal & Akhtar, 2018). Thus difficulties in perspective-taking 
combined with other apparently egocentric difficulties in social behaviour could lead to an 
overgeneralisation by family members of social limitations and restricted adaptability. 
Further research which compares perspectives between family members and autistic relatives 
can help shed further light on these possibilities. The two-sided dynamic of Study 1 at least 
highlights that a pathway to reducing misunderstandings in autistic-family member 
relationships could be interventions designed for family members, as well as autistic people. 
For example, it remains to be seen whether knowledge about confirmatory bias can be used to 
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correct such biases and reduce the potential double empathy effects resulting from the label 
of autism.  
The findings of Study 1 also have wider implications in terms of current debates about mental 
health and employment in autism. The finding that autistic participants are aware of being 
perceived negatively by others, but are less forthcoming in articulating with others the 
rationale for this perception, indicates a potential state of negative self-esteem and self-
awareness that compares with reports on high psychiatric comorbidity with depression and 
anxiety (Lugnegård et al., 2011). Indeed, a recent study about depression in autism identified 
“acceptance from others” as a significant predictor of depression and stress (Cage, Di 
Monaco, & Newell, 2017). Autistic people may thus have the dual challenge of being both 
aware that they are could be unfavourably viewed in social terms by others, and similarly 
because of their communication difficulties are unable to address or articulate their concerns 
to ameliorate the perceptions others may have. But while autistic self-awareness may 
potentially lead to depression, it certainly demonstrates an under-recognised strength in 
introspection, and as such it is important to recognise that the detailed accounts provided by 
autistic people have social validity (McGeer, 2004).  
Moreover, the findings also raise questions about whether autistic people are adept at 
knowing how others perceive and value their strengths, since in Study 1 autistic participants 
were anticipating predominantly negative misunderstandings. This could have important 
implications in employment settings, where autistic employees may be unsure about the 
positive aspects they bring to a job role (Heasman, 2017a), which could have a cascading 
effect on the ability of employers to reinforce such aspects. To some extent this could explain 
why autistic people typically demonstrate a very fragmented work history with many changes 
in job roles and periods of unemployment (Ohl et al., 2017).  
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In summary, the contribution of Study 1 is to further knowledge about the two-sided nature of 
misunderstandings experienced in family relationships involving autistic adults, with 
important implications for other domains of social life.  
RQ2: What are the features of neurodivergent interaction when neurotypical norms are 
removed? 
Beyond the ability to take perspectives, social interaction also involves sharing and 
negotiating perspectives in everyday activities. Study 2 aimed to build on existing 
ethnographic research about autism and intersubjectivity (Bagatell, 2007; Kremer-Sadlik, 
2004; Ochs, 2015; Ochs, Kremer-Sadlik, Sirota, & Solomon, 2004; Sirota, 2004; Solomon, 
2015; Sterponi et al., 2014) to examine specifically neurodivergent forms of intersubjectivity 
that occur between autistic people. Through a mixed methods approach involving the 
systematic rating of conversational turns and follow-up qualitative analysis of peaks and 
troughs in coordination, Study 2 was able to identify two forms of neurodivergent 
intersubjectivity. Both of these forms were common across interactions and are significant 
because they highlight unconventional ways in which autistic people are able to achieve 
social coordination outside of neurotypical norms.  
First, participants demonstrated a low demand for social coordination, in the sense that, over 
multiple turns, participants would be disconnected from each other in terms of coherence, 
affect or symmetry (i.e. assertiveness). However, although this often resulted in tangential 
monologues, it had beneficial effects as it allowed players to externalise the process of their 
own individual sensemaking, and in doing so present a cue for another player to reciprocate 
understanding (e.g. in Example 4, Study 2 where participants separately articulated embodied 
reactions to the game and the structure of past games, converging on the topic of how games 
are designed to create the experience of vertigo). It also had the additional advantage of 
ameliorating many of the challenges associated with fragmented or potentially disruptive 
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turns (e.g. players shouting at each other). Second, participants made very generous 
assumptions of common ground, often sharing specific references which could result in the 
rapid construction of rapport and humour as it allowed underlying sub-cultures to be 
identified. However, when assumptions of common ground failed to be reciprocated, it was 
not problematic as autistic participants moved on to the next topic. In this respect, the two 
features of neurodivergent intersubjectivity identified are more than isolated features, they 
complement each other forming a functional system that can facilitate shared understanding 
without being disrupted by unexpected and tangential turns.  
The forms of neurodivergent intersubjectivity identified in Study 2 further our understanding 
of autistic sociality, because they show how in a setting between autistic participants, where 
neurotypical conventions are not reinforced, social coordination can be achieved in 
unconventional ways. The extent to which neurotypical norms would be an obstacle to such 
forms of neurodivergent intersubjectivity cannot be assessed purely on the basis of Study 2, 
which chose to focus on describing autistic interactions without benchmarking against 
neurotypical interactions. However, we can speculate on the basis of existing literature that 
such forms of intersubjectivity are not only likely to be unrecognised, but also stigmatised in 
neurotypical settings. From a neurotypical viewpoint, loose social coordination is undesirable 
since it contravenes the cooperative principles of Grice’s maxims, in particular the maxim of 
quantity (to not make the contribution more than is required) and the maxim of relevance 
(Grice, 1989). This view is more than a sociocultural norm, it may also have a universal basis 
in terms of the economy of effort required to make communication efficient. Dingemanse et 
al. (2015) have examined repair sequences across languages and cultures identifying a 
common principle of “specificity”, where speakers choose the most specific type of repair 
initiator possible (an example of an open other-initiated repair is “huh?”, whereas a more 
specific repair is one that seeks confirmation about a part of a preceding utterance, e.g. “she 
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had a boy?”) (Dingemanse et al., 2015, p. 5). Specificity serves a dual purpose in minimising 
the effort for the speaker being asked to address a problem and for the dyad as a whole in 
terms of minimising the number of turns required to complete the repair sequences. Thus, the 
interactive achievement of mutual understanding across languages and cultures is strongly 
governed by a conservation of labour required to “fix” misunderstandings. From this 
viewpoint neurodivergent intersubjectivity may be deemed inefficient since reciprocated 
coordination can require multiple turns, and missed turns, to come to fruition. Despite this, I 
believe there is an argument that it is not as inefficient as may first appear from a purely 
external view of the interaction, because the communicative effort required to make 
neurodivergent intersubjectivity functional is offset by the freedom with which autistic 
interlocutors can continue or discontinue with a particular conversational topic. To use an 
analogy of running a race, neurotypical communication may be likened to maintaining a 
constant efficient speed by plotting a path over the flattest terrain. Neurodivergent 
communication on the other hand explores a hilly terrain with recovery aided by the freedom 
to stop or start progress at one’s own pace, instead of maintaining the pace of the group. To 
explore aspects of effort required, further research would benefit from reconstructive 
interviews with participants who could perhaps review and rate their own video recordings of 
interactions. This could facilitate a subjective analysis of how the principles of specificity and 
conservation operate within a neurodivergent interaction.  
Further research could also potentially explore the link between neurodivergent 
intersubjectivity and productivity to understand how alternative and unconventional ways of 
achieving coordination affect collaboration performance. This research could be relevant to 
understanding how to optimise employment for autistic people. In terms of the specific 
activity of video-gaming, participants were able to effectively coordinate and complete in-
game tasks, in some cases to a very advanced level of game progression (e.g. Call of Duty 
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where players were able to progress to Level 10 on a survival mode). How this may translate 
into a different domain of social interaction which is not contingent of prior experience 
remains to be explored. A potential insight in literature about the relationship between 
intersubjectivity and productivity might be gained by a recent study by Hawlina, Gillespie 
and Zittoun (2017). They explored the “diversity hypothesis”, which suggests that “disparate 
perspectives are beneficial to organizational creativity and innovation” (Hawlina et al., 2017, 
p. 1). Interestingly, although perspective-taking was strongly associated with greater 
creativity, they found that interactional perspective-taking behaviours, such as questioning, 
signalling understanding or repairing, were associated with lesser creativity. This is because 
some dyads could become side-tracked from the task in question as they attempt to elaborate 
and justify their ideas more to one another, whereas other dyads which were less focussed on 
tight coordination were able to stay closer to the task objective of generating more ideas. 
However, critical to the success of moving on was the recognition that other’s ideas were 
valuable. Thus, in one respect (e.g. loose coordination) we may find that neurodivergent 
intersubjectivity is suited towards creative tasks, but in another respect (e.g. signalling 
recognition of others’ values) we may find that it requires a degree of social strategy in order 
to be successfully deployed. Understanding how to maximise opportunities for 
intersubjectivity between autistic and non-autistic people requires further evidence about the 
optimal trade-off between different communication styles and the factors which enable them 
to flourish.  
Study 2 also raises a question about the incompatibility of neurodivergent intersubjectivity 
with more standardised forms of efficient communication, and whether this leads to a 
potential neurotypical bias in the established interpretation of autistic sociality. For instance, 
the same features that support neurodivergent intersubjectivity observed in Study 2 have been 
traditionally understood as undesirable features of autistic-to-neurotypical interaction. A 
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generous assumption of common ground may feed into perceptions of egocentrism because 
from the neurotypical viewpoint it looks as though the autistic individual is prioritising their 
interests over the interests of others. However, interactions between autistic people are not 
necessarily egocentric if both parties are sharing their own thoughts and interests and 
reciprocate each other’s turns when a significant shared common ground is identified. 
Likewise, having a low demand for social coordination could contribute to perceptions of 
lacking empathy, because autistic people may suddenly change topic without warning which 
looks as if it is discarding the value of another speaker’s thoughts. Yet, if both parties do not 
seek tight coordination the risk to losing face is minimised, as shown by the presence of 
disruptive turns followed quickly by pockets of tight coordination. This has important 
implications for understanding the nature of the double empathy problem, specifically the 
question of what is lost when there is incompatibility between norms and expectations of 
different actors with different neurological dispositions. Study 2 highlights that when 
broadening norms around expected communication styles, more forms of coordination and 
shared understanding are possible for neurodivergent people. Thus, autistic people certainly 
have unrealised social potential, and recognising such potential represented a way to 
ameliorating the double empathy problem, not only to improve cross-neurological relations, 
but also to potentially maximise the sociality of autistic people beyond what has previously 
been observed.   
RQ3: How does diagnostic disclosure affect social perception and behaviour towards 
autistic people? 
Study 3 examined how diagnostic disclosure of autism affected the social perception and 
behaviour towards an assumed human collaborator, through an online video-game, Dyad3D. 
It aimed to make sense of the conflicting evidence regarding positive and negative 
discrimination that studies of vignettes and reports from autistic people have highlighted 
respectively. Study 3 used an online computer-mediated game, Dyad3D, to simulate 
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interactions and control the independent variable of diagnostic disclosure. In doing so it was 
able to (a) demonstrate that Dyad3D is a viable method for successfully deceiving 
participants and efficiently gathering behavioural data for comparison with self-report data; 
(b) identify positive self-report discrimination in the form of higher ratings of intelligence 
and usefulness for information shared when a diagnosis of autism was disclosed, but also 
potential negative discrimination in that participants perceived themselves to be more helpful 
than they actually were; and (c) illustrate that the way people make sense of a diagnosis can 
vary from using the diagnosis to explain misunderstandings to perceiving it to be redundant 
information.  
These findings have a number of implications. First, they help to provide a window into 
understanding the discrepancy between positive and negative discrimination associated with 
diagnostic disclosure of autism. Existing studies have highlighted that increased levels of 
autism knowledge are associated with more positive social ratings and lower stigma 
(Gillespie-Lynch et al., 2015; Gillespie-Lynch, Kapp, Brooks, Pickens, & Schwartzman, 
2017; Obeid et al., 2015; Sasson & Morrison, 2017). This suggests that there is an 
experiential gap which underscores whether diagnostic disclosure results in positive or 
negative discrimination. Study 3 makes the contribution that non-autistic people may also be 
unintentionally inaccurate about the extent to which they are helpful towards autistic people, 
in addition to lacking prerequisite knowledge about the diagnosis. This could explain why 
non-autistic people rate themselves and others favourably, because they rate in line with their 
own positive sense of identity, yet a lack of corresponding helpful behaviour will only be 
noticed by autistic people in the form of negative discrimination. If non-autistic people are 
unaware of a gap between their own perceptions of helping and their actual behaviour of 
helping, they would be less predisposed to listening to autistic people should they attempt to 
point out any shortfall. Thus, the  “helping bias” could potentially explain why in daily social 
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life autistic people often encounter negative discrimination (Treweek et al., 2018), while non-
autistic people remain unaware and broadly positive in their outlook. Interactionally, such a 
bias could have a cascading effect in terms of reinforcing a double empathy disjuncture rather 
than ameliorating it, since it would feed frustrations on both sides of relationships. Autistic 
people may feel their concerns are not being addressed or listened to, while neurotypical 
people would feel that their efforts towards helping are not being fairly recognised. Such a 
finding aligns with evidence from other interpersonal contexts involving people with and 
without disabilities. For example, in relationships between caregivers and people with 
aphasia, caregivers have been shown to demonstrate a variety of helping behaviours which, 
paradoxically, reinforce the assumption of disability and potentially restrict the agency of 
people with aphasia to direct conversational action (Gillespie & Hald, 2017).  
A second insight provided by Study 3 is that explanations provided by participants about how 
the disclosure of autism affected the collaboration are both varied and not very detailed. For 
many participants the diagnostic disclosure explained why there was a misunderstanding in 
the third level of the game, with the IVA not being aware of the participant remaining trapped 
in a prison. In this respect the diagnostic disclosure worked as part of people’s sense-making 
about the collaboration. However, some participants felt that the information was totally 
redundant, thus depending on the collaborator, diagnostic disclosure could potentially 
frustrate others rather than improving understanding. In Study 3 no extra context was 
provided about the diagnosis in order to see what information people import into the 
experience, with the varied explanations highlighting that autism experience and knowledge 
is partial at best. Providing more contextual information about the diagnosis and its possible 
impact on the collaboration would perhaps help to fill a void in understanding about the 
diagnosis and stabilise its positive effects. Yet, given that some participants were so 
dismissive of the diagnosis, I do not think that further context would totally remove the 
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potential for stigma. Clearly there are dispositional characteristics associated with the 
perceiver that may impact how diagnostic disclosure is rendered meaningful. Certainly it 
would be interesting to see the responses of autistic people to playing the Dyad3D game, 
particularly since research has shown that in-group identification facilitates more favourable 
perceptions (Gernsbacher et al., 2017). Study 3 therefore highlights the need for further 
research about the social construction of autism and how people draw on its aspects when 
making sense of a social situation.  
Since the aim of Study 3 was to test the viability of using a computer-mediated experience to 
simulate social interactions, aspects of the design were deliberately simple and abstract. We 
therefore did not explore the effect of different modalities of stimulus (e.g. auditory, visual) 
on social perception and behaviour, which in other studies have been shown to shape social 
perceptions towards autistic people (Sasson et al., 2017). For example, audio-visual data can 
provide a rich source of information about speech prosody and eye-gaze which influence 
social perceptions of autistic people (Brewer et al., 2016; Faso et al., 2014; Paul, Orlovski, 
Marcinko, & Volkmar, 2009). Study 3 highlights that even at a very abstracted level of 
virtual spheres navigating through a maze, diagnostic disclosure of autism has profound 
social effects. Further studies could explore the effect of different modalities to see how this 
impacts collaboration.  
Another potential variable to explore is whether changing the nature of the collaboration 
would result in different outcomes. The current task involves a misunderstanding which 
negatively impacts scores. This choice was made in order to provide participants with a key 
moment in the interaction to talk about and problematise, in doing so drawing on their 
underlying knowledge and representations of autism. However, the game could equally be 
configured so that everything goes perfectly and the participant believes they score the 
highest out of all the dyads. Would participants mention the diagnosis as often in such 
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circumstances compared to when the outcome is sub-optimal? If participants have a 
predisposition to perceiving their pairing with an autistic person as a hinderance, would 
participants have an elevated sense of positive identity if an optimal outcome is achieved, 
because it is done so despite constraints? These are interesting questions which further 
iterations of Dyad3D could explore. 
Study 3 raises important questions about the many domains in social life where autistic 
people may need to disclose their diagnosis. For example, eye-witness testimony in court 
remains a precarious situation for autistic people who may be poorly supported or even 
misled by untrained legal professionals (George, Remington, Crane, Pophale, & Bingham, 
2018; Maras & Bowler, 2014). Study 3 highlights why diagnostic disclosure is a risk-reward 
decision, and one which would be potentially hard to make for autistic people since it 
requires a fine attunement to the politics of the social situation.  
Towards an extended model of Double Empathy  
In understanding autistic sociality as being a relational, two-way process wherein one’s social 
opportunities are co-determined by actors, this thesis moves away from a traditional view of 
autism being an impairment of the individual and moves towards a more social model of 
disability. The findings of this thesis have helped to provide indicators about the dynamic of 
the double empathy problem between autistic and non-autistic actors, as well as between 
familiar and unfamiliar relations. Figure 9 below illustrates how we might conceptualise the 
combined contribution of the findings presented in this thesis in terms of understanding the 
double empathy problem: 
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FIGURE 9: EXTENDED MODEL OF DOUBLE EMPATHY 
 
Figure 9 delineates two dimensions of the double empathy situation the empirical studies 
have explored. First, there is neurodivergence between actors, represented on the x- axis by 
autistic people (marked with an “A”) on the left side and neurotypical people (marked with 
an “N”) on the right side. A second dimension is whether the relationship is familiar or 
unfamiliar, represented on the y-axis. The chevrons between actors are used to indicate the 
direction and quantity of observed social ability. For example existing research on autism has 
explored in depth how autistic people understand unfamiliar neurotypical others, with studies 
highlighting difficulties in theory of mind, executive functioning, non-verbal behaviour (See 
Chapter 3, p. 46-51).  On the basis of this literature, in Figure 9 only one filled chevron points 
from an autistic person to an unfamiliar neurotypical person, to indicate observed limitations 
in social ability. The contribution of this thesis is to reveal more about the double empathy 
dynamics across different actors and situations, depicted in the rest of Figure 9. For example, 
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Study 1 and 2 take as its starting point the idea that everyday social perspective-taking is an 
interactional achievement drawing heavily on interpersonal expertise, thus to understand 
autistic sociality requires an examination of how familiar relationships operate in addition to 
the well-documented abstracted perspective-taking ability. Study 1 finds that autistic people 
are fairly accurate at imagining the perspectives of familiar others, an increase in observed 
social ability shown in Figure 9 via three filled chevrons (in comparison to the one filled 
chevron in an unfamiliar relationship). Moreover, the non-autistic family members were not 
as accurate as they believed themselves to be, demonstrating a confirmatory bias where they 
underestimated the social perspective-taking of autistic relatives in light of their diagnosis. 
Figure 9 thus depicts a reduction in assumed social ability of neurotypical people in familiar 
relationships with autistic people, with only three chevrons filled instead of what might have 
been considered the ceiling performance of a neurotypical as a maximum of five chevrons.  
Study 2 makes the contribution that in familiar relationships between autistic people, there 
are neurodivergent ways of building shared understanding which are contingent on norms 
associated with a loose communication style. Study 2 thus highlights that autistic people may 
have unrealised social potential, indicated in Figure 9 by the partially filled chevrons. 
Examining the dynamic of familiar relationships therefore indicates the potential for there to 
be more equitability between actors with different neurological dispositions, because autistic 
people are not solely the cause of misunderstandings, with their social potential under-
recognised, while similarly neurotypical people are not immune to their own biases in social 
perception. This thesis therefore suggests that the double empathy dynamic is very different 
in familiar relationships compared to the previously well-documented unfamiliar 
relationships.  
Moreover, Study 3 helps to reveal more about the double empathy effects in terms of how 
neurotypical people perceive unfamiliar autistic others. The study highlights a potential 
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mismatch between social perception and social behaviour, resulting in a bias in perceiving the 
extent to which one is actually helpful. Thus, once again the presence of such a bias could 
limit the social possibilities of neurotypical people towards autistic people, indicated via a 
reduction of filled-in chevrons for neurotypical people perceiving unfamiliar autistic people 
in Figure 9. 
Taken as a whole this extended model of double empathy illustrates a more fluid 
understanding of autistic sociality, with familiar relationships potentially opening up social 
potential for autistic people. Similarly, neurotypical people may struggle with biases in the 
perception of Self and Other in such relationships, which persist even if relationships are 
familiar. Such a model builds upon ideas about an algorithm for autistic sociality presented 
by Ochs and Solomon (2010). Their model focussed more on the mode of communication 
(e.g. corporeal alignment, tempo of speech) as variables affecting the range of social 
coordinations available to autistic people, rather than the dispositional characteristics of 
actors. Yet the key similarity is the observation that sociality fluctuates across different 
domains of social life, and to understand what constitutes an enabling environment for 
autistic people requires sensitivity to such variations. Further research could build on a fluid 
understanding of autistic sociality and examine more social dimensions, for example social 
interaction across different activities (e.g. workplace, domestic life, social life), 
communication across different media (e.g. face-to-face communication, computer-mediated 
communication), and mappings across different actor divergences (e.g. ethnic minorities, 
gender, age).  
A more fluid model of double empathy would be advantageous for reducing the potential for 
unintentionally amplifying social disability. For example, a new autistic employee may 
rapidly find themselves in a workplace scenario where there are many implicit expectations 
about behaviour which are not articulated by the employer (e.g. thus an unfamiliar autistic-to-
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neurotypical relationship with high pressure in an unfamiliar workplace setting). It is easy to 
imagine that the employer may have an idea of productivity based on neurotypical modes of 
operating, and would not instinctively recognise the potential for optimising productivity 
through addressing implicit neurotypical biases, modes of communicating, the sensory 
environment, and investing in shared background understanding, as has been reported in 
personal conversations (Heasman, 2017a). Indeed, a more fluid model of autistic sociality can 
already be observed as underpinning trends in managerial thinking towards autistic 
employees, whereby a number of high-profile companies such as Microsoft and SAP are 
investing autism–specific programmes designed to maximise the opportunities for autistic 
employees by taking a holistic approach (e.g. optimising the physical environment, the 
communication channels, the support networks) (Austin & Pisano, 2017). It remains to be 
seen whether such corporate initiatives will help to draw research of autism towards a more 
dynamic and interactional approach to research on autism.  
While differences between people (e.g. cultural, ethnic, political) give rise to difficulties in 
mutual understanding, through three empirical studies this thesis identifies aspects of the 
double empathy problem that makes it particularly salient and persistent for bridging autistic-
to-neurotypical relationships, namely imagining autistic perspectives, recognising 
unconventional social opportunities, and overcoming biases associated with diagnostic 
disclosure of autism. Recognising the more distributed and fluid nature of autistic sociality as 
an interactional achievement could result in a more nuanced understanding of neurodiversity, 
with society better placed to support the abilities of autistic people. This could lead to a 
macro-level two-way effect: better societal understanding can enable autistic people to 
flourish, which will in turn, enrich society.  
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APPENDIX 
Supplementary files: Chapter 5 
Wechsler Scale of Intelligence (WASI-II).  
The Wechsler Abbreviated Scale of Intelligence, Second Edition (WASI-II) was administered 
to participants with Asperger’s syndrome to ensure there was no underlying learning 
difficulty. The Wechsler scale uses four sub-tests (Vocabulary, Similarities, Block Design, 
and Matrix Reasoning) to provide a brief and reliable measure of cognitive ability.  
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Talking Mats Example 
An example of rating mat 2 (FM rating PwAS). Before each mat the researcher explained the 
perspective being captured (e.g. Self, Other or Meta) and adjusted the questions accordingly 
(e.g. “how would you rate yourself on topic X?”, “how would you rate your partner on topic 
X?”, “how do you think your partner will rate you on topics X?”). 
Materials were laminated to make it easy to slide the topics around. Topics were also colour 
coded into groups of three: Blue = adaptability; Green = communication; purple = 
independence; yellow = future orientation. Colour coding the topics made the task more 
visually interesting for participants, and made it easy for the researcher to spot missing topics.  
Finally, all topics were numbered in order to assist the researcher in documenting the results 
in a systematic way.  
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IPM ratings produced by people with Asperger’s (PwAS) and family members (FM) 
 
Rating Self 
(e.g. “How good 
are you at X?”) 
Rating Other 
(e.g. “How good 
is your partner at 
X?”) 
Rating Meta* 
(e.g. How do you 
think your partner 
will rate you for 
X?” 
 Median (range) Median (range) Median (range) 
  PwAS FM PwAS FM PwAS FM 
    Handling criticism 2 (0-5) 3 (0-5) 3 (1-5) 1 (0-4) 2 (0-4) 2 (0-4) 
    Adapting routines 2 (0-4) 5 (3-5) 4 (1-5) 3 (0-5) 1 (0-3) 4 (1-5) 
    Sympathy 3 (1-5) 4 (3-5) 4 (2-5) 2 (1-4) 3 (0-5) 4 (1-5) 
    Small talk 3 (0-5) 4 (1-5) 4 (1-5) 2 (0-5) 3 (0-5) 4 (2-5) 
    Body language 3 (0-5) 5 (2-5) 4 (2-5) 2 (0-4) 2 (0-4) 4 (1-5) 
    Managing discussions 3 (0-5) 4 (2-5) 4 (1-5) 2 (0-5) 2 (0-4) 4 (1-5) 
    Handling everyday tasks 3 (1-5) 5 (4-5) 5 (3-5) 3 (0-5) 3 (1-5) 5 (4-5) 
    Making own decisions 3 (0-5) 5 (3-5) 4 (2-5) 2 (0-5) 2 (0-5) 4 (3-5) 
     Organisation 3 (0-5) 4 (2-5) 4 (0-5) 2 (0-5) 3 (0-5) 4 (3-5) 
    Visit new places 3 (1-5) 5 (2-5) 4 (3-5) 3 (0-5) 3 (0-5) 5 (3-5) 
    Consequences of actions 3 (0-5) 4 (2-5) 4 (2-5) 2 (0-5) 2 (0-5) 3 (1-5) 
    Five year view 3 (0-5) 4 (1-5) 4 (1-5) 3 (0-5) 2 (0-5) 3 (1-5) 
* Meta = what person A thinks person B thinks of person A 
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Supplementary files: Chapter 6 
  
Transcription Conventions adapted from (Markee, 2015) 
. Period indicates a falling, or final, intonation contour, not necessarily the end of 
a sentence. 
 
?  
 
Question mark indicates rising intonation, not necessarily a question. 
, 
 
Comma indicates “continuing” intonation, not necessarily a clause boundary. 
 
↑↓ Upward and downward pointing arrows indicate marked rising and falling shifts 
in intonation 
::: Colons indicate stretching of the preceding sound, proportional to the number of 
colons 
- 
 
A hyphen after a word or a part of a word indicates a cut-off or self-interruption 
with level pitch 
word Underlining indicates stress or emphasis. 
WOrd Upper case indicates loudness. 
°word° 
 
Degree signs enclose whispered speech 
 
= Equal sign indicate no break or delay between the words thereby connected. 
<word> 
 
Indicates slowed down delivery relative to surrounding talk 
>word< Indicates speeded up delivery relative to surrounding talk 
(()) Double parentheses enclose descriptions of conduct. 
 
(word) When all or part of an utterance is in parentheses, this indicates uncertainty on 
the transcriber’s part. 
() 
 
Empty parentheses indicate that something is being said, but no hearing can be 
achieved. 
 
(1.2) 
 
Numbers in parentheses indicate silence in tenths of a second. 
 
(.) 
 
A dot in parentheses indicated a “micropause,” hearable but not readily 
measurable. 
 
[ 
 
Separate left square brackets, one above the other on two successive lines with 
utterances by different speakers, indicates a point of overlap onset. 
 
] 
 
Separate right square brackets, one above the other on two successive lines with 
utterances by different speakers, indicates a point of overlap ending. 
 
… Ellipsis 
(-) Indicates unintelligible speech, each dash pertains to a syllable. 
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Table 3 
Mean and standard deviations of intersubjective dimensions 
Interaction Coherence 
Mean (S.D.) 
Affect 
Mean (S.D.) 
Symmetry 
Mean (S.D.) 
1 0.23 (0.91) 0.25 (0.64) 0.33 (0.67) 
2 0.18 (0.90) 0.41 (0.60) 0.48 (0.55) 
3 0.49 (0.79) 0.16 (0.54) 0.35 (0.63) 
4 0.36 (0.85) -0.14 (0.65) 0.11 (0.75) 
5 0.31 (0.88) 0.09 (0.61) 0.25 (0.65) 
6 0.34 (0.87) 0.08 (0.47) 0.44 (0.65) 
7 0.31 (0.93) 0.24 (0.51) 0.35 (0.66) 
8 0.19 (0.83) 0.04 (0.58) 0.13 (0.67) 
9 0.22 (0.93) 0.15 (0.60) 0.26 (0.68) 
10 0.13 0.90) 0.09 (0.67) 0.48 (0.60) 
11 0.48 (0.82) 0.36 (0.56) 0.53 (0.57) 
12 0.44 (0.82) 0.25 (0.49) 0.46 (0.63) 
13 0.44 (0.68) 0.33 (0.47) 0.35 (0.60) 
14 0.33 (0.85) 0.41 (0.60) 0.36 (0.59) 
15 0.34 (0.51) 0.50 (0.43) 0.18 (0.57) 
16 0.39 (0.60) 0.38 (0.46) 0.39 (0.55) 
17 0.45 (0.81) 0.16 (0.45) 0.39 (0.62) 
18 0.41 (0.87) 0.37 (0.51) 0.42 (0.58) 
19 0.41 (0.79) 0.23 (0.50) 0.21 (0.70) 
20 0.24 (0.86) 0.36 (0.60) 0.25 (0.66) 
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Table 4 
20-turn average highs and lows 
Interaction Coherence Affect Symmetry 
 Min Max Min Max Min Max 
1 -0.30 0.70 -0.30 0.65 -0.30 0.70 
2 -0.45 0.72 -0.46 0.70 0.05 1.00 
3 -0.20 1.00 -0.28 0.55 0.05 0.85 
4 -0.38 0.94 -0.39 0.45 -0.45 0.56 
5 -0.40 0.75 -0.39 0.60 -0.16 0.70 
6 -0.16 0.90 -0.23 0.40 0.00 0.80 
7 -0.17 1.00 -0.05 0.59 0.10 0.91 
8 -0.18 0.64 -0.58 0.47 -0.13 0.47 
9 -0.50 0.80 -0.26 0.80 -0.20 0.80 
10 -0.55 1.00 -0.78 0.63 0.00 0.79 
11 -0.21 1.00 0.00 0.76 0.00 0.81 
12 -0.15 1.00 0.00 0.60 0.05 0.88 
13 -0.11 1.00 0.00 0.68 -0.26 0.78 
14 -0.27 0.87 -0.21 0.78 0.00 0.63 
15 -0.10 0.75 -0.05 0.74 -0.20 0.55 
16 -0.39 0.75 0.05 0.60 -0.35 0.80 
17 -0.15 1.00 -0.13 0.60 0.05 0.80 
18 -0.20 0.85 0.00 0.75 -0.08 0.65 
19 -0.10 0.80 -0.05 0.50 -0.75 0.80 
20 -0.54 0.94 -0.25 0.77 -0.41 0.82 
Note. Across all interactions, all dimensions had 20 turns with a max score greater than +0.4 and a 
min score lower than +0.1.  
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Figure 3 
Mean scores for coordination dimensions (with standard deviation bars around the mean) 
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Table 5    
Frequency of different voices (i.e. when the players assume a voice markedly different 
from their own) in the data sampled.   
 
Voice type Frequency Reciprocated* % Reciprocated 
Player's avatar 115 81 70% 
Fictional voices (TV/film/comics 50 26 52% 
Accents/dialects 33 13 39% 
Game AI 24 15 63% 
unknown voice 24 13 54% 
Narrator 19 12 63% 
Miscellaneous** 19 14 73% 
Social voices (other players/family) 12 10 83% 
Music lyric 12 4 33% 
Total 308 188  
*Reciprocated = instances where voices, in the next turn, are responded to in terms of 
coherence, affect or symmetry. 
**Miscellaneous = Instances of voices that were very infrequent and did not belong to 
any other categories. These included idioms, anthropomorphising the voice of the Xbox 
console itself, sound effects and musical jingles.  
 
Figure 4 
Distribution of voicing across interactions* 
 
*This figure shows the distribution of voicing frequency (i.e. when the players assume a voice 
markedly different from their own) across all interactions. 
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Supplementary files: Chapter 7 
To access a version of Study 3: 
https://lse.eu.qualtrics.com/jfe/form/SV_9NUdJ5PfUbSoEOV 
 
To access the source code of Study 3: https://bitbucket.org/enghoff/dyad3d 
 
To access the server code and instructions for Study 3: https://bitbucket.org/enghoff/dyad3d-
server 
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Interactive target 
The image below has been included for the purposes of creating an interactive target for 
augmented reality technology that I have been developing. It functions like a QR code, in that 
it can be easily tracked by digital cameras with audio-visual content super-imposed onto the 
target. I have used a version of this target in a conference poster where a digital interactive 
virtual version of myself presents the key themes of research I have undertaken. The 
advantage of including such a target in the present document is that I can continue to update 
the associated software in light of intellectual developments related to the thesis. The 
interactive target is thus a means by which to make the thesis accessible and to keep its 
discussion up to date. I would like to especially thank Alexandra Sexton for her creativity in 
designing the target. 
FIGURE 10: INTERACTIVE TARGET FOR AUGMENTED REALITY SOFTWARE 
 
 
